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ECCLESIASTICAL
INSTITUTIONS:

BEING PART VI

OF THE

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY.

first portion of vol. 3

BY

HERBERT SPENCER.

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PREFACE TO PART VI.

THREE years and a half have elapsed since the issue of *Political Institutions*—the preceding division of the *Principles of Sociology*. Occupation with other subjects has been one cause of this long delay ; but the delay has been in a much greater degree caused by ill health, which has, during much of the interval, negatived even that small amount of daily work which I was previously able to get through.

Two other parts remain to be included in Vol. II—*Professional Institutions* and *Industrial Institutions*. Whether these will be similarly delayed, I cannot of course say. I entertain hopes that they may be more promptly completed ; but it is possible, or even probable, that a longer rather than a shorter period will pass before they appear—if they ever appear at all.

Bayswater, October, 1885.

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PART VI.

ECCLESIASTICAL INSTITUTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

THE RELIGIOUS IDEA.

§ 583. THERE can be no true conception of a structure without a true conception of its function. To understand how an organization originated and developed, it is requisite to understand the need subserved at the outset and afterwards. Rightly to trace the evolution of Ecclesiastical Institutions, therefore, we must know whence came the ideas and sentiments implied by them. Are these innate or are they derived?

Not only by theologians at large but also by some who have treated religion rationalistically, it is held that there is an innate consciousness of deity. Prof. Max Müller's speculations are pervaded by this assumption; and in such books as that by Mr. R. W. Mackay on *The Progress of the Intellect*, it is contended that man is by nature a monotheist. But this doctrine, once almost universally accepted, has been rudely shaken by the facts which psychologists and anthropologists have brought to light.

There is clear proof that minds which have from infancy been cut off by bodily defects from intercourse with the minds of adults, are devoid of religious ideas. The deaf Dr. Kitto, in his book called *The Lost Senses* (p. 200), quotes the testimony of an American lady who was deaf and dumb, but at a mature age was instructed, and who said "the idea that the world must have had a Creator never occurred to her, nor to any other of several intelligent pupils, of similar

age." Similarly, the Rev. Samuel Smith, after "twenty-eight years' almost daily contact" with such, says of a deaf-mute, "he has no idea of his immortal nature, and it has not been found in a single instance, that an uneducated deaf-mute has had any conception of the existence of a Supreme Being as the Creator and Ruler of the universe."

The implication is that the religious ideas of civilized men are not innate; and this implication is supported by proofs that among various savages they do not exist. Sir John Lubbock has given many of these in his *Prehistoric Times* and his *Origin of Civilization*; and others may be added. Thus of a Wedda, who, when in jail received some little instruction, Mr. Hartshorne writes—"he had no idea of a soul, of a Supreme Being, or of a future state." Concerning an African race Heuglin says—"the Dōr do not seem to have religious conceptions properly so called, but they believe in spirits." We learn from Schweinfurth that "the Bongo have not the remotest conception of immortality. . . . All religion, in our sense of the word religion, is quite unknown to the Bongo." Still more definite evidence is afforded by a people of considerable intelligence, the Zulus, as shown by Mr. Gardiner's questioning of one.

"'Have you any knowledge of the power by whom the world was made? When you see the sun rising and setting, and the trees growing, do you know who made them and who governs them?'"

"Tpāi (after a little pause, apparently deep in thought)—'No: we see them, but cannot tell how they come; we suppose that they come of themselves.'"

And the like state of mind is well shown by Sir Samuel Baker's conversation with a chief of the Latooki—a Nile tribe.

"'Have you no belief in a future existence after death?' . . .

Commoro (log.).—"Existence after death! How can that be? Can a dead man get out of his grave unless we dig him out?"

'Do you think man is like a beast, that dies and is ended?'

Commoro.—"Certainly; an ox is stronger than a man; but he dies, and his bones last longer; they are bigger. A man's bones break quickly—he is weak."

‘Is not a man superior in sense to an ox? Has he not a mind to direct his actions?’

Commoro.—‘Some men are not so clever as an ox. Men must sow corn to obtain food, but the ox and wild animals can procure it without sowing.’

‘Do you not know that there is a spirit within you more than flesh? Do you not dream and wander in thought to distant places in your sleep? Nevertheless, your body rests in one spot. How do you account for this?’

Commoro, laughing.—‘Well, how do *you* account for it? It is a thing I cannot understand; it occurs to me every night.’

* * *

‘Have you no idea of the existence of spirits superior to either man or beast? Have you no fear of evil except from bodily causes?’

Commoro.—‘I am afraid of elephants and other animals when in the jungle at night, but of nothing else.’

‘Then you believe in nothing; neither in a good nor evil spirit! And you believe that when you die it will be the end of body and spirit; that you are like other animals; and that there is no distinction between man and beast; both disappear, and end at death?’

Commoro.—‘Of course they do.’”

And then in response to Baker’s repetition of St. Paul’s argument derived from the decaying seed, which our funeral service emphasizes, *Commoro* said:—

“‘Exactly so; that I understand. But the *original* grain does *not* rise again; it rots like the dead man, and is ended; the fruit produced is not the same grain that we buried, but the *production* of that grain: so it is with man,—I die, and decay, and am ended; but my children grow up like the fruit of the grain. Some men have no children, and some grains perish without fruit; then all are ended.’”

Clearly, then, religious ideas have not that supernatural origin commonly alleged; and we are taught, by implication, that they have a natural origin. How do they originate?

§ 584. In the first volume of this work, nearly a score chapters are devoted to an account of primitive ideas at large; and especially ideas concerning the natures and actions of supernatural agents. Instead of referring the reader back

to those chapters, I think it better to state afresh, in brief, the doctrine they contain. I do this partly because that doctrine, at variance both with current beliefs and the beliefs of the mythologists, needs re-emphasizing; partly because citing a further series of illustrations will strengthen the argument; and partly because a greater effect may be wrought by bringing the several groups of facts and inferences into closer connexion.

As typifying that genesis of religious conceptions to be delineated in this chapter, a statement made by Mr. Brough Smyth in his elaborate work *The Aborigines of Victoria* may first be given. When an Australian, of mark as a hunter or counsellor, is buried, the medicine-man, seated or lying beside the grave, praising the deceased and listening for his replies, said—"The dead man had promised that if his murder should be sufficiently avenged his spirit would not haunt the tribe, nor cause them fear, nor mislead them into wrong tracks, nor bring sickness amongst them, nor make loud noises in the night." Here we may recognize the essential elements of a cult. There is belief in a being of the kind we call supernatural—a spirit. There are praises of this being, which he is supposed to hear. On condition that his injunctions are fulfilled, he is said to promise that he will not make mischievous use of his superhuman powers—will not hurt the living by pestilence, nor deceive them, nor frighten them.

Is it not manifest that from germs of this kind elaborate religions may be evolved? When, as among the ancestor-worshipping Malagasy, we find, as given by M. Réville, the prayer,—"*Nyang, méchant et puissant esprit, ne fais pas gronder le tonnerre sur nos têtes. Dis à la mer de rester dans ses bords. Épargne, Nyang, les fruits qui mûrissent. Ne sèche pas le riz dans sa fleur ;*" it is a conclusion scarcely to be resisted that Nyang is but the more developed form of a spirit such as that propitiated and petitioned by the Australian. On reading the Japanese sayings, "that the

spirits of the dead continue to exist in the unseen world, which is everywhere about us, and that they all become gods, of varying character and degrees of influence," and also that "the gods who do harm are to be appeased, so that they may not punish those who have offended them, and all the gods are to be worshipped, so that they may be induced to increase their favours;" we are strengthened in the suspicion that these maleficent gods and beneficent gods have all been derived from "the spirits of the dead . . . of varying character and influence." From the circumstance that in India as Sir Alfred Lyall tells us, "it would seem that the honours which are at first paid to all departed spirits come gradually to be concentrated, as divine honours, upon the Manes of notables," we derive further support for this view. And when by facts of these kinds we are reminded that among the Greeks down to the time of Plato, parallel beliefs were current, as is shown in the *Republic*, where Socrates groups as the "chiefest of all" requirements "the service of gods, demigods, and heroes. . . . and the rites which have to be observed in order to propitiate the inhabitants of the world below," proving that there still survived "that fear of the wrath of the departed which strongly possessed the early Greek mind;" we get from this kinship of beliefs among races remote in time, space, and culture, strong warrant for the inference that ghost-propitiation is the origin of all religions.

This inference receives support wherever we look. As, until lately, no traces of pre-historic man were supposed to exist, though now that attention has been drawn to them, the implements he used are found everywhere; so, once being entertained, the hypothesis that religions in general are derived from ancestor-worship, finds proofs among all races and in every country. Each new book of travels yields fresh evidence; and from the histories of ancient peoples come more numerous illustrations the more closely they are examined.

Here I will re-exemplify the chief factors and stages in this genesis of religious beliefs; citing, in large measure, books that have been published since the first volume of this work.

§ 585. The African savage Commoro, quoted above, and shown by his last reply to be more acute than his questioner, had no theory of dreams. To the inquiry how he accounted for the consciousness of wandering while asleep, he said—"It is a thing I cannot understand." And here it may be remarked in passing, that where there existed no conception of a double which goes away during sleep, there existed no belief in a double which survives after death. But with savages who are more ready to accept interpretations than Commoro, the supposition that the adventures had in dreams are real, prevails. The Zulus may be instanced. To Bishop Callaway one of them said:—

"When a dead man comes [in a dream] he does not come in the form of a snake, nor as a mere shade; but he comes in very person, just as if he was not dead, and talks with the man of his tribe; and he does not think it is the dead man until he sees on awaking, and says, 'Truly I thought that So-and-so was still living; and forsooth it is his shade which has come to me.'"

Similarly with the Andamanese (who hold that a man's reflected image is one of his souls), the belief is that "in dreams it is the soul which, having taken its departure through the nostrils, sees or is engaged in the manner represented to the sleeper."

Abnormal forms of insensibility are regarded as due to more prolonged absences of the wandering double; and this is so whether the insensibility results naturally or artificially. That originally, the accepted interpretations of these unusual states of apparent unconsciousness were of this kind, we see in the belief expressed by Montaigne, that the "souls of men when at liberty, and loosed from the body, either by sleep, *or some extasie*, divine, foretel, and see things which whilst joyn'd to the body they could not see." Then at the present

time among the Waraus (Guiana Indians) to gain magical power a man takes infusion of tobacco, "and, in the death-like state of sickness to which it reduces him, his spirit is supposed to leave the body, and to visit and receive power from the yauhahu . . . the dreaded beings under whose influence he is believed to remain ever after."

From the ordinary absence of the other-self in sleep and its extraordinary absences in swoon, apoplexy, etc., the transition is to its unlimited absence at death; when, after an interval of waiting, the expectation of immediate return is given up. Still, the belief is that, deaf to entreaties though the other-self has become, it either does from time to time return, or will eventually return. Commonly, the spirit is supposed to linger near the body or revisit it; as by the Iroquois, or by the Chinooks, who "speak of the dead walking at night, when they are supposed to awake, and get up to search for food." Long surviving among superior races, in the alleged nightly wanderings of de-materialized ghosts, this belief survives in its original crude form in the vampyre stories current in some places.

One sequence of the primitive belief in the materiality of the double, is the ministering to such desires as were manifest during life. Hence the shell with "some of her own milk beside the grave" of an infant, which an Andamanese mother leaves; hence the "food and oblations to the dead" by the Chippewas, etc.; hence the leaving with the corpse all needful implements, as by the Chinooks; hence the "fire kept burning there [the grave] for many weeks," as among the Waraus; hence the immolation of wives and slaves with the chief, as still, according to Cameron, at Urua in Central Africa. Hence, in short, the universality among the uncivilized and semi-civilized of these funeral rites implying belief that the ghost has the same sensations and emotions as the living man. Originally this belief is entertained literally; as by the Zulus, who in a case named said, "the Ancestral spirits came and eat up all the meat, and

when the people returned from bathing, they found all the meat eaten up." But by some peoples the ghost, conceived as less material, is supposed to profit by the spirit of the thing offered: instance the Nicaraguans, by whom food "was tied to the body before cremation;" and instance the Ahts, who "burn blankets when burying their friends," that they may not be "sent shivering to the world below."

Ministrations to the double of the deceased, habitually made at the funeral, are in many places continued—here on special occasions and here at regular intervals. For if the ghost is not duly attended to, there may come mischief. Men of various types visit their dead from time to time to carry food, drink, etc.; as the Gonds, by whom, at the graves of honoured persons, "offerings continue to be presented annually for many years." Others, as the Ukiahs and Sanéls of California, "sprinkle food about the favorite haunts of the dead." Elsewhere, ghosts are supposed to come to places where food is being prepared for them; as instance Zululand. Bishop Callaway quotes a Zulu as saying—"These dead men are fools! Why have they revealed themselves by killing the child in this way, without telling me? Go and fetch the goat, boys."

The habitats of these doubles of the dead, who are like the living in their appetites and passions, are variously conceived. Some peoples, as the Shillook of the White Nile, "imagine of the dead that they are lingering amongst the living and still attend them." Other peoples, as for instance the Santals, think that the ghosts of their ancestors inhabit the adjacent woods. Among the Sonoras and the Mohaves of North America, the cliffs and hills are their imagined places of abode. "The Land of the Blest" says Schoolcraft, "is not in the sky. We are presented rather . . . with a new earth, or terrene abode." Where, as very generally, the ghost is believed to return to the region whence the tribe came, obstacles have to be overcome. Some, as the Chibchas, tell of difficult rivers to be crossed

to reach it; and others of seas: the Naowe (of Australia) think that their ghosts depart and people the islands in Spencer's Gulf.

With these materialistic conceptions of the other-self and its place of abode, there go similarly materialistic conceptions of its doings after death. Schoolcraft, describing the hereafter of Indian belief, says the ordinary avocations of life are carried on with less of vicissitude and hardship. The notion of the Chibchas was that "in the future state, each nation had its own particular location, so that they could cultivate the ground." And everywhere we find an approach to parallelism between the life here and the imagined life hereafter.

Moreover, the social relations in the other world, are supposed, even among comparatively-advanced peoples, to repeat those of this world. "Some of them [Taouist temples] are called Kung, *palace*; and the endeavour is made in these to represent the gods of the religion in their celestial abodes, seated on their thrones in their palaces, either administering justice or giving instruction:" recalling the Greek idea of Hades. That like ideas prevailed among the early English, is curiously shown by a passage Kemble quotes from King Alfred, concerning the permission to compound for crimes by the bot in money, "except in cases of treason against a lord, to which they dared not assign any mercy; because Almighty God adjudged none to them that despised him, nor did Christ . . . adjudge any to him that sold him unto death: and he commanded that a lord should be loved like himself."

Grave-heaps on which food is repeatedly placed, as by the Woolwas of Central America, or heaps of stones such as the "obo" described by Prejevalski, which "a Mongol never passes without adding a stone, rag, or tuft of camels' hair, as an offering," and which, as in Afghanistan, manifestly arise as coverings over dead men, are by such observances made into altars. In some cases they acquire this character quite definitely. On the grave of a prince in Vera Paz, there was "a stone altar erected above all, upon which incense was

burned and sacrifices were made in memory of the deceased." Various peoples make shelters for such incipient altars or developed altars. By the Mosquitos "a rude hut is constructed over the grave, serving as a receptacle for the choice food, drink," etc. In Africa the Wakhutu "usually erect small pent-houses over them [the graves], where they place offerings of food." Major Serpa Pinto's work contains a cut representing a native chief's mausoleum, in which we see the grave covered by a building on six wooden columns—a building needing but additional columns to make it like a small Greek temple. Similarly in Borneo. The drawing of "Rajah Dinda's family sepulchre," given by Boek, shows development of the grave-shed into a temple of the oriental type. A like connexion existed among the Greeks.

"The 'heroön' was a kind of chapel raised to the memory of a hero. . . . It was at first a funeral monument (*σῆμα*) surrounded by a sacred enclosure (*τέμενος*); but the importance of the worship there rendered to the heroes soon converted it into a real 'hieron' [temple]."

And in our own time Mohammedans, notwithstanding their professed monotheism, show us a like transformation with great clearness. A saint's mausoleum in Egypt, is a "sacred edifice." People passing by, stop and become "pious worshippers" of "our lord Abdallah." "In the corner of the sanctuary stands a wax candle as long and thick as an elephant's tusk;" and there is a surrounding court with "niches for prayer, and the graves of the favoured dead."

The last quotation implies something more. Along with development of grave-heaps into altars and grave-sheds into religious edifices, and food for the ghost into sacrifices, there goes on the development of praise and prayer. Instance, in addition to the above, the old account Dapper gives, translated by Ogilby, which describes how the negroes near the Gambia erected small huts over graves, "whither their surviving Friends and Acquaintance at set-times repair, to ask pardon for any offences or injuries done them while alive."

The growth of ancestor-worship, thus far illustrated under its separate aspects, may be clearly exhibited under its combined aspects by quotations from a recent book, *Africana*, by the Rev. Duff MacDonald, one of the missionaries of the Blantyre settlement. Detached sentences from his account, placed for clearness in a changed order, run as follows:—

“The man may be buried in his own dwelling.” . . . “His old house thus becomes a kind of temple.” . . . “The deceased is now in the spirit world, and receives offerings and adoration.” . . . “Now he is a god with power to watch over them, and help them, and control their destiny.” . . . “The spirit of a deceased man is called his Mulangu.” . . . The probably correct derivation of this word is “stated by Bleek [the philologist], which makes it originally mean ‘great ancestor.’” . . . “Their god appears to them in dreams. They may see him as they knew him in days gone by.” . . . “The gods of the natives are nearly as numerous as their dead.” . . . “Each worshipper turns most naturally to the spirits of his own departed relatives.” . . . A chief “will present his offering to his own immediate predecessor, and say, ‘Oh, father, I do not know all your relatives, you know them all, invite them to feast with you.’” . . . “The spirit of an old chief may have a whole mountain for his residence, but he dwells chiefly on the cloudy summit.” . . . “A great chief that has been successful in his wars does not pass out of memory so soon. He may become the god of a mountain or a lake, and may receive homage as a local deity long after his own descendants have been driven from the spot. When there is a supplication for rain the inhabitants of the country pray not so much to their own forefathers as to the god of yonder mountain on whose shoulders the great rain clouds repose.” . . . “Beyond and above the spirits of their fathers, and chiefs localised on hills, the Wayao speak of others that they consider superior. Only their home is more associated with the country which the Yao left; so that they too at one time may have been looked upon really as local deities.” (Vol. I, pp. 59–110).

Let us pass now to certain more indirect results of the ghost-theory. Distinguishing but confusedly between semblance and reality, the savage thinks that the representation of a thing partakes of the properties of the thing. Hence he believes that the effigy of a dead man (originally placed on the grave) becomes a habitation for his ghost. This belief spreads to effigies otherwise placed. Concerning “a rude figure of a naked man and woman” which some Land

Dyaks place on the path to their farms, St. John says "These figures are said to be inhabited each by a spirit."

Because of the indwelling doubles of the dead, such images are in many cases propitiated. Speaking of the idols made by the people west of Lake Nyassa, Livingstone says "they present pombe, flour, bhang, tobacco, and light a fire for them to smoke by. They represent the departed father or mother, and it is supposed that they are pleased with the offerings made to their representatives . . . names of dead chiefs are sometimes given to them." Bastian tells us that a negress in Sierra Leone had in her room four idols whose mouths she daily daubed with maize and palm-oil: one for herself, one for her dead husband, and one for each of her children. Often the representation is extremely rude: The Damaras have "an image, consisting of two pieces of wood, supposed to represent the household deity, or rather the deified parent," which is brought out on certain occasions. And of the Bhils we read—"Their usual ceremonies consist in merely smearing the idol, which is seldom anything but a shapeless stone, with vermilion and red lead, or oil; offering, with protestations and a petition, an animal and some liquor."

Here we see the transition to that form of fetichism in which an object having but a rude likeness to a human being, or no likeness at all, is nevertheless supposed to be inhabited by a ghost. I may add that the connexion between development of the ghost-theory and development of fetichism, is instructively shown by the absence of both from an African people described by Thomson:—

"The Wahebe appear to be as free from superstitious notions as any tribe I have seen . . . there was an entire absence of the usual signs of that fetichism, which is so prevalent elsewhere. They seem, however, to have no respect for their dead; the bodies being generally thrown into the jungle to be eaten by the hyenas."

And just the same connexion of facts is shown in the account of the Masai more recently given by him.

In several ways there arises identification of ancestors

with animals, and consequent reverence for the animals: now resulting in superstitious regard, and now in worship. Creatures which frequent burial places or places supposed to be haunted by spirits, as well as creatures which fly by night, are liable to be taken for forms assumed by deceased men. Thus the Bongo dread—

“Ghosts, whose abode is said to be in the shadowy darkness of the woods. Spirits, devils, and witches have their general appellation of ‘bitaboh ;’ wood-goblins being specially called ‘ronga.’ Comprehended under the same term are all the bats . . . as likewise are owls of every kind.”

Similarly, the belief that ghosts often return to their old homes, leads to the belief that house-frequenting snakes are embodiments of them. The negroes round Blantyre think that “if a dead man wants to frighten his wife he may persist in coming as a serpent;” and “when a man kills a serpent thus belonging to a spirit, he goes and makes an apology to the offended god, saying, ‘Please, please, I did not know that it was your serpent.’” Moreover, “serpents were regarded as familiar and domestic divinities by a multitude of Indo-European peoples;” and “in some districts of Poland [in 1762] the peasants are very careful to give milk and eggs to a species of black serpent which glides about in their . . . houses, and they would be in despair if the least harm befel these reptiles.”

Beliefs of the same class, suggested in other ways, occur in North America. The Apaches “consider the rattlesnake as the form to be assumed by the wicked after death.” By the people of Nayarit it was thought that “during the day they [ghosts] were allowed to consort with the living, in the form of flies, to seek food:” recalling a cult of the Philistines and also a Babylonian belief expressed in the first Izdubar legend, in which it is said that “the gods of Uruk Suburi (the blessed) turned to flies.”

Identification of the doubles of the dead with animals—now with those which frequent houses or places which the doubles are supposed to haunt, and now with those which are like certain of the dead in their malicious or beneficent natures

—is in other cases traceable to misinterpretation of names. We read of the Ainos of Japan that “their highest eulogy on a man is to compare him to a bear. Thus Shinondi said of Benri the chief ‘He is as strong as a bear,’ and the old Fate praising Pipichari called him ‘The young bear.’” Here the transition from comparison to metaphor illustrates the origin of animal names. And then on finding that the Ainos worship the bear, though they kill it, and that after killing it at the bear-festival they shout in chorus—“We kill you, O bear! come back soon into an Aino,” we see how identification of the bear with an ancestral Aino, and consequent propitiation of the bear, may arise. Hence when we read “that the ancestor of the Mongol royal house was a wolf,” and that the family name was Wolf; and when we remember the multitudinous cases of animal-names borne by North American Indians, with the associated totem-system; this cause of identification of ancestors with animals, and consequent sacredness of the animals, becomes sufficiently obvious. Even without going beyond our own country we find significant evidence. In early days there was a tradition that Earl Siward of Northumbria had a grandfather who was a bear in a Norwegian forest; and “the bear who was the ancestor of Siward and Ulf had also, it would seem, known ursine descendants.” Now Siward was distinguished by “his gigantic stature, his vast strength and personal prowess;” and hence we may reasonably conclude that, as in the case of the Ainos above given, the supposed ursine descent had arisen from misinterpretation of a metaphor applied to a similarly powerful progenitor. In yet other cases, sacredness of certain animals results from the idea that deceased men have migrated into them. Some Dyaks refuse to eat venison in consequence of a belief that their ancestors “take the form of deer after death;” and among the Esquimaux “the Angekok announces to the mourners into what animal the soul of the departed has passed.” Thus there are several ways in which respect for, and sometimes worship of, an

animal arises: all of them, however, implying identification of it with a human being.

A pupil of the Edinburgh institution for deaf-mutes said, "before I came to school, I thought that the stars were placed in the firmament like grates of fire." Recalling, as this does, the belief of some North Americans, that the brighter stars in the Milky Way are camp-fires made by the dead on their way to the other world, we are shown how naturally the identification of stars with persons may occur. When a sportsman, hearing a shot in the adjacent wood, exclaims—"That's Jones," he is not supposed to mean that Jones is the sound; he is known to mean that Jones made the sound. But when a savage, pointing to a particular star originally thought of as the camp-fire of such or such a departed man, says—"There he is," the children he is instructing naturally suppose him to mean that the star itself is the departed man: especially when receiving the statement through an undeveloped language. Hence such facts as that the Californians think ghosts travel to "where earth and sky meet, to become stars, chiefs assuming the most brilliant forms." Hence such facts as that the Mangaians say of certain two stars that they are children whose mother "was a scold and gave them no peace," and that going to "an elevated point of rock," they "leaped up into the sky;" where they were followed by their parents, who have not yet caught them. In ways like these there arises personalization of stars and constellations; and remembering, as just shown, how general is the identification of human beings with animals in primitive societies, we may perceive how there also originate animal-constellations; such as Callisto, who, metamorphosed into a she-bear, became the bear in heaven.

That metaphorical naming may cause personalization of the heavens at large, we have good evidence. A Hawaiian king bore the name Kalani-nui-Liho Liho, meaning "the heavens great and dark;" whence it is clear that (reversing the order alleged by the mytho-

logists) Zeus may naturally have been at first a living person, and that his identification with the sky resulted from his metaphorical name.

There are proofs that like confusion of metaphor with fact leads to Sun-worship. Complimentary naming after the Sun occurs everywhere; and, where it is associated with power, becomes inherited. The chiefs of the Hurons bore the name of the Sun; and Humboldt remarks that "the 'sun-kings' among the Natches recall to mind the Heliades of the first eastern colony of Rhodes." Out of numerous illustrations from Egypt, may be quoted an inscription from Silsilis—"Hail to thee! king of Egypt! Sun of the foreign peoples. . . . Life, salvation, health to him! he is a shining sun." In such cases, then, worship of the ancestor readily becomes worship of the Sun.

The like happens with other celestial appearances. "In the Beirût school" says Jessup, "are and have been girls named . . . Morning Dawn, Dew, Rose. . . . I once visited a man in the village of Brummana who had six daughters, whom he named *Sun*, *Morning*, *Zephyr breeze*," &c. Another was named *Star*. Here, again, the superiority, or good fortune, or remarkable fate, of an individual thus named, would originate propitiation of a personalized phenomenon.

That personalization of the wind had an origin of this kind is indicated by a Bushman legend. "The wind" it says "was formerly a person. He became a feathered thing. And he flew, while he no longer walked as formerly; for he flew, and he dwelt in the mountain . . . he inhabited a mountain-hole." Here, too, we are reminded that in sundry parts of the world there occurs the notion that not only the divine ancestors who begat the race came out of caves, but that Nature-gods also did. A legend of the Mexicans tells of the Sun and Moon coming out of caves; and in the conception of a cave inhabited by the wind, the modern Bushman does but repeat the ancient Greek. As descending from the traditions of cave-dwellers, stories of this kind, with accompanying worship, are natural;

but otherwise they imply superfluous absurdities which cannot be legitimately ascribed even to the most unintelligent.

That in primitive times names are used in ways showing such lack of discrimination as leads to the confusions here alleged, we have proof. Grote says of the goddess Atē,—“the same name is here employed sometimes to designate the person, sometimes the attribute or event not personified.” And again, it has been remarked that “in Homer, Aïdes is invariably the name of a god; but in later times it was transferred to his house, his abode or kingdom.” Nature-worship, then, is but an aberrant form of ghost-worship.

In their normal forms, as in their abnormal forms, all gods arise by apotheosis. Originally, the god is the superior living man whose power is conceived as superhuman. From uncivilized peoples at present, and from civilized peoples during their past, evidence is derived. Mr. Selous says—“the chief of these kraals, ‘Situngweesa,’ is considered a very powerful ‘Umlimo,’ or god, by the Amandebele.” So, too, among existing Hindus, “General Nicholson . . . was adored as a hero in his lifetime, in spite of his violent persecution of his own devotees.” The *Rig Veda* shows that it was thus with the ancient people of India. Their gods are addressed—“Thou, Agni, the earliest and most Angiras-like sage” (R. V., i, 31). “Thou Agni, the most eminent rishi” (iii, 21, 3). “Thou [Indra] art an anciently-born rishi” (viii, 6, 41). “Indra is a priest, Indra is a rishi” (viii, 16, 7). That Achilles was apotheosized, and that according to tradition the Pythian priestess preferred to address Lykurgus as a god, are examples sufficiently reminding us of man-derived deities among the Greeks. It is a familiar fact, too, that with the Romans and subject peoples emperor-worship became a developed cult. In “every one of the Gaulish cities,” “a large number of men, who belonged to the highest as well as to the middle classes, were priests and flamens of Augustus, flamens of Drusus,

priests of Vespasian or Marcus Aurelius." "The statues of the emperors were real idols, to which they offered incense, victims, and prayers." And how natural to other European peoples in those days were conceptions leading to such cults, is curiously shown by an incident in the campaign of Tiberius, then a prince, carried on in Germany in A.D. 5, when Romans and Teutons were on opposite sides of the Elbe.

"One of the barbarians, an aged man, powerfully built and, to judge from his attire, of high rank, got into an excavated trunk (such as they use for boats) and rowed his vessel to the middle of the river. There he asked and obtained leave to come safely to our side and to see the prince. Having come to shore, he first for a long time silently looked at the prince and finally broke out into these words: 'Mad, indeed, are our young men. For if you are far, they worship you as gods, and if you approach, they rather fear your weapons than do you homage. But I, by thy kind permission, O prince, to day have seen the gods of whom before I had heard.'

That some of our own ancestors regarded gods simply as superior men is also clear. If the Norseman "thought himself unfairly treated, even by his gods, he openly took them to task and forsook their worship;" and, reminding us of some existing savages, we read of a Norse warrior "wishing ardently that he could but meet with Odin, that he might attack him."

As, in primitive thought, divinity is thus synonymous with superiority; and as at first a god may be either a powerful living person (commonly of conquering race) or a dead person who has acquired supernatural power as a ghost; there come two origins for semi-divine beings—the one by unions between the conquering god-race and the conquered race distinguished as men, and the other by supposed intercourse between living persons and spirits. We have seen that dream-life in general is at first undistinguished from waking life. And if the events of ordinary dreams are regarded as real, we may infer that the concomitants of dreams of a certain kind create a specially strong belief in their reality. Once having become established in

the popular mind, this belief in their reality is, on occasion, taken advantage of. At Hamóa (Navigator's Islands) "they have an idea which is very convenient to the reputation of the females, that some of these *hatooa pawa* [mischievous spirits] molest them in their sleep, in consequence of which there are many supernatural conceptions." Among the Dyaks it is the same. We are told both by Brooke and St. John of children who were begotten by certain spirits. Of like origin and nature was the doctrine of the Babylonians concerning male and female spirits and their offspring. And the beliefs in incubi and succubi lasted in European history down to comparatively late times: sometimes giving rise to traditions like that of Robert the Devil. Of course the statement respecting the nature of the supernatural parent is variable—he is demoniacal or he is divine; and consequently there now and then result such stories as those of the Greeks about god-descended men.

Thus Comparative Sociology discloses a common origin for each leading element of religious belief. The conception of the ghost, along with the multiplying and complicating ideas arising from it, we find everywhere—alike in the arctic regions and in the tropics; in the forests of North America and in the deserts of Arabia; in the valleys of the Himalayas and in African jungles; on the flanks of the Andes and in the Polynesian islands. It is exhibited with equal clearness by races so remote in type from one another, that competent judges think they must have diverged before the existing distribution of land and sea was established—among straight-haired, curly-haired, woolly-haired races; among, white, tawny, copper-coloured, black. And we find it among peoples who have made no advances in civilization as well as among the semi-civilized and the civilized. Thus we have abundant proofs of the natural genesis of religions.

§ 586. To give to these proofs, re-inforcing those before

given, a final re-inforcement, let me here, however, instead of taking separately each leading religious conception as similarly exhibited by different peoples, take the whole series of them as exhibited by the same people.

That belief in the reality of dream-scenes and dream-persons, which, as we before saw (§ 530), the Egyptians had in common with primitive peoples at large, went along with the belief, also commonly associated with it, that shadows are entities. A man's shadow was "considered an important part of his personality;" and the Book of the Dead treats it "as something substantial." Again, a man's other-self, called his *ka*, accompanied him while alive; and we see "the Egyptian king frequently sculptured in the act of propitiating his own *ka*," as the Karen does at the present day. "The disembodied personality" had "a material form and substance. The soul had a body of its own, and could eat and drink." But, as partially implied by this statement, each man was supposed to have personalities of a less material kind. After death "the soul, though bound to the body, was at liberty to leave the grave and return to it during the daytime in any form it chose;" and a papyrus tells of mummies who "converse in their catacomb about certain circumstances of their past life upon earth." Having desires, the *ka* must be ministered to; and, as M. Maspero says, "*le double des pains, des liquides, de la viande, passait dans l'autre monde et y nourrissait le Double de l'homme.*" Along with this belief that the bodily desires and satisfactions continued in the second life, there naturally went a conception of the second life as substantially like the first; as is shown by the elaborate delineations of it contained in ancient tombs, such as the tomb of Ti.

Along with ministrations to the appetites of the supposed material or semi-material dead, resulting from these beliefs, there went ministrations to desires of other kinds. In the richly-adorned sepulchral chamber of king Mycerinus's daughter, there was a daily burning of incense; and at night

a lamp was "kept burning in the apartment." Habitually there were public praises of the dead; and to tempt back to Egypt a valued subject, a king promises that "the poor shall make their moan at the door of thy tomb. Prayers shall be addressed to thee." Such sacrifices, praises, and prayers, continued from festival to festival, and, eventually, from generation to generation, thus grew into established worships. "The monuments of the time of the building of the pyramids mention priests and prophets which were devoted to the service of Kheops, Chabryes, and other rulers, and who offered them sacrifices"—priests who had successors down even to the 26th dynasty. Such priest-hoods were established for worship not of the royal dead only, but for worship of other dead. To ensure sacrifices to their statues, great landowners made "contracts with the priests of their town," prescribing the kinds of food and drink to be offered. So far was this system carried that Hapi Tefa, the governor of a district, to maintain services to himself "for all time . . . provides salaries for the priests." As implied in some of the foregoing extracts, there arose an idol-worship by differentiation from worship of the dead. The *ka*, expected eventually to return and re-animate the mummy, could enter also a statue of wood or stone representing the deceased. Hence some marvellous elaborations. In the Egyptian tomb, sometimes called the "house of the double," there was a walled-up space having but a small opening, which contained images of the dead, more or less numerous; so that if re-animation of the mummy was prevented by destruction of it, any one of these might be utilized in its place.

The proofs thus furnished that their idolatry was developed from their ancestor-worship, are accompanied by proofs that their animal-worship was similarly developed. The god Ammon Ra is represented as saying to Thothmes III—

"I have caused them to behold thy majesty, even as it were the star Seschet (the evening star) . . . I have caused them to behold thy

majesty as it were a bull young and full of spirit . . . I have caused them to behold thy majesty as it were a crocodile [and similarly with a lion, an eagle, and a jackal] . . . It is I who protecteth thee, oh my cherished son ! Horus, valiant bull, reigning over the Thebaid."

Here, in the first place, we are shown, as we were shown by the Ainos, that there takes place a transition from simile to metaphor: "thy majesty, as it were a bull," presently becomes "Horus, valiant bull." This naturally leads in subsequent times to confusion of the man with the animal, and consequent worship of the animal. We may further see that complimentary comparisons to other animals, similarly passing through metaphors into identifications, are likely to generate belief in a deified individual who had sundry forms. Another case shows us how, from what was at first eulogistic naming of a local ruler, there may grow up the adoption of an animal-image for a known living person. We read of "the Ram, who is the Lord of the city of Mendes, the Great God, the Life of Ra, the Generator, the Prince of young women." We find the king speaking of himself as "the image of the divine Ram, the living portrait of him . . . the divine efflux of the prolific Ram . . . the eldest son of the Ram." And then, further, we are told that the king afterwards deified the first of his consorts, and "commanded that her Ram-image should be placed in all temples."

So, too, literal interpretation of metaphors leads to worship of heavenly bodies. As above, the star Seshet comes to be identified with an individual; and so, continually, does the Sun. Thus it is said of a king—"My lord the Sun, Amenhotep III, the Prince of Thebes, rewarded me. He is the Sun-god himself;" and it is also said of him "no king has done the like, since the time of the reign of the Sun-god Ra, who possessed the land." In kindred manner we are told of the sarcophagus provided for another king, Amenemhat, that "never the like had been provided since the time of the god Ra." These quotations show that this complimentary metaphor was used in so positive a way as to cause accept-

ance of it as fact; and thus to generate a belief that the Sun had been actual ruler over Egypt.

The derivation of all these beliefs from ancestor-worship, clear as the above evidence makes it, becomes clearer still when we observe, on the one hand, how the name "god" was applied to a superior living individual, and, on the other hand, how completely human in all their attributes were the gods, otherwise so-called. "Would His Majesty order a god to be sent," was the address to a king of Egypt when asking for an exorcisor; and the man who was sent was repeatedly referred to as "that god." When we thus see a living medicine-man apotheosized, we cannot wonder on finding king Sahura of the 5th dynasty called "God, who strikes all nations, and reaches all countries with his arm;" or on meeting with like deifications of other historical kings and queens, such as Mencheres and Nofert-Ari-Aáhmes. And on finding omnipotence and omnipresence ascribed to a living king, as to Ramses II., we see little further scope for deification. Indeed we see no further scope; since along with these exalted conceptions of certain men there went low conceptions of gods.

"The bodies of the gods are spoken of as well as their souls, and they have both parts and passions; they are described as suffering from hunger and thirst, old age, disease, fear and sorrow. They perspire, their limbs quake, their head aches, their teeth chatter, their eyes weep, their nose bleeds, 'poison takes possession of their flesh.' . . . All the great gods require protection. Osiris is helpless against his enemies, and his remains are protected by his wife and sister."*

* It is strange how impervious to evidence the mind becomes when once pre-possessed. One would have thought that such an accumulation of proofs, congruous with the proofs yielded by multitudinous other societies, would have convinced everyone that the Egyptian religion was a developed ancestor-worship. But such proofs appear to have no effects in the minds of the theologians and the mythologists. Though the ancient Egyptian tradition is that "the land of Punt was the original seat of the gods," whence "the holy ones had travelled to the Nile valley, at their head Amon, Horus, Hathor;" though there is also the tradition that "during the first age a Dynasty of the Gods reigned in the land; this was followed by the age of the Demigods; and the dynasty of the mysterious Manes closed the prehistoric time;" though

The saying that one half the world does not know how the other half lives, may be paralleled by the saying that one half the world has no idea what the other half thinks, and what it once thought itself. Habitually at a later mental stage, there is a forgetting of that which was familiar at an earlier mental stage. Ordinarily in adult life many thoughts and feelings of childhood have faded so utterly that there is an incapacity for even imagining them; and, similarly, from the consciousness of cultured humanity there have so completely disappeared certain notions natural to the consciousness of uncultured humanity, that it has become almost incredible they should ever have been entertained. But just as certain as it is that the absurd beliefs at which parents laugh when displayed in their children, were once their own; so certain is it that advanced peoples to whom primitive conceptions seem ridiculous, had forefathers who held these primitive conceptions. Their own theory of things has arisen by slow modification of that original theory of things in which, from the supposed reality of dreams, there resulted the supposed reality of ghosts; whence developed all kinds of supposed supernatural beings.

§ 587. Is there any exception to this generalization? Are we to conclude that amid the numerous religions, varying in

these traditions are congruous with that deification of kings, priests, minor potentates, and, in a sense, even ordinary persons, which Egyptian history at large shows us; yet all this evidence is disregarded from the desire to ascribe a primitive monotheism or a primitive nature-worship. For these the sole authorities are statements made by the later Egyptian priests or contained in certain of the inscriptions—statements, written or spoken, which were necessarily preceded by a long period during which the art of recording did not exist, and a further long period of culture—statements which naturally embodied relatively advanced conceptions. It would be about as wise to deny that the primitive Hebrew worship was that prescribed in Leviticus because such worship is denounced by Amos and by Hosea. It would be about as wise to take the conception of Zeus entertained by Socrates as disproving the gross anthropomorphism of the primitive Greeks. It would be about as wise to instance some refined modern version of Christianity, like that of Maurice, as showing what mediæval Christians believed.

their forms and degrees of elaboration, which have this common origin, there exists one which has a different origin? Must we say that while all the rest are natural, the religion possessed by the Hebrews which has come down to us with modifications, is supernatural?

If, in seeking an answer, we compare this supposed exceptional religion with the others, we do not find it so unlike them as to imply an unlike genesis. Contrariwise, we find it presenting throughout remarkable likenesses to them. We will consider these in groups.

In the first place, the plasma of superstitions amid which the religion of the Hebrews evolved, was of the same nature with that found everywhere. Though, during the early nomadic stage, the belief in a permanently-existing soul was undeveloped, yet there was shown belief in the reality of dreams and of the beings seen in dreams. At a later stage we find that the dead were supposed to hear and sometimes to answer; there was propitiation of the dead by gashing the body and cutting the hair; there was giving of food for the dead; spirits of the dead were believed to haunt burial-places; and demons entering into men caused their maladies and their sins. Much given, like existing savages, to amulets, charms, exorcisms, etc., the Hebrews also had functionaries who corresponded to medicine men—men having “familiar spirits,” “wizards” (Isaiah viii, 19), and others, originally called seers but afterwards prophets (1 Sam. ix, 9); to whom they made presents in return for information, even when seeking lost asses. And Samuel, in calling for thunder and rain, played the part of a weather-doctor—a personage still found in various parts of the world.

Sundry traditions they held in common with other peoples. Their legend of the deluge, besides being allied to that of the Accadians, was allied to that of the Hindus; among whom the Śathapatha-brāhmaṇa tells how Manu was instructed by Vishnu to make an ark to escape the

coming flood, which came as foretold and "swept away all living creatures; Manu alone was left." The story of Moses' birth is paralleled by an Assyrian story, which says—"I am Sargina the great King . . . my mother . . . in a secret place she brought me forth: she placed me in an ark of bulrushes . . . she threw me into the river . . ." etc. Similarly with the calendar and its entailed observances. "The Assyrian months were lunar . . . the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth days, being the sabbaths. On these sabbath days, extra work and even missions of mercy were forbidden . . . The enactments were similar in character to those of the Jewish code."

So again is it with their Theology. Under the common title *Elohim*, were comprehended distinguished living persons, ordinary ghosts, superior ghosts or gods. That is to say, with the Hebrews as with the Egyptians and numerous other peoples, a god simply meant a powerful being, existing visibly or invisibly. As the Egyptian for god, *Nutar*, was variously used to indicate strength; so was *Il* or *El* among the Hebrews, who applied it to heroes and also "to the gods of the gentiles." Out of these conceptions grew up, as in other cases, the propitiation or worship of various supernatural beings—a polytheism. Abraham was a demi-god to whom prayers were addressed. "They sacrificed unto devils, not to God; to gods whom they knew not, to new *gods that* came newly up, whom your fathers feared not" (Deut. xxxii, 17). That the belief in other gods than Jahveh long survived, is shown by Solomon's sacrifices to them, as well as by the denunciations of the prophets. Moreover, even after Jahveh had become the acknowledged great-god, the general conception remained essentially polytheistic. For just as in the *Iliad* (bk. v, 1000-1120) the gods and goddesses are represented as fighting with sword and lance the battles of the mortals whose causes they espoused; so the angels and archangels of the Hebrew pantheon are said to fight in Heaven when the peoples they respectively patronize fight

on earth: both ideas being paralleled by those of some existing savages.

Seeing then that Jahveh was originally one god among many—the god who became supreme; let us ask what was his nature as shown by the records. Not dwelling on the story of the garden of Eden (probably accepted from the Accadians) where God walked and talked in human fashion; and passing by the time when “the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded;” we may turn to such occasions as those on which Jacob wrestled with him, and on which “the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend.” These, and many kindred statements, show that by the Hebrews in early days, Jahveh, “the strong one,” “a man of war,” having been originally a local potentate (like those who even now are called gods by the Bedouins), was, in after times, regarded as the most powerful among the various spirits worshipped: the places where sacrifices to him were made, being originally high places (2 Kings xii, 3), such as those habitually used for the burials of superior persons; as they are still in the same regions. Says Burkhardt of the Bedouins—“the saints’ tombs are generally placed on the summits of mountains,” and “to him [a saint] all the neighbouring Arabs address their vows.” Here we see parallelism to the early religious ideas of Greeks, Scandinavians, and others; among whom gods, indistinguishable from men in appearance, sometimes entered into conflicts with them, not always successfully.

Moreover, this “God of battles,” whose severe punishments, often inflicted, were for insubordination, was clearly a local god—“the god of Israel.” The command “thou shalt have none other gods but me,” did not imply that there were none other, but that the Israelites were not to recognize their authority. The admission that the Hebrew god was not the only god is tacitly made by the expression “our” god as used by the Hebrews to distinguish Jahveh from others. And though with these admissions that

Jahveh was one god among many, there were assertions of universality of rule; these were paralleled by assertions concerning certain gods of the Egyptians—nay, by assertions concerning a living Pharaoh, of whom it is said “no place is without thy goodness. Thy sayings are the law of every land. . . . Thou hast millions of ears. . . . Whatsoever is done in secret, thy eye seeth it.” Along with the

limitations of Jahveh’s authority in range, went limitations of it in degree. There was no claim to omnipotence. Not forgetting the alleged failure of his attempt personally to slay Moses, we may pass on to the defeats of the Israelites when they fought by his advice, as in two battles with the Benjaminites, and as in a battle with the Philistines when “the ark of God was taken” (1 Sam. iv, 3–10). And then, beyond this, we are told that though “the Lord was with Judah,” he “could not drive out the inhabitants of the valley, because they had chariots of iron.” (Judges i, 19.) That is, there were incapacities equalling those attributed by other peoples to their gods.

Similarly with intellectual and moral nature. Jahveh receives information; he goes to see whether reports are true; he repents of what he has done—all implying anything but omniscience. Like Egyptian and Assyrian kings, he continually lauds himself; and while saying “I will not give my glory to another” (Isai. xlviii, 11), he describes himself as jealous, as revengeful, and as a merciless destroyer of enemies. He sends a lying spirit to mislead a king, as Zeus does to Agamemnon (2 Chron. xviii, 20–2); by his own account he will deceive a prophet that he may prophesy falsely, intending then to destroy him (Ezekiel xiv, 9); he hardens men’s hearts that he may inflict evils on them for what they then do; and, as when he prompts David to number Israel, suggests a supposed sin that he may afterwards punish those who have not committed it. He acts as did the Greek gods; from whom bad impulses were supposed to come, and who were similarly indiscriminate in their revenges.

The forms of worship show us like parallelisms. Not dwelling on the intended or actual human sacrifices (though by grouping the sacrifice of a son with sacrifices of rams and calves, as methods of propitiation to be repudiated, Micah implies in ch. vi, 6-9 that the two had been associated in the Hebrew mind), it suffices to point out that the prescribed ceremonies in temples, had the characters usual everywhere. Called in sundry places the "bread of God," the offerings, like those to Egyptian gods and mummies, included bread, meat, fat, oil, blood, drink, fruits, etc.; and there was maintained, as by other peoples, a constant fire, as well as burnings of incense: twice daily by the Hebrews, and four times daily by the Mexicans. Jahveh was supposed to enjoy the "sweet savour" of the burnt offerings, like the idol-inhabiting gods of the negroes (§ 161). Associated with the belief that "the blood is the life," this, either poured on the ground or on the altar, according to circumstances, was reserved for Jahveh; as with the ancient Mexican and Central American gods, to whom was continually offered up the blood alike of sacrificed men and animals: now the image of the god being anointed with it, and now the cornice of the doorway of the temple. As the Egyptians and as the Greeks, so did the Hebrews offer hecatombs of oxen and sheep to their god; sometimes numbering many thousands (1 Kings viii, 62-64). To the Hebrews, it was a command that unblemished animals only should be used for sacrifices; and so among the Greeks a "law provided that the best of the cattle should be offered to the Gods," and among the Peruvians it was imperative that "all should be without spot or blemish." A still more remarkable likeness exists. Those orders made in Leviticus, under which certain parts of animals are to be given to Jahveh while other parts are left to the priests, remind us of those endowment-deeds, by which Egyptian landowners provided that for their ghosts should be reserved certain joints of the sacrificed animals, while the remaining parts

were made over to the *ka*-priests. Again, just as we have seen that the gods of the Wayao, who were ghosts of ancient great chiefs, dwelt on the cloudy summits of certain adjacent mountains; and just as the residence of "cloud-compelling Jove" was the top of Olympus, where storms gathered; so the Hebrew god "descended in the cloud" on the summit of Mount Sinai, sometimes with thunder and lightning. Moreover, the statement that from thence Moses brought down the tables of the commands, alleged to be given by Jahveh, parallels the statement that from Mount Ida in Crete, from the cave where Zeus was said to have been brought up (or from the connected Mount Iuktas reputed in ancient times to contain the burial place of Zeus), Rhadamanthus first brought down Zeus' decrees, and Minos repaired to obtain re-inforced authority for his laws.*

Various other likenesses may be briefly noted. With the account of the council held by Jahveh when compassing Ahab's destruction, may be compared the account of the council of the Egyptian gods assembled to advise Ra, when contemplating the destruction of the world, and also the accounts of the councils of the Greek gods held by Zeus. Images of the gods, supposed to be inhabited by them, have been taken to battle by various peoples; as by the Hebrews was the ark of the covenant, which was a dwelling place of Jahveh. As by many savages, who even when living dislike

* It matters not to the argument whether this was or was not the Olympian Zeus. It suffices that he was a king, whose mountain-dwelling ghost became a god giving commands. But that the two personages were originally one is a tenable conclusion. Having a belief in a god inhabiting a neighbouring mountain where the clouds gathered, a migrating people, settling elsewhere, near a mountain similarly distinguished as an originator of storms, would naturally infer that their god had come with them. A recently published work, *Africana*, has yielded me some evidence supporting this conclusion; in so far that the Wayaos regard as superior, certain gods originally localized in the country they left, and who yet must, in a sense, be present with them if they are regarded as their superior gods. The different genealogy of the Olympian Zeus goes for little, considering what differences there were among the genealogies of historical persons among the Greeks.

their names to be known) it is forbidden to call a dead man by his real name, especially if distinguished; and as among the early Romans, it was a "deeply cherished belief that the name of the proper tutelary spirit of the community ought to remain for ever unpronounced;" so was it with the Hebrews in early days: their god was not named. Dancing was a form of worship among the Hebrews as it was among the Greeks and among various savages: instance the Iroquois. Fasts and penances like those of the Hebrews exist, or have existed, in many places; especially in ancient Mexico, Central America, and Peru, where they were extremely severe. The fulfilments of prophecies alleged by the Hebrews were paralleled by fulfilments of prophecies alleged by the Greeks; and the Greeks in like manner took them to be evidence of the truth of their religion. Nay we are told the same even of the Sandwich Islanders, who said that Captain Cook's death "fulfilled the prophecies of the priests, who had foretold this sad catastrophe." The working of miracles alleged of the Hebrew god as though it were special, is one of the ordinary things alleged of the gods of all peoples throughout the world. The translation of the living Elijah recalls the Chaldean legend of Izdubar's "translated ancestor, Hasisadra or Xisuthrus;" and in New World mythologies, there are the cases of Hiawatha, who was carried living to heaven in his magic canoe, and the hero of the Arawâks, Arawanili. As by the Hebrews, Jahveh is represented as having in the earliest times appeared to men in human shape, but not in later times; so by the Greeks, the theophany frequently alleged in the *Iliad*, becomes rare in traditions of later date. Nay, the like happened with the ancient Central Americans. Said an Indian in answer to Fr. Bobadilla—"For a long time our gods have not come nor spoken to them [the devotees]. But formerly they used to do so, as our ancestors told us."

Nor do parallelisms fail us when we turn to the more developed form of the Hebrew religion. That the story of

a god-descended person should be habitually spoken of by Christians as though it were special to their religion, is strange considering their familiarity with stories of god-descended persons among the Greeks,—Æsculapius, Pythagoras, Plato. But it is not the Greek religion only which furnished such parallels. The Assyrian king Nebuchadnezzar asserted that he had been god-begotten. It is a tradition among the Mongols that Alung Goa, who herself “had a spirit for her father,” bore three sons by a spirit. In ancient Peru if any of the virgins of the Sun “appeared to be pregnant, she said it was by the Sun, and this was believed, unless there was any evidence to the contrary.” And among the existing inhabitants of Mangaia it is the tradition that “the lovely Ina-ani-vai” had two sons by the great god Tangaroa. The position, too, of mediator held by the god-descended son, has answering positions elsewhere. Among the Fijian gods, “*Tokairambe* and *Tui Lakemba Randinandina* seem to stand next to Ndengei, being his sons, and acting as mediators by transmitting the prayers of suppliants to their father.”

Once more we have, in various places, observances corresponding to the eucharist. All such observances originate from the primitive notion that the natures of men, inhering in all their parts, inhere also in whatever becomes incorporated with them; so that a bond is established between those who eat of the same food. As furnishing one out of many instances, I may name the Padam, who “hold inviolate any engagement cemented by an interchange of meat as food.” Believing that the ghosts of the dead, retaining their appetites, feed either on the material food offered or on the spirit of it, this conception is extended to them. Hence arise, in various parts of the world, feasts at which living and dead are supposed to join; and thus to renew the relation of subordination on the one side and friendliness on the other. And this eating with the ghost or the god, which by the Mexicans, was transformed into “eating the god” (symbolized by a cake

made up with the blood of a victim), was associated with a bond of service to the god for a specified period. Briefly stringing together minor likenesses, we may note that the Christian crusades to get possession of the holy sepulchre, had their prototype in the sacred war of the Greeks to obtain access to Delphi; that as, among Christians, part of the worship consists in reciting the doings of the Hebrew god, prophets, and kings, so worship among the Greeks consisted partly in reciting the great deeds of the Homeric gods and heroes; that Greek temples were made rich by precious gifts from kings and wealthy men to obtain divine favour or forgiveness, as Christian cathedrals have been; that St. Peter's at Rome was built by funds raised from various catholic countries, as the temple of Delphi was rebuilt by contributions from various Grecian states; that the doctrine of special providences, general over the world, was as dominant among the Greeks as it has been among Christians, so that, in the words of Grote, "the lives of the Saints bring us even back to the simple and ever-operative theology of the Homeric age;" and lastly that various religions, alike in the new and old worlds, show us, in common with Christianity, baptism, confession, canonization, celibacy, the saying of grace, and other minor observances.

§ 588. What are we to conclude from all this evidence? What must we think of this unity of character exhibited by religions at large? And then, more especially, what shall we say of the family likeness existing between the creed of Christendom and other creeds? Observe the facts.

Alike in those minds among the civilized which, by defective senses, have been cut off from instruction, and in the minds of various primitive peoples, religious conceptions do not exist. Wherever the rudiments of them exist, they have, as their form, a belief in, and sacrifices to, the doubles of the dead. The ghost-theory, with resulting propitiation of ordinary ghosts, habitually survives along with belief in,

and propitiation of, supernatural beings of more powerful kinds; known at first by the same generic name as ordinary ghosts, and differentiating by small steps. And the worships of the supposed supernatural beings, up even to the highest, are the same in nature, and differ only in their degrees of elaboration. What do these correspondences imply? Do they not imply that in common with other phenomena displayed by human beings as socially aggregated, religions have a natural genesis?

Are we to make an exception of the religion current among ourselves? If we say that its likenesses to the rest hide a transcendant unlikeness, several implications must be recognized. One is that the Cause to which we can put no limits in Space or Time, and of which our entire Solar System is a relatively infinitesimal product, took the disguise of a man for the purpose of covenanting with a shepherd-chief in Syria. Another is that this Energy, unceasingly manifested everywhere, throughout past, present, and future, ascribed to himself under this human form, not only the limited knowledge and limited powers which various passages show Jahveh to have had, but also moral attributes which we should now think discreditable to a human being. And a third is that we must suppose an intention even more repugnant to our moral sense. For if these numerous parallelisms between the Christian religion and other religions, do not prove likeness of origin and development, then the implication is that a complete simulation of the natural by the supernatural has been deliberately devised to deceive those who examine critically what they are taught. Appearances have been arranged for the purpose of misleading sincere inquirers, that they may be eternally damned for seeking the truth.

On those who accept this last alternative, no reasonings will have any effect. Here we finally part company with them by accepting the first; and, accepting it, shall find that Ecclesiastical Institutions are at once rendered intelligible in their rise and progress.

CHAPTER II.

MEDICINE-MEN AND PRIESTS.

§ 589. A SATISFACTORY distinction between priests and medicine-men is difficult to find. Both are concerned with supernatural agents, which in their original forms are ghosts; and their ways of dealing with these supernatural agents are so variously mingled, that at the outset no clear classification can be made.

Among the Patagonians the same men officiate in the "three-fold capacity of priests, magicians, and doctors;" and among the North American Indians the functions of "sorcerer, prophet, physician, exorciser, priest, and rain-doctor," are united. The Pe-i-men of Guiana "act as conjurors, soothsayers, physicians, judges, and priests." So, too, Ellis says that in the Sandwich Islands the doctors are generally priests and sorcerers. In other cases we find separation beginning; as witness the New Zealanders, who, in addition to priests, had at least one in each tribe who was a reputed sorcerer. And with advancing social organization there habitually comes a permanent separation.

In point of time the medicine-man takes precedence. Describers of the degraded Fuegians, speak only of wizards; and even of the relatively-advanced Mapuchés on the adjacent continent, we read that they have no priests, though they have diviners and magicians. In Australian tribes the only men concerned with the supernatural are the *boyala*-men or doctors; and the like is alleged by Bonwick of the

Tasmanians. Moreover, in many other instances, those who are called priests among uncivilized peoples, do little else than practise sorcery under one or other form. The *pajé* or priest of the Mundurucús “fixes upon the time most propitious for attacking the enemy; exorcises evil spirits, and professes to cure the sick;” and the like is the case with the Uaupés. In various tribes of North America, as the Clallums, Chippewayans, Crees, the priests’ actions are simply those of a conjuror.

How shall we understand this confusion of the two functions, and the early predominance of that necromantic function which eventually becomes so subordinate?

§ 590. If we remember that in primitive thought the other world repeats this world, to the extent that its ghostly inhabitants lead similar lives, stand in like social relations, and are moved by the same passions; we shall see that the various ways of dealing with ghosts, adopted by medicine-men and priests, are analogous to the various ways men adopt of dealing with one another; and that in both cases the ways change according to circumstances.

See how each member of a savage tribe stands towards other savages. There are first the members of adjacent tribes, chronically hostile, and ever on the watch to injure him and his fellows. Among those of his own tribe there are parents and near relatives from whom, in most cases, he looks for benefit and aid; and towards whom his conduct is in the main amicable, though occasionally antagonistic. Of the rest, there are some inferior to himself over whom he habitually domineers; there are others proved by experience to be stronger and more cunning, of whom he habitually stands in fear, and to whom his behaviour is propitiatory; and there are many whose inferiority or superiority is so far undecided, that he deals with them now in one way and now in another as the occasion prompts—changing from bullying to submission or from submission to bullying, as he finds one

or other answer. Thus to the living around him, he variously adapts his actions—now to conciliate, now to oppose, now to injure, according as his ends seem best subserved.

Men's ghosts being at first conceived as in all things like their originals, it results that the assemblage of them to which dead members of the tribe and of adjacent tribes give rise, is habitually thought of by each person as standing to him in relations like those in which living friends and enemies stand to him. How literally this is so, is well shown by a passage from Bishop Callaway's account of the Zulus, in which an interlocutor describes his relations with the spirit of his brother.

"You come to me, coming for the purpose of killing me. It is clear that you were a bad fellow when you were a man : are you still a bad fellow under the ground ?"

Ghosts and ghost-derived gods being thus thought of as repeating the traits and modes of behaviour of living men, it naturally happens that the modes of treating them are similarly adjusted—there are like efforts, now to please, now to deceive, now to coerce. Stewart tells us of the Nagas that they cheat one of their gods who is blind, by pretending that a small sacrifice is a large one. Among the Bouriat, the evil spirit to whom an illness is ascribed, is deluded by an effigy—is supposed "to mistake the effigy for the sick person," and when the effigy is destroyed thinks he has succeeded. In Kibokwé, Cameron saw a "sham devil," whose "functions were to frighten away the devils who haunted the woods." Believing in spirits everywhere around, the Kamtschatkans "adored them when their wishes were fulfilled, and insulted them when their affairs went amiss." The incantations over a sick New Zealander were made "with the expectation of either propitiating the angry deity, or of driving him away : " to which latter end threats to "kill and eat him," or to burn him, were employed. The Wáralís, who worship Wághiá, on being asked—"Do you ever scold Wághiá ?" replied—"To be sure, we do. We say, You fellow, we have given you a

chicken, a goat, and yet you strike us ! What more do you want ?” And then to cases like these, in which the conduct towards certain ghosts and ghost-derived gods, is wholly or partially antagonistic, have to be added the cases, occurring abundantly everywhere, in which those ghosts who are supposed to stand in amicable relations with the living, are propitiated by gifts, by praises, and by expressions of subordination, with the view of obtaining their good offices—ghosts who receive extra propitiations when they are supposed to be angry, and therefore likely to inflict evils.

Thus, then, arises a general contrast between the actions and characters of men who deal antagonistically with supernatural beings and men who deal sympathetically. Hence the difference between medicine-men and priests ; and hence, too, the early predominance of medicine-men.

§ 591. For in primitive societies relations of enmity, both outside the tribe and inside the tribe, are more general and marked than relations of amity ; and therefore the doubles of the dead are more frequently thought of as foes than as friends.

As already shown at length in §§ 118, 119, one of the first corollaries drawn from the ghost-theory is, that ghosts are the causes of disasters. Numerous doubles of the dead supposed to haunt the neighbourhood, are those of enemies to the tribe. Of the rest, the larger number are those with whom there have been relations of antagonism or jealousy. The ghosts of friends, too, and even of relatives, are apt to take offence and to revenge themselves. Hence, accidents, misfortunes, diseases, deaths, perpetually suggest the agency of malevolent spirits and the need for combating them. Modes of driving them away are devised ; and the man who gains repute for success in using such modes becomes an important personage. Led by the primitive conception of ghosts as like their originals in their sensations, emotions, and ideas,

he tries to frighten them by threats, by grimaces, by horrible noises; or to disgust them by stenches and by things to which they are averse; or, in cases of disease, to make the body a disagreeable habitat by subjecting it to intolerable heat or violent ill-usage. And the medicine-man, deluding himself as well as others into the belief that spirits have been expelled by him, comes to be thought of as having the ability to coerce them, and so to get supernatural aid: as instance a pagé of the Uaupés, who is "believed to have power to kill enemies, to bring or send away rain, to destroy dogs or game, to make the fish leave a river, and to afflict with various diseases."

The early predominance of the medicine-man as distinguished from the priest, has a further cause. At first the only ghosts regarded as friendly are those of relatives, and more especially of parents. The result is that propitiatory acts, mostly performed by descendants, are relatively private. But the functions of the medicine-man are not thus limited in area. As a driver away of malicious ghosts, he is called upon now by this family and now by that; and so comes to be a public agent, having duties co-extensive with the tribe. Such priestly character as he occasionally acquires by the use of propitiatory measures, qualifies but little his original character. He remains essentially an exorcist.

It should be added that the medicine-man proper, has some capacity for higher development as a social factor, though he cannot in this respect compare with the priest. Already in § 474, instances have been given showing that repute as a sorcerer sometimes conduces to the attainment and maintenance of political power; and here is another.

"The King of *Great Cassan* [Gambia] call'd *Magro* . . . was well skill'd in *Necromantick Arts*. . . . One time to shew his Art, he caused a strong Wind to blow. . . . Another time desiring to be resolved of some questioned particular, after his Charms a smoke and flame arose out of the Earth, by which he gathered the answer to his demand."

We also saw in § 198 that the medicine-man, regarded with fear, occasionally becomes a god.

§ 592. In subsequent stages when social ranks, from head ruler downwards, have been formed, and when there has evolved a mythology having gradations of supernatural beings—when, simultaneously, there have grown up priest-hoods ministering to those superior supernatural beings who cannot be coerced but must be propitiated; a secondary confusion arises between the functions of medicine-men and priests. Malevolent spirits, instead of being expelled directly by the sorcerer's own power, are expelled by the aid of some superior spirit. The priest comes to play the part of an exorcist by calling on the supernatural being with whom he maintains friendly relations, to drive out some inferior supernatural being who is doing mischief.

This partial usurpation by the priest of the medicine-man's functions, we trace alike in the earliest civilizations and in existing civilizations. At the one extreme we have the fact that the Egyptians "believed . . . in the incessant intervention of the gods; and their magical literature is based on the notion of frightening one god by the terrors of a more powerful divinity;" and at the other extreme we have the fact that in old editions of our *Book of Common Prayer*, unclean spirits are commanded to depart "in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

There may be added the evidence which early records yield, that the superior supernatural beings invoked to expel inferior supernatural beings, had been themselves at one time medicine-men. Summarizing a tablet which he translates, Smith says—

"It is supposed in it that a man was under a curse, and Merodach, one of the gods, seeing him, went to the god Hea his father and enquired how to cure him. Hea, the god of Wisdom, in answer related the ceremonies and incantations, for effecting his recovery, and these are recorded in the tablet for the benefit of the faithful in after times."

§ 593. Thus, after recognizing the fact that in primitive

belief the doubles of the dead, like their originals in all things, admit of being similarly dealt with, and may therefore be induced to yield benefits or desist from inflicting evils, by bribing them, praising them, asking their forgiveness, or by deceiving and cajoling them, or by threatening, frightening, or coercing them; we see that the modes of dealing with ghosts, broadly contrasted as antagonistic and sympathetic, initiate the distinction between medicine-man and priest.

It is needless here to follow out the relatively unimportant social developments which originate from the medicine-man. Noting, as we have done, that he occasionally grows politically powerful, and sometimes becomes the object of a cult after his death, it will suffice if we note further, that during civilization he has varieties of decreasingly-conspicuous descendants, who, under one or other name, using one or other method, are supposed to have supernatural power or knowledge. Scattered samples of them still survive under the forms of wise women and the like, in our rural districts.

But the other class of those who are concerned with the supernatural, becoming, as it does, conspicuous and powerful, and acquiring as society develops an organization often very elaborate, and a dominance sometimes supreme, must be dealt with at length.

CHAPTER III

PRIESTLY DUTIES OF DESCENDANTS.

§ 594. As we have before seen (§ 87), it is in some cases the custom to destroy corpses for the purpose of preventing resurrection of them and consequent annoyance by them; and in other cases where no such measure of protection is taken, the dead are, without discrimination between relatives and others, dreaded as causers of misfortunes and diseases. Illustrations of this belief as existing among various savages were given in Part I, Chaps. XVI, XVII. Here is another from New Britain.

The Matukanaputa natives "bury their dead underneath the hut which was lately inhabited by the deceased, after which the relatives go for a long canoe journey, staying away some months . . . they say . . . the spirit of the departed stays in his late residence for some time after his death, and eventually finding no one to torment goes away for good; the surviving relatives then return and remain there as formerly."

Even where ghosts are regarded as generally looking on their descendants with goodwill, they are apt to take offence and to need propitiation. We read of the Santāls that from the silent gloom of the adjacent grove—

"the bygone generations watch their children and children's children playing their several parts in life, not altogether with an unfriendly eye. Nevertheless the ghostly inhabitants of the grove are sharp critics, and deal out crooked limbs, cramps and leprosy, unless duly appeased."

But while recognizing the fact that ghosts in general are usually held to be more or less malicious, we find, as might

be expected, that the smallest amount of enmity and the greatest amount of amity are supposed to be felt by the ghosts of relatives. Indeed by some races such ghosts are considered purely beneficent; as by the Karens, who think their meritorious ancestors "exercise a general watch care over their children on earth."

Though among various peoples there is propitiation chiefly of bad spirits, while good spirits are ignored as not likely to do mischief; yet wherever ancestor-worship preserves its original lineaments, we find the chief attention paid to the spirits of kindred. Prompted as offerings on graves originally are by affection for the deceased, and called forth as praises are by actual regrets for his or her departure, it naturally happens that these propitiations are made more by relatives than by others.

§ 595. Hence then the truth, everywhere illustrated, that those who perform the offices of the primitive cult are, at the outset, children or other members of the family. Hence then the fact that in Samoa—

"Prayers at the grave of a parent or brother or *chief* were common. Some, for example, would pray for health in sickness and might or might not recover."

Hence the fact that the people of Banks' Island, setting out on a voyage, would say—

"'Uncle! Father! plenty of pigs for you, plenty of money, kava for your drinking, twenty bags of food for your eating in the canoe. I pray you look upon me; let me go safe on the sea.'"

And hence once more the fact that among the Blantyre negroes—

"If they pray for a successful hunting expedition and return laden with venison or ivory, they know that it is their old relative that has done it, and they give him a thank offering. If the hunting party get nothing, they may say 'the spirit has been sulky with us,' . . . and refuse the thank-offering."

Unquestionably these cases, re-inforcing many before given, show us the beginnings of a family-religion. Along with that fear of a supernatural being which forms the central

element of every religion, we see sacrifice and prayer, gratitude and hope, as well as the expectation of getting benefits proportionate to propitiations.

§ 596. An interpretation is thus furnished of the fact that in undeveloped societies the priestly function is generally diffused.

We find this to be the case at present among the uncivilized; as in New Caledonia, where "almost every family has its priest;" as in Madagascar, where other worships have arisen "long subsequently to the prevalence of the worship of household gods;" and as among the aborigines of India, who, though they propitiate ancestors, have not "in general, a regular and established priesthood." So, too, was it with the people who made the first advances in civilization—the Egyptians. Each family maintained the sacrifices to its own dead; and the greater deities had a semi-private worship, carried on by actual or nominal descendants. The like held of the Greeks and Romans, who joined sacrifices made to their public gods, chiefly by priests, with sacrifices made by private persons to their household gods who were dead relatives. And it is the same at the present time in China, where priesthoods devoted to wider worships, have not supplanted the primitive worship of departed progenitors by their offspring.

Having thus observed that in the earliest stage, propitiation of the double of a dead man by offerings, praises, etc., is carried on by surviving relatives, we have now to observe that this family-cult acquires a more definite form by the devolution of its functions on one member of the family.

CHAPTER IV.

ELDEST MALE DESCENDANTS AS QUASI-PRIESTS.

§ 597. THOUGH in the earliest stages sacrifices to the ghost of the dead man are made by descendants in general, yet in conformity with the law of the instability of the homogeneous, an inequality soon arises: the propitiatory function falls into the hands of one member of the group. Of the Samoans we read that "the father of the family was the *high-priest*." The like was true of the Tahitians: "in the family . . . the father was the priest." Of Madagascar, Drury says—"Every man here . . . is a Priest for himself and Family." Similarly in Asia. Among the Ostyaks "the father of a family was the sole priest, magician, and god maker;" and among the Gonds religious rites are "for the most part performed by some aged relative." With higher races it is, or has been, the same. By existing Hindoos the daily offering to ancestors is made by the head of the family. While "every good Chinaman regularly, every day, burns incense before the tablet to his father's memory," on important occasions the rites are performed by the head of the brotherhood. That family-headship brought the like duties in respect of manes-worship among Greeks and Romans, needs no showing. Speaking of primitive Sabæans, Palgrave says—"presidence in worship was, it seems, the privilege merely of greater age or of family headship;" and even among the Jews, to whom propitiation of the dead had

been forbidden, there long survived the usage which had resulted from it. Kuenen remarks that though, up to David's time, "the competence of every Israelite to offer sacrifice was not doubted," yet "it was the kings and the heads of the tribes and families especially who made use of this privilege."

In the course of evolution under all its forms, differentiations tend ever to become more definite and fixed; and the differentiation above indicated is no exception. Eventually the usage so hardens, that the performance of sacrificial rites to ancestors is restricted to particular descendants. Speaking of the ancient Aryans, Sir Henry Maine says—"not only must the ancestor worshipped be a male ancestor, but the worshipper must be the male child or other male descendant."

§ 598. Hence certain sequences which we must note before we can rightly understand the institutions which eventually become established. In ancient Egypt "it was most important that a man should have a son established in his seat after him who should perform the due rites [of sacrifice to his *ka*, or double] and see that they were performed by others." Still more strongly was the need felt by the ancient Aryans. Says Duncker, "according to the law [of the Brahmans] every man ought to marry; he must have a son who may one day pour for him the libations for the dead." And we further read concerning them:—

"But the chief reason [for allowing polygamy] was that a son must necessarily be born to the father to offer libations for the dead to him. If the legitimate wife was barren, or brought forth daughters only, the defect must be remedied by a second wife. Even now, Hindoo wives, in a similar case, are urgent with their husbands to associate a second wife with them, in order that they may not die without male issue. How strongly the necessity was felt in ancient times is shown by an indication of the Rigveda, where the childless widow summons her brother-in-law to her bed, and by the narrative in the Epos of the widows of the king who died without a son, for whom children are raised up by a relation, and these children pass for the issue of the dead king (p. 85, 101). The law shows that such a custom did exist, and is not a poetic invention. It permits a son to be begotten by the brother of the husband, or the nearest of kin after him; in any case

by a man of the same race (*gotra*), even in the life-time of the husband with his consent."

Among the Jews, too, though interdicted by their law from making material sacrifices to the dead, there survived the need for a son to utter the sacrificial prayer.

"Part of this extreme desire for sons is rooted in the fact that men alone can really pray, that men only can repeat the Kaddish, a prayer that has become almost a corner-stone of Hebraism, for there is deemed inherent in it a marvellous power. It is held that this prayer spoken by children over their parents' graves releases their souls from purgatory, that it is able to penetrate graves, and tell the dead parents that their children remember them."

So is it too in China, where a chief anxiety during life is to make provision for proper sacrifices after death. Failure of a first wife to bear a male child who may perform them, is considered a legitimate reason for taking a second wife; and in the Corea, where the funeral ceremonies are so elaborate that the mourners have cues to weep or cease weeping, we are shown the quasi-priestly function of the son, and also get an indication of the descent of this function. After a death "a man must be at once appointed *Shangjoo*, or male Chief Mourner. The eldest son, if living, or, failing him, his son rather than his brother, is the proper *Shangjoo*. . . . When these friends arrive, they mourn altogether, with the *Shangjoo* at their head." And among the *Shangjoo's* duties is that of putting food into the deceased's mouth: performing, at the same time, the reverential obeisance—baring his left shoulder.

§ 599. The primitive and long-surviving belief in a second life repeating the first in its needs—a belief which, as we see, prompted surprising usages for procuring an actual or nominal son who should minister to these needs—prompted, in other cases, a usage which, though infrequent among ourselves, has been and still is frequent in societies less divergent from early types: so frequent as to cause surprise until we understand its origin. Says Satow—"The practice of adoption, which supplies the childless with heirs, is common all

over the East, but its justification in Japan is the necessity of keeping up the ancestral sacrifices." Accounts of Greeks and Romans show us that a kindred custom had among them a kindred motive. Though, as indicated in §§ 319 and 452, the practice of adoption had, among these people, survived from the times when its chief purpose was that of strengthening the patriarchal group; yet it is clear that the more special form of adoption which grew up had another purpose. Such a ceremony as that of a mock birth, whereby a fictitious son was made to simulate as nearly as might be a real son, could not have had a political origin, but must have had a domestic origin; and this origin was the one above indicated. As is pointed out by Prof. Hunter, Gaius speaks of "the great desire of the ancients to have vacant inheritances filled up, in order that there might be some one to perform the sacred rites, which were specially called for at the time of death." And since the context shows that this was the dominant reason for easy legalization of inheritance, it becomes clear that it was not primarily in the interest of the son, or the fictitious son, or the adopted son, that heirship was soon settled; but in the interest of the departed person. Just as, in ancient Egypt, men made bequests and endowed priests for the purpose of carrying on sacrifices in the private shrines erected to them; so did Roman fathers secure to themselves dutiful heirs, artificial when not natural, to minister to their ghosts out of the transmitted property.

Further significant evidence is supplied by the fact that heirship involved sacrifice. It was thus with the Eastern Aryans. Sir Henry Maine, speaking of the "elaborate liturgy and ritual" for ancestor-worship among the Hindus, says—"In the eye of the ancient Hindu sacerdotal lawyer, the whole law of Inheritance is dependent on its accurate observance." Or as Prof. Hunter remarks of these people—"The earliest notions of succession to deceased persons are connected with duties rather than with rights, with sacrifices rather than with property." And it was so with the Western

Aryans. Sir Henry Maine quotes the appeal of a Greek orator on behalf of a litigant—"Decide between us, which of us should have the succession and make the sacrifices at the tomb." And he points out that "the number, costliness, and importance of these ceremonies and oblations [to the dead] among the Romans," were such that even when they came to be less regarded, "the charges for them were still a heavy burden on Inheritances." Nay, even in mediæval Christendom there survived the same general conception in a modified form. Personal property was held to be "primarily a fund for the celebration of masses to deliver the soul of the owner from purgatory."

That these obligations to the dead had a religious character, is shown by the fact that where they have survived down to our own day, they take precedence of all other obligations. In India "a man may be pardoned for neglecting all his social duties, but he is for ever cursed if he fails to perform the funeral obsequies of his parents, and to present them with the offerings due to them."

§ 600. That we may the better comprehend early ideas of the claim supposed to be made by the double of the dead man on his property and his heir, it will be well to give some ancient examples of the way in which a son, or one who by a fiction stands in the position of a son, speaks of, or speaks to, his actual or nominal father who has died.

In Egypt, at Beni-hassan, an inscription by Chnumhotep says—"I made to flourish the name of my father, and I built the chapels for his *ka*. I caused my statues to be conveyed to the holy dwelling, and distributed to them their offerings in pure gifts. I instituted the officiating priest, to whom I gave donations in lands and peasants." Similarly at Abydos, Rameses II says concerning the worship of his father, Seti I:—

"I dedicated to thee the lands of the South for the service of thy temple, and the lands of the North, they bring to thee their gifts before thy beautiful countenance . . . I fixed for thee the number of the fields . . . great is their number according to their valuation in acres. I

provided thee with land-surveyors and husbandmen, to deliver the corn for thy revenues."

Both which extracts exhibit the successor as being, in some sort, a steward for the deceased, administering on his behalf.

So was it in an adjacent empire. Assyria's "first rulers were called Patesi or 'Viceroys' of Assur;" and an inscription of Tiglath-Pileser says:—

"Ashur (and) the great gods, the guardians of my kingdom, who have government and laws to my dominions, and ordered an enlarged frontier to their territory, having committed to (my) hand their valiant and warlike servants, I have subdued the lands and the peoples and the strong places, and the Kings who were hostile to Ashur."

If now we remember that in Egypt the *ka*, or double of the dead man, was expected to return after a long period to re-animate his mummy and resume his original life—if we recall, too, the case of the Peruvians, who, similarly providing elaborately for the welfare of departed persons, similarly believed that they would eventually return—if we find ourselves thus carried back to the primitive notion that death is simply a long-suspended animation; we may suspect the original conception to be that when he revives, a man will reclaim whatever he originally had; and that therefore whoever holds his property, holds it subject to his prior claim—holds it as a kind of tenant who may be dispossessed by the owner, and whose sacred duty meanwhile is to administer it primarily for the owner's benefit.

§ 601. Be this so or not, however, the facts grouped as above, clearly show how, among the progenitors of the civilized peoples of the Old World, as well as among peoples who still retain early institutions, there arose those arrangements of the family-cult which existed, or still exist.

What has happened where descent in the female line obtains, is not clear. I have met with no statements showing that in societies characterized by this usage, the duty of ministering to the double of the dead man devolved on one of his children rather than on others. But the above facts show that, where the system of counting kinship through

males has been established, the descent of the priestly function follows the same law as the descent of property; and there are other facts showing it more directly.

At the present time the connexion between the two is well displayed in China, where "it is regarded as indispensable that there should be some one to *burn incense to the manes of the dead*, from the eldest son down to posterity in the direct line of the eldest son, either by an own child or an adopted child;" and where the eldest son, who inherits more than other sons, has to bear the cost of the offerings. So, too, is it in the Corea, where, as already pointed out, the Shangjoo, or chief mourner, is either the eldest son or the eldest son of the eldest. When the corpse is buried, "if there are graves of ancestors in that place already, the Shangjoo sacrifices before them also, informing them of the new arrival."

These facts, along with foregoing ones, show that devolution of the sacrificial office accompanies devolution of property, because the property has to bear the costs of the sacrifices. We see that in societies characterized by the patriarchal form of organization, a son, who alone was capable of inheriting, could alone have due means of ministering to the deceased, and therefore could alone be priest. Whence obviously resulted the necessity for having a male descendant, as indicated above.

At the same time we are shown how, under the patriarchal type of society in its first stages, the domestic, the political, and the ecclesiastical, are undistinguished. These sacrifices made to the departed head of a family-group are primarily domestic. As the family-group develops into the compound group, the patriarch at its head acquires a quasi-political character; and these offerings made to him after death are in the nature of tribute, while fulfilment of the commands he left, disobedience to which may bring punishment when he returns, implies civil subordination. At the same time, in so far as these actions are performed to propitiate a being distinguished as supernatural, those who perform them acquire a quasi-ecclesiastical character.

CHAPTER V.

THE RULER AS PRIEST.

§ 602. IN Chapters XIV and XV of Part I, we saw that according to the primitive Theory of Things, this life and this world stand in close relations with the other life and the other world. As implied at the end of the last chapter, one of the many results is that throughout early stages of social evolution, the secular and the sacred are but little distinguished.

Speaking of religion and politics, Huc remarks that "in the Eastern regions of Asia they were formerly one and the same thing, if we may judge from tradition. . . . The name of *heaven* was given to the Empire, the sovereign called himself *God*." How intimately blended were conceived to be the affairs of the material and spiritual worlds by the ancient Ethiopians, is well shown in Maspero's translation of a tablet describing the choice of a king by them.

"Then said each of them [the assembled host] unto his mate: 'It is true! since the time heaven was, since the royal crown was, . . . Ra decreed to give it unto his son whom he loves, so that the king be an image of Ra amongst the living; and has not Ra put himself in this land, that this land may be in peace?' Then said each of them unto his mate: 'But Ra has he not gone away to heaven, and is not his seat empty without a king . . .?' So this whole host mourned, saying: 'There is a Lord standing amongst us without our knowing him!'" [The host eventually agrees to go to Amen-Ra, "who is the god of Kush," and ask him to give them their "Lord to vivify" them. Amen-Ra selects one of the Royal Brothers. The new king makes his obeisance to Amen-Ra, "and smelt the earth very much, very much, saying: 'Come to me, Amen-Ra, Lord of the seats of both worlds.'"]

Again of the ancient Peruvians we read that—

“If the estates of the King were not sufficient to provide for the excessive cost of a war, then those of the Sun were made available, which the Ynca considered to be his, as the legitimate child and heir of the Deity.”

If from the primitive belief that the double of the dead man will presently return and resume his life, there results the conception that the son who holds his property and ministers to him from its proceeds is but a deputy, then this fusion of the sacred with the secular is a corollary. When we read of the New Caledonians that in Tokelau, while “the king, Tui Tokelau, is high priest as well,” “their great god is called Tui Tokelau, or king of Tokelau,” we have a typical instance of the union which results from this supposed vicegerency.

§ 603. While the growth of the family into the cluster of families, ending in the formation of the village-community, which often includes affiliated strangers, involves that the patriarch ceases to have the three-fold character of domestic, political, and ecclesiastical head, his character remains two-fold: he habitually retains, as in the case just named, the functions of ruler and priest. This connexion of offices we everywhere find in early stages of social evolution; and we observe it continuing through later stages.

In Tanna, “the chief acts as high-priest;” and the like is true in other islands of the group. The kings of Mangaia “were ‘te ara pia o Rongo’ *i.e.*, ‘the mouth-pieces, or priests, of Rongo.’” Among the New Zealanders “the offices of chief and priest were generally united and hereditary.” “The king of Madagascar . . . is high-priest of the realm.” In the Sandwich Islands the king “uttered the responses of the oracle, from his concealment in a frame of wicker-work.” Of Humphrey’s Island we read that the king “was high priest as well.” Similarly with rude peoples in America. “The Pueblo chiefs seem to be at the same time priests,” says Bancroft; and we learn the like from Ross concerning the Chinooks, and from Hutchison concerning the Bolivian

Indians. Of various semi-civilized peoples, past and present, we have similar accounts. The traditional "founders of the Maya civilization, united in their persons the qualities of high-priest and king." In ancient Peru, the Ynca was high-priest: "as the representative of the Sun, he stood at the head of the priesthood, and presided at the most important of the religious festivals." Of Siam, Thomson writes—"the King himself is High Priest." We are told by Crawfurd that the Javanese king is "the first minister of religion." In China the ritual laws give to the Emperor-Pontiff "the exclusive privilege of worshipping the Supreme, and prohibit subjects from offering the great sacrifices." And in Japan, the Mikado was "chief of the national religion." The early records of Old World peoples show us the same connexion. The Egyptian king, head of the priesthood, was everywhere represented in their monuments as sacrificing to a god. The Assyrian king was similarly represented; and the inscriptions show that Tiglath Pileser was "high-priest of Babylon." So, too, in the Hebrew records we read of David officiating as priest. It was the same with Aryan peoples in ancient days. Among the Greeks, as described by Homer, acts of public devotion "are everywhere performed by the chiefs without the intervention of a priest." The Spartan kings were priests of Zeus; and they received the perquisites due to priests. So "at Athens, the archon-king . . . embraced in his functions all that belonged to the State-religion. He was a real *rex sacrorum*." And that the like was the case among the Romans, "we know from the fact that the 'rex sacrificulus' was appointed on the abolition of the monarchy to perform such sacrifices as could only be performed by a king." Nor did the Aryans who spread northwards fail to furnish illustrations. Among the primitive Scandinavians the head man was "minister and magistrate in one:" in early days "each chief, as he settled, built his own hof or temple, and assumed the functions of priest himself."

This connexion long continued in a modified form through-

out mediæval Europe. King Gontran was "like a priest among priests." Charlemagne, too, had a kind of high-priestly character: on solemn occasions he bore relics on his shoulders and danced before relics. Nor indeed is the connexion entirely broken even now.*

§ 604. In illustrating this primitive identity of ruler and priest, and in tracing out the long-continued connexion between the two, I have been unavoidably led away from the consideration of this double function as seen at the outset. Fully to understand the genesis of the priest properly so called, we must return for a moment to early stages.

At first the priestly actions of the chief differ in nothing from the priestly actions of other heads of families. The heads of all families forming the tribe, severally sacrifice to their departed ancestors; and the chief does the like to his departed ancestors. How, then, does his priestly character become more decided than theirs?

Elsewhere I suggested that besides propitiating the ghosts of dead relatives, the members of a primitive community will naturally, in some cases, think it prudent to propitiate the ghost of a dead chief, regarded as more powerful than other ghosts, and as not unlikely to do them mischief if friendly

* The fact that most people on reading that Melchizedek was priest and king, are struck by the connexion as anomalous, well exemplifies the quality of current education. When, as I have just learned, a clergyman examining young ladies at their confirmation, names as remarkable this combination of characters, which is the normal combination, we may judge how widely prevalent is the ignorance of cardinal truths in the histories of societies: an ignorance which goes along with knowledge of those multitudinous trivialities that make up primers of history and figure on examination papers. But our many-headed political pope, which is as fit to prescribe a system of education as was the ecclesiastical pope to tell Galileo the structure of the Solar System, thinks well that children should learn (even though the lessons add to that strain which injures health) what woman this or that king married, who commanded at this or that battle, what was the punishment of this rebel or that conspirator, &c.; while they are left in utter darkness respecting the early stages of leading institutions under which they live.

relations are not maintained by occasional offerings. I had not, when making the suggestion, any evidence; but conclusive evidence has since been furnished by the Rev. Duff MacDonald's *Africana*. The following three extracts show the transition from priestly actions of a private character to those of a public character, among the Blantyre negroes.

"On the subject of the village gods opinions differ. Some say that everyone in the village, whether a relative of the chief or not, must worship the forefathers of the chief. Others say that a person not related to the chief must worship his own forefathers, otherwise their spirits will bring trouble upon him. To reconcile these authorities we may mention that nearly everyone in the village is related to its chief, or if not related is, in courtesy, considered so. Any person not related to the village chief would be polite enough on all public occasions to recognise the village god: on occasions of private prayer . . . he would approach the spirits of his own forefathers."

"The chief of a village has another title to the priesthood. It is his relatives that are the village gods."

"Apart from the case of dreams and a few such private matters, it is not usual for anyone to approach the gods except the chief of the village. He is the recognised high priest who presents prayers and offerings on behalf of all that live in his village."

Here, then, we see very clearly the first stage in the differentiation of the chief into the priest proper—the man who intercedes with the supernatural being not on his own behalf simply, nor on behalf only of members of his family, but on behalf of unrelated persons. This is, indeed, a stage in which, as shown by the disagreement among the people themselves, the differentiation is incomplete. In another part of Africa, we find it more definitely established. At Onitsha on the Niger, "the people reverence him [the king] as the mediator between the gods and themselves, and salute him with the title of *Igwe*, which in Ebo means supreme being." A kindred state of things is illustrated among remote and unallied peoples. In Samoa, where the chiefs were priests, "every village had its god, and everyone born in that village was regarded as the property of that god." And among the ancient Peruvians, more advanced though they were in their social organization, a like primitive arrangement was trace-

able. The *huacas* were adored by the entire village; the *canopas* by particular families, and only the priests spoke to, and brought offerings to, the *huacas*.

These few out of many cases, while they sufficiently exemplify the incipient parting of the sacred function from the secular function, also illustrate the truth which everywhere meets us, that the political and religious obligations are originally both obligations of allegiance, very little distinguished from one another—the one being allegiance to the living chief and the other allegiance to the ghost of the dead chief.

To prevent misapprehension a parenthetical remark must be made. This growth of a distinction between the public worship of his ancestor by a chief, and the private worship of their ancestors by other men, which makes the chief's priestly character relatively decided, is apt to be modified by circumstances. Where allegiance to the ghost of a deceased patriarch or founder of the tribe, has become so well established through generations that he assumes the character of a god; and where, by war or migration, the growing society is so broken up that its members are separated from their chief and priest; it naturally results that while continuing to sacrifice to the doubles of their dead relatives, these separated members of the society begin to sacrifice on their own account to the traditional god. Among the ancient Scandinavians "every father of a family was a priest in his own house," where he sacrificed to Odin. Similarly among the Homeric Greeks. While chiefs made public sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices and prayers were made to them by private persons, in addition to the sacrifices made to their own ancestors. The like was the case with the Romans. And even among the Hebrews, prohibited from worshipping ancestors, the existence of public propitiators of Jahveh did not exclude "the competence of every Israelite" to perform propitiatory rites: the nomadic habits preventing concentration of the priestly function.

Phenomena of this kind, however, manifestly belong to a more advanced stage and not to that first stage in which, as we see, the genesis of the god and the priest are concurrent.

§ 605. Thus, then, the ghost-theory, which explains the multitudinous phenomena of religion in general, explains also the genesis of the priestly function, and the original union of it with the governing function.

Propitiations of the doubles of dead men, made at first by all their relatives and afterwards by heads of families, come to be somewhat distinguished when made by the head of the most powerful family. With increased predominance of the powerful family, and conception of the ghost of its deceased head as superior to other ghosts, there arises the wish, at first in some, then in more, and then in all, to propitiate him. And this wish eventually generates the habit of making offerings and prayers to him through his ruling descendant, whose priestly character thus becomes decided.

We have now to observe how, with the progress of social evolution, the sacerdotal function, though for a long time retained and occasionally exercised by the political head, comes to be performed more and more by proxy.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RISE OF A PRIESTHOOD.

§ 606. IN §§ 480 and 504, I have drawn conclusions from the fact, obvious *a priori* and illustrated everywhere, that with increase of a chief's territory, there comes an accumulation of business which necessitates the employment of assistants; whence follows the habit of frequently, and at length permanently, deputing one or other of his functions, such as general, judge, etc. Among the functions thus deputed, more or less frequently, is that of priest.

That such deputation takes place under pressure of affairs, civil or military, we see in the case of the Romans. As the kings could not always attend to the sacrifices, having often to make war, Numa (who performed, according to Livy, the majority of the sacerdotal offices) "instituted flamens to replace the kings when the latter were absent;" and, adds M. Coulanges, "thus the Roman priesthood was only an emanation from the primitive royalty." How causes of this kind operate in simple societies, we are shown by a sentence in Mr. MacDonald's account of the Blantyre negroes. He says:—"If the chief is from home his wife will act [as priest], and if both are absent, his younger brother." As occurring in a ruder society where the blood-relationship of the chief to the god is still recognized, this case shows us, better than that of the Romans, how a priesthood normally originates.

This vicarious priest-ship of the younger brother, here arising temporarily, in other cases becomes permanent. Of

the New Zealanders, who have in many cases chiefs who are at the same time priests, we read that in other cases the brother of the chief is priest. In the Mexican empire "the high-priest in the kingdom of Acolhuacan [and in that of Tlacupan] was, according to some historians, always the second son of the king." So, too, in ancient Peru "they had a high priest, who was an uncle or brother of the king, or at least a legitimate member of the royal family." As this last case shows, when the ruling man, still exercising the priestly function on great occasions, does not invariably make his younger brother his deputy on ordinary occasions, the office of high-priest still habitually falls to some blood-relation. Thus of the Khonds we read that "the chief civil and sacerdotal offices appear originally to have been united, or, at least, to have been always held by members of the chief patriarchal family." In Tahiti, where the king frequently personified the god, receiving the offerings brought to the temple and the prayers of the supplicants, and where he was sometimes the priest of the nation, "the highest sacerdotal dignity was often possessed by some member of the reigning family." Dupuis tells us that one of the priests of Ashantee belonged to the "king's own family." Among the Maya nations of America "the high-priests were members of the royal families." And in ancient Egypt there existed a kindred connexion. The king himself being high-priest, it was natural that the priesthood should include some of his relatives; and Brugsch, speaking of the high-priests of Ptah, says—"We find among their number princes of the blood royal. As an example we may name the prince Khamus, a favourite son of Ramses II."

In some cases the priestly functions of the head man are performed by a female relative. Among the Damaras the chief's daughter is priestess; and, "besides attending to the sacrifices, it is her duty to keep up the 'holy fire.'" On appointed occasions among the Dahomans, sacrifices are brought to the tomb (presumably of a king) and "before the

tomb, a Tansi-no priestess, of blood-royal, offers up to the Ghost a prayer." Similarly in ancient Peru, a chief priestess who was one of the virgins of the Sun, and who was regarded as his principal wife, "was either the sister or the daughter of the ruler." On reading that among the Chibchas, with the priests "as with the caziques, the sister's son inherited," we may suspect that usages of this kind were consequent on descent in the female line. Among the Damaras this law of descent is still in force; it was manifestly at one time the law among the Peruvians; and the high political position of women among the Dahomans suggests that it was once the law with them also. Further reason for assuming this cause is supplied by the fact that in Dahomey and Peru, the priestly organization in general is largely officered by women; and that in Madagascar too, where descent is in the female line, there are women-priests. Obviously the transition from the usage of tracing descent through females to that of tracing descent through males, or the mixture of peoples respectively recognizing these unlike laws of descent, will cause anomalies; as instance that shown us by the Karens, whose village priests are males, but who, in their family ancestor-worship, "require that the officiating priest shall be a woman, the oldest of the family."

This deputation of priestly functions to members of a ruling family, usual in early stages, may be considered the normal differentiation; since the god being the apotheosized ancestor, the sacrifices made to him continue to be the sacrifices made by descendants. Even where descent is not real, or has ceased to be believed, it is still pretended; as in Egypt, where the king habitually claimed kinship with a god, and where, by consequence, members of his family were hypothetically of divine descent.

§ 607. But while this is distinguishable as the usual origin of a priesthood, there are other origins. In a preceding chapter we saw that there is at the outset no clear distinction

between the medicine-man and the priest. Though the one is a driver away of spirits rather than a propitiator of them, while the other treats them as friends rather than enemies, yet either occasionally adopts the policy of the other. The priest sometimes plays the part of exorcisor and the medicine-man endeavours to appease: instance the Australian medicine-man described in § 584. Among the Ostyaks the shamans, who are medicine-men, are also "intermediators between the people and their gods." The business of a Gond medicine-man is "to exorcise evil spirits, to interpret the wishes of the fetish, to compel rain, and so on." And the same men who, among the Kukis, have to pacify a god who is angry and has caused disease, are often supposed to abuse "the influence they possess with supernatural agents." Evidently there is here indicated another origin of a priesthood.

Especially in cases where the medicine-man is supposed to obtain for the tribe certain benefits by controlling the weather through the agency of supernatural beings, does he participate in the character of priest. On recalling the case of Samuel, who while a judge over Israel also offered sacrifice to Jahveh as a priest and also controlled the weather by his influence with Jahveh (thus uniting the offices of ruler, priest and weather-doctor), we are shown how a kindred union of functions may in other cases similarly arise. Such facts as that among the Obbo the chief is also the rain-maker, and that Sechele, king of the Bechuanas, practises "rain-magic," besides re-inforcing the evidence given in § 474 that supposed power over supernatural beings strengthens the hands of political heads, shows also that, as having the function of obtaining from the supernatural beings benefits for the society, they in so far fulfil the priestly office.

In other cases there arise within the tribe the worships of apotheosized persons who were not related to the apotheosized chief; but who, for some reason or other, have left behind awe-inspiring reputations. Hislop tells us of a Gond who

boasts of miraculous powers, and who "has erected a sacred mound to the manes of his father, who was similarly gifted, and he uses the awe which attaches to this spot as a means of extorting money from the deluded Queen"—money partly spent in offerings to "his deified ancestor:" the rest being appropriated by himself. And Sir Alfred Lyall in his *Asiatic Studies*, variously illustrates this sporadic origin of new deities severally apt to originate priesthoods.

Hence it seems inferable that in early stages there occasionally arise men not descended from the chief's ancestor, who acquire quasi-priestly characters, and may even succeed in supplanting priests of normal origin. Especially is such usurpation likely to happen where by migration or by war, there have been produced fragments of the society which do not contain within themselves descendants of the traditional god.

§ 608. So long as there continues undivided, a community of which the deceased founder has become the village god, propitiated on behalf of his descendants by the nearest of kin among them, who also serves as intermediary for other heads of families respectively worshipping their ancestors, no advance in the development of a priesthood is likely to take place. But when increase of numbers necessitates parting, there comes a further differentiation. How this arises we are well shown by a statement of Andersson concerning the Damaras:—"A portion of such fire [sacred fire] is also given to the head man of a kraal, when about to remove from that of the chief. The duties of a vestal then devolve upon the daughter of the emigrant." Evidently where a dead ruler, or other remarkable member of the tribe, has become a traditional god, so well established that propitiation of him has become imperative, migrating portions of the tribe, carrying their cult with them, must have someone to perform the rites on their behalf. Always the probability is that the detached group contains men akin to the chief of

the parent tribe, and therefore descendants, direct or collateral, of the worshipped god; and on one of these, in virtue of greatest age or nearest relationship, the function is likely to fall. And since the reasons which determine this choice tend also to determine inheritance of the function, the genesis of a priestly caste becomes intelligible. Light is thrown on the matter by Hislop's statement that though the Gonds are without priests, there are "some men who, from supposed superior powers, or in consequence of their hereditary connection with a sacred spot, are held to be entitled to take the lead in worship." The course which change in some cases takes is shown us by the Sântals. Hunter says—

"Two of the tribes have more especially devoted themselves to religion, and furnish a large majority of the priests. One of these represents the state religion, founded on the family basis, and administered by the descendants of the fifth son, the original family priest. . . . In some places, particularly in the north, the descendants of the second son . . . are held to make better priests than those of the fifth. . . . They are for the most part prophets, diviners, and officiating Levites of forest or other shrines, representing demon-worship; and in only a few places do they take the place of the fifth tribe."

Not only by the spread of a growing tribe into new habitats, are there thus produced conditions which further the growth of a priesthood; but kindred conditions are produced by the spread of a conquering tribe, and the establishment of its members as rulers over subordinate tribes. While it has to establish local governments, it has also to establish local ministrations of the cult it brings with it. The case of the Peruvians may be taken as typical. The Yncarace, over-running indigenous races and leaving their religions intact, simply superposed their own religion. Hence the need for dispersed representatives of it. "The principal priest (or bishop) in each province was an Ynca, who took care that the sacrifices and ceremonies should be in conformity with those of the metropolitan." Now since the Ynca-religion was a worship of the Sun, regarded as ancestor; and since his supposed most direct descendant, the king himself, was high-priest on important occasions, while the other chief priests

were "all Yncas of the blood royal;" it becomes clear that this establishment of a local priesthood of Ynca-blood, illustrates the development of a priestly caste from the ancestor-worshipping members of a conqueror's family.

§ 609. In verification of the foregoing conclusions, some evidence might be added showing that in tribes which lead peaceful lives, and in which considerable advances have been made without the establishment of strong personal governments, and therefore without the rise of apotheosized chiefs serving as village gods, there is but a feeble marking off of the priest-class. Among the Bodo and Dhimals, for example, the priestly office is not hereditary, and is participated in by the elders of the people.

It is scarcely practicable, however, and would not be very profitable, to trace further this rise of a priesthood. Influences of sundry kinds tend everywhere to complicate, in one way or other, the primitive course of development. While we see that worshipping the spirit of the dead chief, at first carried on by his heir, is in his heir's absence deputed to a younger brother—while we see that temporary assumption of the function by a brother or other member of the family, tends to become permanent where the business of the chief increases—while we see that migrating parts of a tribe, are habitually accompanied by some of the village god's direct or collateral descendants, who carry with them the cult and perform its rites, and that where conquest of adjacent communities leads to an extension of rule, political and ecclesiastical, members of the ruling family become local priests; we find at work sundry causes which render this process irregular. Besides the influence which the chief or his priestly relative is supposed to have with powerful supernatural beings, there is the competing influence ascribed to the sorcerer or rain-maker. Occasionally, too, the tribe is joined by an immigrant stranger, who, in virtue of superior knowledge or arts, excites awe; and an additional cult may

result either from his teachings, or from his own apotheosis. Moreover, a leader of a migrating portion of the tribe, if in some way specially distinguished, is likely at death to become himself the object of a worship competing with the traditional worship, and perhaps initiating another priesthood. Fluctuating conditions are thus apt, even in early stages, to produce various modifications in ecclesiastical organization.

But the complications thus resulting are small compared with others which they foreshadow, and to which we may now turn our attention.

CHAPTER VII.

POLYTHEISTIC AND MONOTHEISTIC PRIESTHOODS.

§ 610. ALREADY in the preceding chapters the rudimentary form of a polytheistic priesthood has been exhibited. For wherever, with the worship of an apotheosized founder of the tribe, there co-exist in the component families of the tribe, worships of their respective ancestors, there is an undeveloped polytheism and an incipient priesthood appropriate to it. In the minds of the people there is no contrast in kind between the undistinguished ghosts and the distinguished ghosts ; but only a contrast in power. In the first stage, as in later and higher stages, we have a greater supernatural being amid a number of lesser supernatural beings ; all of them propitiated by like observances.

The rise of that which is commonly distinguished as polytheism, appears to result in several ways ; of which two may be named as the more important.

The first of them is a concomitant of the division and spreading of tribes which outgrow their means of subsistence. Within each separated sub-tribe eventually arises some distinguished chief or medicine-man, whose greatly-feared ghost, propitiated not by his descendants only but by other members of the sub-tribe, becomes a new local god ; and where there survives the cult which the sub-tribe brought with it, there will, in addition to the worship of the more ancient god common to the spreading cluster of sub-tribes, grow up in each sub-tribe the worship of a more modern god

peculiar to it. Traces of this process we find in many places. What we read of the Malagasy may be instanced as typical. They have gods who belong "respectively to different tribes or divisions of the natives, and are supposed to be the guardians and benefactors, or the titular gods, of these particular clans or tribes. Four of these are considered superior to all others"—are public or national gods. And Ellis adds that the gods of one province have little weight or authority with people of another province. As a case remote in time may be named that of the ancient Egyptians. The nomes, or original divisions of which Egypt was composed, were "of the highest antiquity": their limits being very exactly defined in inscriptions borne by the most ancient monumental structures. "Each district had a chief place where the [hereditary] governor resided, and enjoyed the protection and the cult of a special divinity, the sanctuary of which formed the centre of the religious worship of the district." That kindred evidence is furnished by accounts of other ancient peoples needs no showing. Of course along with this process goes the rise of priesthoods devoted some to the local and some to the general cults, with consequent differences in dignity. Thus of Egyptian priests we read:—"Some also, who were attached to the service of certain divinities, held a rank far above the rest; and the priests of the great gods were looked upon with far greater consideration than those of the minor deities. In many provinces and towns, those who belonged to particular temples were in greater repute than others."

A genesis of polytheism, and of polytheistic priesthoods, equally important with, or perhaps more important than, the foregoing, but frequently, as in the last case, scarcely distinguishable from it, accompanies conquest. The over-runnings of tribe by tribe and nation by nation, which have been everywhere and always going on, have necessarily tended to impose one cult upon another; each of them already in most cases made composite by earlier processes of like kind. Not destroying the worships of the conquered, the conquerors bring in their own worships—either carrying them on

among themselves only, or making the conquered join in them; but in either case multiplying the varieties of priests. The survival of cults that were of Pelasgian origin amid those of the Greeks, supplies an early instance in Europe; and later instances are supplied by the Romans. "As a conquering state Rome was constantly absorbing the religions of the tribes it conquered. On besieging a town, the Romans used solemnly to evoke the deities dwelling in it." The process was illustrated in ancient American societies. "The high-priests of Mexico were the heads of their religion only among the Mexicans, and not with respect to the other conquered nations: these . . . maintaining their priesthood independent." Similarly in Peru.

"The Yncas did not deprive the chiefs of their lordship, but his delegate lived in the valley, and the natives were ordered to worship the sun. Thus a temple was built, and many virgins and priests to celebrate festivals resided in it. But, notwithstanding that this temple of the sun was so pre-eminently established, the natives did not cease to worship also in their ancient temple of Chinchaycama."

Of additional but less important causes of complication, three may be named. The spreading reputations of local deities, and the consequent establishment of temples to them in places to which they do not belong, is one of these causes. A good example is that of *Æsculapius*; the worship of whom, as a local ancestor and medicine-man, originated in Pergamon, but, along with his growth into a deity, spread East and West, and eventually became established in Rome. Another additional cause, well illustrated in ancient Egypt, is the deification of powerful persons who establish priesthoods to minister to their ghosts. And a third is the occasional apotheosis of those who, for some reason or other strike the popular imagination as remarkable. This is even now active in India. Sir Alfred Lyall has exemplified it in his *Asiatic Studies*.

§ 611. The frequent genesis of new worships and continued co-existence of many worships, severally having their

priesthoods, though quite normal as we here see, appears to many persons anomalous. Carrying back modern ideas to the interpretation of ancient usages, writers comment on the "tolerance" shown by the Romans in leaving intact the religions of the peoples conquered by them. But considered from their point of view instead of from our point of view, this treatment of local gods and their priests was quite natural. If everywhere, from ancestor-worship as the root, there grow up worships of known founders of tribes and traditional progenitors of entire local races, it follows that conquerors will, as a matter of course, recognize the local worships of the conquered while bringing in their own. The corollary from the universally-accepted belief is that the gods of the vanquished are just as real as those of the victors.

Sundry interpretations are yielded. Habitually in the ancient world, conquerors and settlers took measures to propitiate the local gods. All they heard about them fostered the belief that they were powerful in their respective localities, and might be mischievous if not prayed to or thanked. Hence, probably, the fact that the Egyptian Nekôs sacrificed to Apollo on the occasion of his victory over Josiah, king of Judah. Hence, to take a case from a remote region, the fact that the Peruvian Yncas, themselves Sun-worshippers, nevertheless provided sacrifices for the various *huacas* of the conquered peoples, "because it was feared that if any were omitted they would be enraged and would punish the Ynca."

Co-existence of different cults is in some cases maintained by the belief that while the allegiance of each man to his particular deity or deities is obligatory, he is not required, or not permitted, to worship the deities belonging to fellow-citizens of different origin. Thus in early times in Greece, "by the combination of various forms of religious worship Athens had become the capital, and Attica one united whole. But . . . Apollo still remained a god of the nobility, and his religion a wall of separation. . . . According to the

plan of Solon this was to be changed. . . . To every free Athenian belonged henceforth the right and the duty of sacrificing to Apollo."

All which facts make it clear that not only the genesis of polytheism but the long survival of it, and consequent persistence of priesthoods devoted to different gods, are sequences of primitive ancestor-worship.

§ 612. But while, during early stages of polytheism, overt efforts at subjugation of one cult by another are not conspicuous, there habitually arises a competition which is the first step towards subjugation.

A feeling like that occasionally displayed by boys, boasting of the strengths of their respective fathers, prompts men in early stages to exaggerate the powers of their ancestors, as compared with the powers which the ancestors of others displayed; and concerning the relative greatness of the deified progenitors of their tribes, there are certain to arise disputes. This state of things was exemplified in Fiji when first described by missionaries: "each district contending for the superiority of its own divinity." Evidently among the Hebrews an implied belief, opposed to the beliefs of adjacent peoples, was—our god is greater than your god. Without denying the existence of other gods than their own, the superiority of their own was asserted. In Greece, too, the religious emulation among cities, and the desire to excite envy by the numbers of men who flocked to sacrifice to their respective deities, implied a struggle between cults—a struggle conducive to inequality. Influences such as those which caused supremacy of the Olympian festivals above kindred festivals, were ever tending among the Greeks to give some gods and their ministers a higher *status* than others. Religion being under its primary aspect the expression of allegiance—an allegiance shown first to the living patriarch or conquering hero and afterwards to his ghost; it is to be expected that causes which modify the degree and extent of

allegiance to the head man while alive, will similarly modify the allegiance to his ghost after his death. How closely connected are the two kinds of fealty we see in such a fact as that at a Santal marriage, the bride must give up her clan and its gods for those of her husband: reminding us of the representation made by Nāomi to Ruth—"thy sister-in-law is gone back unto her people, and unto her gods;" and the rejoinder of Ruth—"thy people shall be my people, and thy god my god."

So understanding the matter, we see how it naturally happens that just as the subjects of a living chief, for one reason or another dissatisfied with his rule, will some of them desert him and attach themselves to a neighbouring chief (§ 452); so, among a polytheistic people, this or that motive may prompt decrease in the number of devotees at one god's temple and increase those at the temple of another. Disappointments like those which lead to the beating of their idols by savages, when in return for sacrifices the idols have not given what was wanted, will, among peoples somewhat more advanced, cause alienation from a deity who has proved obstinate, and propitiation of a deity who it is hoped will be more conceding. Even at the present day, we are shown by the streams of pilgrims to Lourdes, how the spread of belief in some alleged marvel may initiate a new worship, or reinforce an old one. As with saints so with gods—there result gradations. Political influences, again, occasionally conduce to the elevation of some cults above others. Speaking of Greece, Curtius says:—

"Another religious worship which the Tyrants raised to a new importance was that of Dionysus. This god of the peasantry is everywhere opposed to the gods of the knightly houses, and was therefore favoured by all rulers who endeavoured to break the power of the aristocracy."

Chiefly, however, inequalities among the ascribed powers of gods, where many co-exist, are due to conquests. Militant activities, which establish gradations of rank among the living, also establish gradations of rank among the worshipped dead. Habitually mythologies tell of victories achieved by the gods;

habitually they describe fights among the gods themselves; and habitually they depict the chief god as the one who acquired supremacy by force. These are just the traits of a pantheon resulting from the apotheosis of conquering invaders, and from the usurpations now and then witnessed among their leaders. And evidently the subjugation of peoples one by another, and consequent elevation of one pantheon above another, must be a chief cause of differences among the powers of the major and minor deities, and of contrasts in importance among their respective cults and priesthoods.

§ 613. Eventually there results under favouring conditions a gravitation towards monothéism. It is true that for a long time there may continue in the minds of a polytheistic people, a fluctuating conflict among the beliefs respecting the relative powers of their gods. Of the ancient Aryans, Professor Max Müller writes—"It would be easy to find, in the numerous hymns of the Veda, passages in which almost every single god is represented as supreme and absolute. . . . Agni is called the ruler of the universe; . . . Indra is celebrated as the strongest god, . . . and the burden of one of the songs . . . is . . . Indra is greater than all. Of Soma it is said that . . . he conquers every one." Of the Egyptian gods too, a like fact is stated. The exaggerated language of worshippers attributes now to this of them and now to that, and sometimes to a living king, a greatness so transcendent that not only all other things but all other gods exist through him.

But the position of "father of gods and men" becomes eventually settled in the minds of believers; and if subsequently usurped, the usurpation does not diminish the tendency towards monothéism but increases it; since there results the idea of a divinity more powerful than was before believed in. How recognition of superiority in a conquering people, and by implication in their gods, tends to dwarf the

gods of the conquered, the ancient Peruvians show. Garcilasso tells us that Indian tribes are said to have sometimes submitted from admiration of the higher culture of the Yncas: the obligation to join in the Yncas' worship being one of the concomitants. Then of the Yncas themselves, Herrera says—

“When they saw the *Spaniards* make Arches on Centers, and take them away when the Bridge was finish'd, they all ran away, thinking the Bridge would fall; but when they saw it stand fast, and the *Spaniards* walk on it, a Cacique said, It is but Justice to serve these Men, who are the Children of the Sun.”

Evidently the attitude thus displayed conduced to acceptance of the Spaniards' beliefs and worship. And such mental conquests often repeated in the evolution of societies, tend towards the absorption of local and minor conceived supernatural agents in greater and more general ones.

Especially is such absorption furthered when one who, as a living ruler, was distinguished by his passion for subjugating adjacent peoples, leaves at death unfulfilled projects of conquest, and then has his ghost propitiated by extending his dominion. As shown by a preceding extract, this was the case with the Assyrian god Ashur (§ 600); and it was so, too, with the Hebrew god Jahveh: witness Deut. xx, 10—18.

“When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it: and when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword. . . . But of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth: But thou shalt utterly destroy them.”

From the beginning we are shown that, setting out with the double of the ordinary dead man, jealousy is a characteristic ascribed to supernatural beings at large. Ghosts not duly sacrificed to are conceived as malicious, and as apt to wreak vengeance on survivors; gods whose shrines have been ne-

glected and whose festivals do not bring due offerings, are said to be angry, and are considered the causers of disasters ; while if one of them is derived from a ruler whose love of power was insatiable, and whose ghost is considered a jealous god, tolerating no recognition of others, he tends, if his devotees become predominant, to originate a worship which suppresses other worships.

Of course with such an advance towards monotheism there goes an advance towards unification of priesthoods. The official propitiators of minor deities dwindle away and disappear ; while the official propitiators of the deity who has come to be regarded as the most powerful, or as the possessor of all power, become established everywhere.

§ 614. These influences conspiring to evolve monotheism out of polytheism are reinforced by one other—the influence of advancing culture and accompanying speculative capacity. Molina says that the Ynea Yupanqui “was of such clear understanding” as to conclude that the Sun could not be the creator, but that there must be “someone who directs him ;” and he ordered temples to be erected to this inferred creator. So again in Mexico, “Nezahuatl, lord of Tezcuco,” disappointed in his prayers to the established idols, concluded that “there must be some god, invisible and unknown, who is the universal creator ;” and he built a nine-storied temple “to the Unknown God, the Cause of Causes.” Here, among peoples unallied to them, we find results like those shown us by the Greeks. In the Platonic dialogues, along with repudiation of the gross conceptions current among the uncultured, there went arguments evidently implying an advance towards monotheism. And on comparing the ideas of the Hebrew prophets with those of primitive Hebrews, and those of most co-existing Hebrews, it becomes clear that mental progress operated as a part cause of Jewish monotheism.

It may be observed, too, that once having been set up, the change towards monotheism goes on with increasing

momentum among the highest intelligences. A supremacy of one supernatural agent having become established, there follows the thought that what power other supernatural agents exercise is exercised by permission. Presently they come to be conceived as deputies, entrusted with powers not their own; and in proportion as the Cause of Causes grows more predominant in thought, the secondary causes fade from thought.

§ 615. Rightly to conceive the evolution of monotheism and its accompanying ecclesiastical institutions, we must take note of several influences which qualify it.

The earlier tendencies towards the rise of a supreme deity are apt to prove abortive. Just as during the first stages of social integration, a predominant headship is often but temporary, and the power acquired by a conquering chief is frequently lost by his successor; so an ascribed headship among the gods is commonly not lasting. For this we may see more reasons than one.

The double of a dead man, at first conceived as existing temporarily, becomes conceived as permanently existing only where circumstances favour remembrance of him; and in like manner supremacy among ghosts or gods, requires for its maintenance that traditions shall be well preserved, and the social state lend itself to orderly observances. In many places these conditions are inadequately fulfilled. Remarking upon the fading of traditions among the Comanches, Schoolcraft says—"I question if the names of any of their chiefs of the fourth generation ascending are retained among them;" and when, in 1770, Cook touched on the shores of New Zealand within fifteen miles of the place visited by Tasman a hundred and twenty-eight years before, he found no tradition of the event. So that though everywhere the original tendency is for the oldest known progenitor to become the chief god; yet, as we are shown by the Unkulunkulu of the Zulus, this headship of the supernatural beings is apt to fade from

memory, and later headships only to be regarded. A further cause militating against an unchanged pantheon, is the rise of usurpers, or of men who, by their successes in war or other achievements, so impress themselves on the popular mind as to make relatively weak the impressions derived from traditions of earlier deified men. The acquirement of supremacy by Kronos over Uranus, and again by Zeus over Kronos, serve as illustrations. And during times in which apotheosis is an ordinary process, there is an evident tendency to such substitutions.

Yet another analogy between the changes of celestial headships and the changes of terrestrial headships, may be suspected. When dealing with political institutions, we saw that power is apt to lapse from the hands of a supreme ruler into the hands of a chief minister, through whom all information comes and all orders are issued. Similarly, a secondary supernatural being regarded as intercessor with a chief supernatural being, and constantly appealed to by worshippers in that capacity, seems liable to become predominant. Among Roman Catholics the Virgin, habitually addressed in prayers, tends to occupy the foreground of consciousness; the title "Mother of God" dimly suggests a sort of supremacy; and now in the Vatican may be seen a picture in which she is represented at a higher elevation than the persons of the trinity.

Another fact to be noted respecting the evolution of monotheisms out of polytheisms—a fact congruous with the hypothesis that they are thus evolved, but not congruous with other hypotheses—is that they do not become complete; or, at least, do not maintain their purity. Already I have referred to the truth, obvious enough though habitually ignored, that the Hebrew religion, nominally monotheistic, retained a large infusion of polytheism. Archangels exercising powers in their respective spheres, and capable even of rebellion, were practically demi-gods; answering in fact, if not in name, to the inferior deities of other pantheons. Moreover, of the derived creeds, that distinguished as trinitarian is partially

polytheistic; and in the mystery plays of the Middle Ages marks of polytheism were still more distinct. Nay, even belief in a devil, conceived as an independent supernatural being, implies surviving polytheism. Only by unitarians of the advanced type, and by those who are called theists, is a pure monotheism accepted.

Further, we may remark that where polytheism under its original form has been suppressed by a monotheism more or less complete, it habitually revives under a new form. Though the followers of Mahomet shed their own blood and the blood of others, to establish everywhere the worship of one god, the worship of minor gods has grown up afresh among them. Not only do the Bedouins make sacrifices at saints' tombs, but among more civilized Mahometans there is worship of their deceased holy men at shrines erected to them. Similarly, throughout mediæval Christendom, canonized priests and monks formed a new class of minor deities. As now in Fiji "nearly every chief has a god in whom he puts special trust;" so, a few centuries back, every knight had a patron saint to whom he looked for succour.

That modifications of Ecclesiastical Institutions result from causes of this kind, is sufficiently shown by the fact, so familiar that we do not observe its significance, that churches are named after, or dedicated to, saints; and that such churches "as were built over the grave of any martyr, or called by his name to preserve the memory of him, had usually the distinguishing title of *Martyrium*, or *Confessio*, or *Memoria*, given them for that particular reason." It may, indeed, be alleged that these usages were rather survivals than revivals; since, as Mosheim says, the early Christian bishops deliberately adopted them, believing that "the people would more readily embrace Christianity" if they "saw that *Christ* and the martyrs were worshipped in the same manner as formerly their gods were." But taken either way the facts show that monotheism, and the sacerdotal arrangements proper to it, did not become complete.

CHAPTER VIII.

ECCLESIASTICAL HIERARCHIES.

§ 616. THE component institutions of each society habitually exhibit kindred traits of structure. Where the political organization is but little developed, there is but little development of the ecclesiastical organization; while along with a centralized coercive civil rule there goes a religious rule no less centralized and coercive. Qualifications of this statement required to meet changes caused in the one case by revolutions and in the other case by substitutions of creeds, do not seriously affect it. Along with the restoration of equilibrium the alliance begins again to assert itself.

Before contemplating ecclesiastical hierarchies considered in themselves, let us, then, note more specifically how these two organizations, originally identical, preserve for a long time a unity of nature consequent on their common origin.

§ 617. As above implied, this relation is primarily illustrated by the cases in which, along with unsettled civil institutions there go unsettled religious institutions. The accounts given of the Nagas by Stewart and by Butler, which are to the effect that they "have no kind of internal government," and have apparently no priesthood, show also that along with their disregard of human authority, they show extremely little respect to such gods as they recognize after a fashion: dealing with beings in the spirit-world as defiantly as they do with living men. Of the Comanches,

again, Schoolcraft, saying that "the authority of their chiefs is rather nominal than positive," also says—"I perceived no order of priesthood . . . if they recognise any ecclesiastical authority whatever, it resides in their chiefs." Evidently in the absence of established political headship, there cannot habitually arise recognition of a deceased political head; and there is consequently no place for an official propitiator.

With the rise of the patriarchal type of organization, both of these governmental agencies assume their initial forms. If, as in early stages, the father of a family, while domestic ruler, is also the one who makes offerings to the ancestral ghost—if the head of the clan, or chief of the village, while exercising political control also worships the spirit of the dead chief on behalf of others, as well as on his own behalf; it is clear that the ecclesiastical and political structures begin as one and the same: the co-existing medicine-man being, as already shown, not a priest properly so-called. When, for instance, we read of the Eastern Slavs that "it was customary among them for the head of the family or the tribe to offer sacrifices on behalf of all beneath a sacred tree," we see that the civil and religious functions and their agents are at first undifferentiated. Even where something like priests have arisen, yet if there is an undeveloped ruling agency they are but little distinguished from others, and they have no exclusive powers: instance the Bodo and Dhimáls, whose village heads have "a general authority of voluntary rather than coercive origin," and among whom elders "participate the functions of the priesthood." Nomadic habits, while they hinder the development of a political organization, also hinder the development of a priesthood; even when priests are distinguishable as such. Tiele says of the primitive Arabs that "the sanctuaries of the various spirits and fetishes had their own hereditary ministers, who, however, formed no priestly caste." So, too, such physical characters of a habitat, and such characters of its occupants as impede the massing of small groups into large ones,

maintain simplicity of the ecclesiastical structure, as of the political. Witness the Greeks, of whom Mr. Gladstone, remarking that the priest was never "a significant personage in Greece," adds "nor had the priest of any one place or deity, so far as we know, any organic connection with the priest of any other ; so that if there were priests, yet there was not a priesthood."

Conversely, along with that development of civil government which accompanies social integration, there usually goes a development of ecclesiastical government. From Polynesia we may take, as an instance, Tahiti. Here, along with the ranks of king, nobility, land-owners, and common people, there went such distinctions among the priests that each officiated in that rank only to which he belonged ; and "the priests of the national temples were a distinct class." In Dahomey and Ashantee, along with a despotic government and a civil organization having many grades there go orders of priests and priestesses divided into several classes. The ancient American states, too, exhibited a like union of traits. Their centralized and graduated political systems were accompanied by ecclesiastical systems which were analogous in complexity and subordination. And that in more advanced societies there has been something approaching to parallelism between the developments of the agencies for civil rule and religious rule, needs not to be shown in detail.

To exclude misapprehension it may be as well to add that establishment of an ecclesiastical organization separate from the political organization, but akin to it in structure, appears to be largely determined by the rise of a decided distinction in thought between the affairs of this world and those of a supposed other world. Where the two are conceived as existing in continuity, or as intimately related, the organizations appropriate to their respective administrations remain either identical or imperfectly distinguished. In ancient Egypt, where the imagined ties between dead and living were

very close, and where the union of civil and religious functions in the king remained a real union, "a chief priest, surrounded by a numerous priesthood, governed each city." The Japanese, too, yield an instance. Along with the belief that Japan was "the land of spiritual beings or kingdom of spirits," and along with the assumption by the Mikado of power to promote deceased persons to higher ranks in their second lives (§ 347), there went the trait that the Mikado's court had six grades of ecclesiastical ranks, and in this chief centre of rule, sacred and secular functions were originally fused: "among the ancient Japanese, government and religion were the same." Similarly in China, where the heavenly and the earthly are, as Hue points out, so little separated in conception, and where there is one authority common to the two, the functions of the established religion are discharged by men who are, at the same time, administrators of civil affairs. Not only is the emperor supreme priest, but the four prime ministers "are lords spiritual and temporal." If, as Tiele says, "the Chinese are remarkable for the complete absence of a priestly caste," it is because, along with their universal and active ancestor-worship, they have preserved that inclusion of the duties of priest in the duties of ruler, which ancestor-worship in its simple form shows us.

§ 618. Likeness between the ecclesiastical and political organizations where they have diverged, is largely due to their community of origin in the sentiment of reverence. Ready obedience to a terrestrial ruler is naturally accompanied by ready obedience to a supposed celestial ruler; and the nature which favours growth of an administration enforcing the one, favours growth of an administration enforcing the other.

This connexion was well illustrated by the ancient American societies. In Mexico, along with an "odious despotism" and extreme submissiveness of the people, making possible

a governmental organization so ramified that there was a sub-sub-ruler for every twenty families, there went an immensely developed priesthood. Torquemada's estimate of 40,000 temples is thought by Clavigero to be greatly under the mark; and Clavigero says—"I should not think it rash to affirm, that there could not be less than a million of priests throughout the empire:" an estimate made more credible by Herrera's statement that "every great Man had a Priest, or Chaplain." Similarly in Peru; where, with an unqualified absolutism of the Ynca, and a political officialism so vast and elaborate that one out of every ten men had command of the others, there was a religious officialism no less extensive. Says Arriaga—"If one counts all the higher and lower officers, there is generally a minister for ten Indians or less." Obviously in the moral natures of the Mexicans and Peruvians, lies the explanation of these parallelisms. People so politically servile as those ruled over by Montezuma, who was "always carry'd on the Shoulders of Noblemen," and whose order was that "no Commoner was to look him in the Face, and if he did, dy'd for it," were naturally people content to furnish the numberless victims annually sacrificed to their gods, and ready continually to inflict on themselves propitiatory blood-lettings. And of course the social appliances for maintenance of terrestrial and celestial subordination developed among them with little resistance in corresponding degrees; as they have done, too, in Abyssinia. In the words of Bruce, "the kings of Abyssinia are above all laws;" and elsewhere he says "there is no country in the world in which there are so many churches as in Abyssinia."

Proof of the converse relation need not detain us. It will suffice to indicate the contrast presented, both politically and ecclesiastically, between the Greek societies and contemporary societies, to suggest that a social character unfavourable to the growth of a large and consolidated regulative organization of the political kind, is also unfavourable to the

growth of a large and consolidated regulative organization of the ecclesiastical kind.

§ 619. Along with increase of a priesthood in size, there habitually go those specializations which constitute it a hierarchy. Integration is accompanied by differentiation.

Let us first note how the simultaneous progress of the two is implied by the fact that while the ecclesiastical organization is at first less sharply marked off from the political than it afterwards becomes, its own structures are less definitely distinguished from one another. Says Tiele—

“That the Egyptian religion, like the Chinese, was originally nothing but an organised animism, is proved by the institutions of worship. Here, too, existed no exclusive priestly caste. Descendants sacrificed to their ancestors, the officers of state to the special local divinities, the king to the deities of the whole country. Not till later did an order of scribes and a regular priesthood arise, and even these as a rule were not hereditary.”

Again, we read that among the ancient Romans—

“The priests were not a distinct order from the other citizens. The Romans, indeed, had not the same regulations with respect to public employments as now obtain with us. With them the same person might regulate the police of the city, direct the affairs of the empire, propose laws, act as a judge or priest, and command an army.”

And though in the case of an adopted religion the circumstances are different, yet we see that in the development of an administrative organization the same essential principle displays itself. M. Guizot writes—

“In the very earliest period, the Christian society presents itself as a simple association of a common creed and common sentiments. . . . We find among them [the first Christians] no system of determinate doctrines, no rules, no discipline, no body of magistrates. . . . In proportion as it advanced . . . a body of doctrines, of rules, of discipline, and of magistrates, began to appear; one kind of magistrates were called *πρεσβυτεροι*, or *ancients*, who became the priests; another, *επισκοποι*, or inspectors, or superintendents, who became bishops; a third *διακονοι*, or deacons, who were charged with the care of the poor, and with the distribution of alms. . . . It was the body of the faithful which prevailed, both as to the choice of functionaries, and as to

the adoption of discipline, and even doctrine. The church government and the Christian people were not as yet separated."

In which last facts, while we see the gradual establishment of an ecclesiastical structure, we also see how, in the Church as in the State, there went on the separation of the small ruling part from the greater part ruled, and a gradual loss of power by the latter.

In the ecclesiastical body as in the political body, several causes, acting separately or jointly, work out the establishment of graduated authorities. Even in a cluster of small societies held together by kinship only, there tend, where priests exist, to arise differences among their amounts of influence: resulting in some subordination when they have to co-operate. Thus we read of the priests among the Bodo and Dhímáls, that "over a small circle of villages one Dhámi presides and possesses a vaguely defined but universally recognised control over the Déóhis of his district." Still more when small societies have been consolidated into a larger one by war, is the political supremacy of the conquering chief usually accompanied by ecclesiastical supremacy of the head priest of the conquering society. The tendency to this is shown even where the respective cults of the united societies remain intact. Thus it appears that "the high-priests of Mexico were the heads of their religion only among the Mexicans, and not with respect to the other conquered nations;" but we also read that the priesthood of Huitzilopochtli was that of the ruling tribe, and had, accordingly, great political influence. The Mexicatlteohuatzin had authority over other priesthoods than his own. Still more in ancient Peru, where the subjugation of the united peoples by the conquering people was absolute, a graduated priesthood of the conqueror's religion was supreme over the priesthoods of the religions professed by the conquered. After an account of the priesthood of the Sun in Cuzco, we read that—

"In the other provinces, where there were temples of the Sun, which were numerous, the natives were the priests, being relations of the

local chiefs. But the principal priest (or bishop) in each province was an Ynca, who took care that the sacrifices and ceremonies should be in conformity with those of the metropolitan."

And then we are told by another writer that—

In the great temple of Cuzco, "the Ingas plac'd the Gods of all the Provinces they conquer'd, each Idol having its peculiar Altar, at which those of the Province it belong'd to offer'd very expensive Sacrifices; the Ingas thinking they had those Provinces secure, by keeping their Gods as Hostages."

In short the ancient Peruvian priesthood consisted of a major hierarchy posed on many minor hierarchies.

But besides these subordinations of one sacerdotal system to another caused by conquest, there are, as implied in the cases given, subordinations which arise within the organization of each cult. Such differences of rank and function existed in Egypt. Besides the high priests there were the *prophetæ*, the *justophori*, the *stolistes*, the *hierogrammateis*, and some others. Similarly among the Accadians. "On comptait à Babylone," says Maury, "divers ordres de prêtres ou interprètes sacrés, les *hakimim* ou savants, peut-être les médecins; les *khartumim*, ou magiciens, les *asaphim*, ou théologiens; et enfin les *kasdim* et les *gazrim*, c'est-à-dire les Chaldéens, les astrologues proprement dits." Rome, too, "had a very rich and complicated religious establishment" (1) the Pontiffs, Augurs, etc.; (2) the Rex Sacrificulus, the Sacrificers, and the Vestal Virgins; (3) Salii and Fetiales; (4) Curiones; (5) Brotherhoods. And it was so with the Mexican priests. "Some were the sacrificers, others the diviners; some were the composers of hymns, others those who sung. . . . Some priests had the charge of keeping the temple clean, some took care of the ornaments of the altars; to others belonged the instructing of youth, the correcting of the calendar, the ordering of festivals, and the care of mythological paintings."

Where, instead of coexisting religions with their priesthoods which we find in most compound societies produced by war in early stages, we have an invading religion which,

monotheistic in theory, cannot recognize or tolerate other religions, there still, as it spreads, arises an organization similar in its centralization and specialization to those just contemplated. Describing the development of Church-government in Europe, M. Guizot says :—

“The bishop was, originally, the inspector, the chief of the religious congregation of each town. . . . When Christianity spread into the rural districts, the municipal bishop no longer sufficed. Then appeared the chorepiscopi, or rural bishops . . . the rural districts once Christian, the chorepiscopi in their turn no longer sufficed . . . each Christian agglomeration at all considerable became a parish, and had a priest for its religious head . . . originally parish priests acted absolutely only as representatives, as delegates of the bishops, and not in virtue of their own right. The union of all the agglomerated parishes around a town, in a circumscription for a long time vague and variable, formed the diocese. After a certain time, and in order to bring more regularity and completeness into the relations of the diocesan clergy, they formed a small association of many parishes under the name of the *rural chapter*. . . . At a later period many rural chapters were united . . . under the name of *district*, which was directed by an archdeacon . . . the diocesan organization was then complete. . . . All the dioceses in the civil province formed the ecclesiastical province, under the direction of the metropolitan or archbishop.”

Fully to understand this development of ecclesiastical organization, it is needful to glance at the process by which it was effected, and to observe how the increasing integration necessitated the increasing differentiation.

“During a great part of this [the second] century, the Christian churches were independent on each other, nor were they joined together by association, confederacy, or any other bonds, but those of *charity*. . . . But, in process of time, all the Christian churches of a province were formed into one large ecclesiastical body, which, like confederate states, assembled at certain times in order to deliberate about the common interests of the whole. . . . These *councils* . . . changed the whole face of the church, and gave it a new form ; for by them the ancient privileges of the people were considerably diminished, and the power and authority of the bishops greatly augmented. The humility, indeed, and prudence of these pious prelates prevented their assuming all at once the power with which they were afterward invested. . . . But they soon changed this humble tone, imperceptibly

extended the limits of their authority, turned their influence into dominion, and their counsels into laws. . . . Another effect of these councils was, the gradual abolition of that perfect equality, which reigned among all bishops in the primitive times. For the order and decency of these assemblies required, that some one of the provincial bishops met in council, should be invested with a superior degree of power and authority; and hence the rights of Metropolitans derive their origin. . . . The universal church had now the appearance of one vast republic formed by a combination of a great number of little states. This occasioned the creation of a new order of ecclesiastics, who were appointed, in different parts of the world, as heads of the church. . . . Such was the nature and office of the *patriarchs*, among whom, at length, ambition, being arrived at its most insolent period, formed a new dignity, investing the bishop of *Rome*, and his successors, with the title and authority of prince of Patriarchs."

To complete the conception it needs only to add that, while there was going on this centralization of the higher offices, there was going on a minuter differentiation of the lower. Says Lingard, speaking of the Anglo-Saxon clergy—

"These ministers were at first confined to the three orders of bishops, priests, and deacons: but in proportion as the number of proselytes increased, the services of additional but subordinate officers were required: and we soon meet, in the more celebrated churches, with subdeacons, lectors or cantors, exorcists, acolythists, and ostiarii or door-keepers. . . . All these were ordained, with appropriate forms, by the bishop."

§ 620. Among leading traits in the development of ecclesiastical institutions, have to be added the rise and establishment of monasticism.

For the origin of ascetic practices, we must once more go back to the ghost-theory, and to certain resulting ideas and acts common among the uncivilized (§§ 103 and 140). There are the mutilations and blood-lettings at funerals; there are the fastings consequent on sacrifices of animals and food at the grave; and in some cases there are the deficiencies of clothing which follow the leaving of dresses (always of the best) for the departed. Pleasing the dead is therefore inevitably associated in thought with pain borne by the living. This connexion of ideas grows most marked where

the ghost to be propitiated is that of some ruling man, notorious for his greediness, his love of bloodshed, and, in many cases, his appetite for human flesh. To such a ruling man, gaining power by conquest, and becoming a much-feared god after his decease, there arise propitiatory ceremonies which entail severe sufferings. Hence where, as in ancient Mexico, we find cannibal deities to whom multitudes of human victims were sacrificed; we also find that there were, among priests and others, self-mutilations of serious kinds, frequent self-bleedings, self-whippings, prolonged fasts, etc. The incidental but conspicuous trait of such actions, usurped in men's minds the place of the essential but less obtrusive trait. Sufferings having been the concomitants of sacrifices made to ghosts and gods, there grew up the notion that submission to these concomitant sufferings was itself pleasing to ghosts and gods; and eventually, that the bearing of gratuitous sufferings was pleasing. All over the world, ascetic practices have thus originated.

This, however, is not the sole origin of ascetic practices. They have been by all peoples adopted for the purpose of bringing on those abnormal mental states which are supposed to imply either possession by spirits, or communion with spirits. Savages fast that they may have dreams, and obtain the supernatural guidance which they think dreams give to them; and especially among medicine-men, and those in training to become such, there is abstinence and submission to various privations, with the view of producing the maniacal excitement which they, and those around, mistake for inspiration. Thus arises the belief that by persistent self-mortifications, there may be obtained an in-dwelling divine spirit; and the ascetic consequently comes to be regarded as a holy man.*

* It is curious to observe how this primitive idea still holds its ground. In Blunt's *Ecclesiastic Dictionary* there is a laudatory description of the prophet Daniel, as "using his ascetic practices as a special means of attaining Divine light:" the writer being apparently ignorant that medicine-men all over the world, have ever been doing the same thing with the same intent.

Led into his mode of life by the two-fold belief that voluntary submission to pain pleases God, and that mortifications of the flesh bring inspiration, the ascetic makes his appearance among the devotees of every religion which reaches any considerable development. Though there is little reference to permanent anchorites in ancient American societies, we are told of temporary religious retirements; as in Guatemala, where the high-priest, who was in some cases the king, fasted "four, or even eight, months in seclusion;" and as in Peru, where the Yucas occasionally lived in solitude and fasted. Among the religions of the old world, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, have all furnished numerous examples. Biblical history shows that "in times anterior to the Gospel, prophets and martyrs 'in sheepskins and goatskins,' wandered over mountains and deserts, and dwelt in caves." This discipline of separateness and abstinence, indicated as early as the days of Moses in the "vow of a Nazarite," and shown by the Essenes to be still existing in later times, reappeared in the discipline of the Christian hermits, who were the first monks or solitaries: the two words being originally equivalent. These grew numerous during the persecutions of the third century, when their retreats became refuges.

"From that time to the reign of Constantine, monachism was confined to the hermits, or anchorets, living in private cells in the wilderness. But when Pachomius had erected monasteries in Egypt, other countries presently followed the example, and so the monastic life came to its full maturity in the church."

Or, as Lingard describes the process:—

"Wherever there dwelt a monk [a recluse] of superior reputation for sanctity, the desire of profiting by his advice and example induced others to fix their habitations in his neighbourhood: he became their Abbas or spiritual father, they his voluntary subjects: and the group of separate cells which they formed around him was known to others by the name of his monastery."

Thus, beginning as usual in a dispersed unorganized form, and progressing to small clusters such as those of the Cœnobites in Egypt, severally governed by a superior with a

steward, monastic bodies, growing common, at the same time acquired definite organizations; and by-and-by, as in the case of the Benedictines, came to have a common rule or mode of government and life. Though in their early days monks were regarded as men more holy than the clergy, they did not exercise clerical functions; but in the fifth and sixth centuries they acquired some of these, and in so doing became subject to bishops: the result being a long struggle to maintain independence on the one side and to enforce authority on the other, which ended in practical incorporation with the Church.

Of course there thus arose a further complication of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which it will be sufficient just to note without describing in detail.

§ 621. For present purposes, indeed, no further account of ecclesiastical hierarchies is needed. We are here concerned only with the general aspects of their evolution.

Examination discloses a relation between ecclesiastical and political governments in respect of degree. Where there is but little of the one there is but little of the other; and in societies which have developed a highly coercive secular rule there habitually exists a highly coercive religious rule.

It has been shown that growing from a common root, and having their structures slightly differentiated in early societies, the political and ecclesiastical organizations long continue to be distinguished very imperfectly.

This intimate relationship between the two forms of regulation, alike in their instrumentalities and in their extents, has a moral origin. Extreme submissiveness of nature fosters an extreme development of both the political and religious controls. Contrariwise the growth of the agencies effecting such controls, is kept in check by the sentiment of independence; which while it resists the despotism of living rulers is unfavourable to extreme self-abasement in propitiation of deities.

While the body which maintains the observances of a cult grows in mass, it also increases in structure; and whether the cult is an indigenous or an invading one, there hence results a hierarchy of sacerdotal functionaries analogous in its general principles of organization to the graduated system of political functionaries. In the one case as in the other the differentiation, setting out from a state in which power is distributed with approximate uniformity, advances to a state in which, while the mass becomes entirely subordinate, the controlling agency displays within itself a subordination of the many to the few and to the one.

CHAPTER IX.

AN ECCLESIASTICAL SYSTEM AS A SOCIAL BOND.

§ 622. ONCE more we must return to the religious idea and the religious sentiment in their rudimentary forms, to find an explanation of the part played by ecclesiastical systems in social development.

Though ancestor-worship has died out, there survive among us certain of the conceptions and feelings appropriate to it, and certain resulting observances, which enable us to understand its original effects, and the original effects of those cults immediately derived from it. I refer more especially to the behaviour of descendants after the death of a parent or grand-parent. Three traits, of which we shall presently see the significance, may be noted.

When a funeral takes place, natural affection and usage supporting it, prompt the assembling of the family or clan: of children especially, of other relations to a considerable extent, and in a measure of friends. All, by taking part in the ceremony, join in that expression of respect which constituted the original worship and still remains a qualified form of worship. The burial of a progenitor consequently becomes an occasion on which, more than on any other, there is a revival of the thoughts and feelings appropriate to relationship, and a strengthening of the bonds among kindred.

An incidental result which is still more significant, not unfrequently occurs. If antagonisms among members of the family exist, they are not allowed to show themselves.

Being possessed by a common sentiment towards the dead, and in so far made to sympathize, those who have been at enmity have their animosities to some extent mitigated ; and not uncommonly reconciliations are effected. So that beyond a strengthening of the family-group by the gathering together of its members, there is a strengthening of it caused by the healing of breaches.

One more co-operative influence exists. The injunctions of the deceased are made known ; and when these have reference to family-differences, obedience to them furthers harmony. Though it is true that directions concerning the distribution of property often initiate new quarrels, yet in respect of pre-existing quarrels, the known wish of the dying man that they should be ended, is influential in causing compromise or forgiveness ; and if there has been a desire on his part that some particular course or policy should be pursued after his death, this desire, even orally expressed, tends very much to become a law to his descendants, and so to produce unity of action among them.

If in our days these influences still have considerable power, they must have had great power in days when there was a vivid conception of ancestral ghosts as liable to be made angry by disregard of their wishes, and able to punish the disobedient. Evidently the family-cult in primitive times, must have greatly tended to maintain the family bond : alike by causing periodic assemblings for sacrifice, by repressing dissensions, and by producing conformity to the same injunctions.

Rising as we do from the ordinary father to the patriarch heading numerous families, propitiation of whose ghost is imperative on all of them, and thence to some head of kindred clans who, leading them to conquest, becomes after death a local chief god, above all others feared and obeyed ; we may expect to find in the cults everywhere derived from ancestor-worship, the same influence which ancestor-worship in its simple original form shows us. We shall not be

disappointed. Even concerning peoples so rude as the Ostyaks, we find the remark that "the use of the same consecrated spot, or the same priest, is also a bond of union;" and higher races yield still clearer evidence. Let us study it under the heads above indicated.

§ 623. The original tribes of the Egyptians, inhabiting areas which eventually became the *nomes*, were severally held together by special worships. The central point in each "was always, in the first place, a temple, about which a city became formed." And since "some animals, sacred in one province, were held in abhorrence in another"—since, as we have seen, the animal-naming of ancestral chiefs, revered within the tribe but hated beyond it, naturally originated this; we have reason for concluding that each local bond of union was the worship of an original ancestor-god.

Early Greek civilization shows like influences at work; and records enable us to trace them to a higher stage. Grote writes—

"The sentiment of fraternity, between two tribes or villages, first manifested itself by sending a sacred legation or *Theoria* to offer sacrifice at each other's festivals and to partake in the recreations which followed." . . . "Sometimes this tendency to religious fraternity took a form called an *Amphiktyony*, different from the common festival. A certain number of towns entered into an exclusive religious partnership, for the celebration of sacrifices periodically to the god of a particular temple, which was supposed to be the common property and under the common protection of all."

Then concerning the most important of these unions, we read in Curtius—

"All Greek collective national names attach themselves to particular sanctuaries: these are the centres of union, and the starting-points of history. . . . In this respect Apollo, as the god of the Thessalian *Amphiktyony*, may be said to be the founder of the common nationality of the Hellenes, and the originator of Hellenic history."

If with this we join the further significant fact that "the Dorians . . . even called Dorus, the ancestor of their race, an so of Apollo, and recognized in the spread of the worship

of the latter their proper mission in history;" the filiation of this religious development upon ancestor-worship becomes manifest. And since the periodic gatherings for sacrifice initiated the Amphietyonic council, the statutes of which "had their origin in the Apolline religion," and were regarded with respect by the separate Grecian states "in all matters touching on rights common to all;" we have clear proof that the federal bond originated in a common worship.

The like happened in Italy. Concerning the Etruscans, Mommsen says—"Each of these leagues consisted of twelve communities, which recognized a metropolis, especially for purposes of worship, and a federal head or rather a high-priest." It was thus with the Latins too. Alba was the chief place of the Latin league; and it was also the place at which the tribes forming the league assembled for their religious festivals: such union as existed among them was sanctified by a cult in which all joined. A kindred fact is alleged of ancient Rome. "The oldest constitution of Rome is religious throughout," says Seeley. "Institutions suggested by naked utility come in later, and those which they practically supersede are not abolished, but formally retained on account of their religious character."

Though generally in such cases the need for joint defence against external enemies is the chief prompter to federation; yet in each case the federation formed is determined by that community of sacred rites which from time to time brings the dispersed divisions of the same stock together, and keeps alive in them the idea of a common origin as well as the sentiment appropriate to it.

Though Christendom has not exemplified in any considerable degree a like consolidating effect—though its worship, being an adopted one, has not supplied that bond which results where the worship is of some great founder of the tribe or traditional god of the race; yet it can hardly be questioned that unity of creed and ceremony has to some extent served as an integrating principle. Though Christian

brotherhood has not been much displayed among Christian peoples, still, it has not been absolutely a mere name. Indeed it is manifest that since similarity of thought and sympathy of feeling must further harmony by diminishing reasons for difference, agreement in religion necessarily favours union.

§ 624. Still more clearly shown is the parallelism between suspension of family animosities at funerals, and temporary cessation of hostilities between clans on occasions of common religious festivals.

Already in § 144 I have pointed out that among some of the uncivilized, burial places of chiefs become sacred, to the extent that fighting in them is forbidden: one of the results being the initiation of sanctuaries. Naturally an interdict against quarrels at burial-places, or sacred places where sacrifices are to be made, tends to become an interdict against quarrels with those who are going there to sacrifice. The Tahitians would not molest an enemy who came to make offerings to the national idol; and among the Chibchas pilgrims to Iraca (Sogamoso) were protected by the religious character of the country even in time of war. These cases at once recall cases from ancient European history. Of the tribes which originated the Roman civilization, we read—"There are, however, indications that during the Latin festival [sacrifices to Jupiter], just as was the case during the festivals of the Hellenic leagues, 'a truce of God' was observed throughout all Latium." And the instance with which Mommsen here makes a comparison, being much more specific, is particularly instructive. First serving to regulate the worship of a deity common to all, and to maintain a temporary peace among worshippers, the Amphictyonic council served to guarantee "a safe and inviolate transit even through hostile Hellenic states" to the sacrifices and to the games which became associated with them. And here from the temporary suspensions of antagonisms came secondary effects furthering union.

"The festivals of the gods thus worshipped in common were national festivals. From the system of festivals it was only a step to a common calendar. A common purse was needed for the preservation of the buildings in which the worship was carried on, and for furnishing sacrifices; this made a common coinage necessary. The common purse and temple-treasures required administrators, for whose choice it was requisite to assemble, and whose administration of their office had to be watched by a representation of the federated tribes. In case of dispute between the Amphictyones, a judicial authority was wanted to preserve the common peace, or punish its violation in the name of the god. Thus the insignificant beginning of common annual festivals gradually came to transform the whole of public life; the constant carrying of arms was given up, intercourse was rendered safe, and the sanctity of temples and altars recognized. But the most important result of all was, that the members of the Amphictyony learnt to regard themselves as one united body against those standing outside it; out of a number of tribes arose a nation, which required a common name to distinguish it, and its political and religious system, from all other tribes."

And that, little as it operated, acceptance of a common creed tended somewhat towards consolidation of European peoples, we see alike in the weekly suspensions of feudal fights under the influence of the Church, in the longer suspensions of larger quarrels under promise to the pope during the crusades and in the consequent combined action of kings who at other times were enemies; as shown by the fighting of Philip Augustus and Richard I. under the same banners.

And then beyond these various influences indirectly aiding consolidation, come the direct influences of judgments supposed to come from God through an inspired person—Delphian oracle or Catholic high-priest. "As men of a privileged spiritual endowment" the priests of Delphi were "possessed of the capacity and mission of becoming in the name of their god the teachers and counsellors, in all matters, of the children of the land;" and obviously, in so far as their judgments concerning inter-tribal questions were respected, they served to prevent wars. In like manner belief in the pope as a medium through whom the divine will was communicated, tended in those who held it to cause subordina-

tion to his decisions concerning international disputes, and in so far to diminish the dissolving effects of perpetual conflicts: instance the acceptance of his arbitration by Philip Augustus and Richard I. under threat of ecclesiastical punishment; instance the maintenance of peace between the kings of Castile and Portugal by Innocent III. under penalty of excommunication; instance Eleanor's invocation—"has not God given you the power to govern nations;" instance the formal enunciation of the theory that the pope was supreme judge in disputes among princes.

§ 625. No less clearly do the facts justify the analogy above pointed out between the recognized duty of fulfilling a deceased parent's wishes, and the imperative obligation of conforming to a divinely-ordained law.

Twice in six months within my own small circle of friends, I have seen exemplified the subordination of conduct to the imagined dictate of a deceased person: the first example being yielded by one who, after long hesitation, decided to alter a house built by his father, but only in such way as he thought his father would have approved; the second being yielded by one who, not himself objecting to play a game on Sunday, declined because he thought his late wife would not have liked it. If in such cases supposed wishes of the dead become transformed into rules of conduct, much more must expressed injunctions tend to do this. And since maintenance of family-union is an end which such expressed injunctions are always likely to have in view—since the commands of the dying patriarch, or the conquering chief, naturally aim at prosperity of the clan or tribe he governed; the rules or laws which ancestor-worship originates, will usually be of a kind which, while intrinsically furthering social cohesion, further it also by producing ideas of obligation common to all.

Already in §§ 529—30 I have pointed out that, among primitive men, the customs which stand in place of laws,

embody the ideas and feelings of past generations; and, religiously conformed to as they are, exhibit the rule of the dead over the living. From usages of the Veddahs, the Scandinavians, and the Hebrews, I there drew evidence that in some cases the ghosts of the dead are appealed to for guidance in special emergencies; and I gave proof that, more generally, apotheosized men or gods are asked for directions: instances being cited from accounts of Egyptians, Peruvians, Tahitians, Tongans, Samoans, Hebrews, and sundry Aryan peoples. Further, it was shown that from particular commands answering special invocations, there was a transition to general commands, passing into permanent laws: there being in the bodies of laws so derived, a mingling of regulations of all kinds—sacred, secular, public, domestic, personal. Here let me add evidence reinforcing that before given.

“Agriculture was inculcated as a sacred duty upon the follower of Zoroaster, and he was taught that it was incumbent upon all who worshipped Ahuramasda to lead a settled life. . . . Everything that the Nomad was enjoined to avoid was thus inculcated, as a religious duty, upon the followers of Zoroaster. . . . The principles of Zoroaster, and of similar teachers, led to the federation of settled tribes, out of which arose the mighty empires of antiquity.”

Evidently bodies of laws regarded as supernaturally given by the traditional god of the race, originating in the way shown, habitually tend to restrain the anti-social actions of individuals towards one another, and to enforce concerted action in the dealings of the society with other societies: in both ways conducing to social cohesion.

§ 626. The general influence of Ecclesiastical Institutions is conservative in a double sense. In several ways they maintain and strengthen social bonds, and so conserve the social aggregate; and they do this in large measure by conserving beliefs, sentiments, and usages which, evolved during earlier stages of the society, are shown by its survival to have had an approximate fitness to the requirements, and are

likely still to have it in great measure. Elsewhere (*Study of Sociology*, Chap. V) I have, for another purpose, exemplified the extreme resistance to change offered by Ecclesiastical Institutions, and this more especially in respect of all things pertaining to the ecclesiastical organization itself. Here let me add a further series of illustrations.

The ancient Mexicans had "flint knives used in the sacrifices." In San Salvador, the sacrificer had "a knife of flint, with which he opened the breast of the victim." Among the Chibchas, again, when a boy was sacrificed, "they killed him with a reed knife;" and at the present time among the Karens, the sacrificial hog offered to deified ancestors, "is not killed with a knife or spear; but a sharpened bamboo is forced into it." In many other cases the implements used for sacred purposes are either surviving tools of the most archaic types, or else of relatively ancient types; as in pagan Rome where "down to the latest times copper alone might be used, *e.g.* for the sacred plough and the shear-knife of the priests," and where also an ancient dress was used during religious ceremonies.

Among the Nagas, the fire for roasting a sacrificed animal is "freshly kindled by means of rubbing together two dry pieces of wood;" and on like occasions among the Todas, "although fire may be readily procured from the Mand, a *sacred* fire is created by the rubbing of sticks." The Damaras keep a sacred fire always burning; and should this be accidentally extinguished "the fire is re-lit in the primitive way—namely, by friction." Even in Europe there long continued a like connexion of ideas and practices. Says Peschel, speaking of the fire-drill, "this mode of kindling fire was retained till quite recently in Germany, for popular superstition attributed miraculous power to a fire generated by this ancient method;" and in the Western Isles of Scotland at the end of the seventeenth century, they still obtained fire for sacrificial purposes by the friction of wood in cases of plague and murrain. So is it with the form of speech. Beyond such examples as the

use of extinct tongues by Jews and by Roman Catholics for religious services, and the retention of an ancient language as a sacred language by the Copts, and the like use by the Egyptian priests of an archaic type of writing, we have illustrations furnished by the uncivilized. Schoolcraft says of the Creeks that their old language (the Seminole) is "taught by women to the children as a kind of religious duty." In Dahomey, too, the priest "pronounces an allocution in the unintelligible hierarchic tongue." And the origin of Japanese Buddhism "is shown to this day in the repetition of prayers in an unknown language, and the retention of an Indian alphabet and writing—the Sanscrit or Devanagari—in all the religious works of Japan."

This same tendency was variously exemplified among the Hebrews; as we see in the prescription of unhewn stone for altars (Exod. xx, 25-6), the use of unleavened bread for offerings (Judges, vi, 19-21), and the interdict on building a temple in place of the primitive tent and tabernacle alleged to have been the divine habitation in earlier days (2 Sam. vii, 4-6). And a like persistence was shown in Greece. Religious institutions, says Grote, "often continued unaltered throughout all the political changes."

Of course while thus resisting changes of usage, ecclesiastical functionaries have resisted with equal or greater strenuousness, changes of beliefs; since any revolution in the inherited body of beliefs, tends in some measure to shake all parts of it, by diminishing the general authority of ancestral teaching. This familiar aspect of ecclesiastical conservatism, congruous with the aspects above exemplified, it is needless to illustrate.

§ 627. Again, then, the ghost-theory yields us the needful clue. As, before, we found that all religious observances may be traced back to funeral observances; so here, we find these influences which ecclesiastical institutions exert, have their germs in the influences exerted by the feelings entertained

towards the dead. The burial of a late parent is an occasion on which the members of the family gather together and become bound by a renewed sense of kinship; on which any antagonism among them is temporarily or permanently extinguished; and on which they are further united by being subject in common to the deceased man's wishes, and made, in so far, to act in concert. The sentiment of filial piety thus manifesting itself, enlarges in its sphere when the deceased man is the patriarch, or the founder of the tribe, or the hero of the race. But be it in worship of a god or funeral of a parent, we ever see the same three influences—strengthening of union, suspension of hostilities, reinforcement of transmitted commands. In both cases the process of integration is in several ways furthered.

Thus, looking at it generally, we may say that ecclesiasticism stands for the principle of social continuity. Above all other agencies it is that which conduces to cohesion; not only between the coexisting parts of a nation, but also between its present generation and its past generations. In both ways it helps to maintain the individuality of the society. Or, changing somewhat the point of view, we may say that ecclesiasticism, embodying in its primitive form the rule of the dead over the living, and sanctifying in its more advanced forms the authority of the past over the present, has for its function to preserve in force the organized product of earlier experiences *versus* the modifying effects of more recent experiences. Evidently this organized product of past experiences is not without credentials. The life of the society has, up to the time being, been maintained under it; and hence a perennial reason for resistance to deviation. If we consider that habitually the chief or ruler, propitiation of whose ghost originates a local cult, acquired his position through successes of one or other kind, we must infer that obedience to the commands emanating from him, and maintenance of the usages he initiated, is, on the average of cases, conducive to social prosperity so long as conditions remain

the same; and that therefore this intense conservatism of ecclesiastical institutions is not without a justification.

Even irrespective of the relative fitness of the inherited cult to the inherited social circumstances, there is an advantage in, if not indeed a necessity for, acceptance of traditional beliefs, and consequent conformity to the resulting customs and rules. For before an assemblage of men can become organized, the men must be held together, and kept ever in presence of the conditions to which they have to become adapted; and that they may be thus held, the coercive influence of their traditional beliefs must be strong. So great are the obstacles which the anti-social traits of the savage (§§ 33-38) offer to that social cohesion which is the first condition to social progress, that he can be kept within the needful bonds only by a sentiment prompting absolute submission—submission to secular rule reinforced by that sacred rule which is at first in unison with it. And hence, as I have before pointed out, the truth that in whatever place arising—Egypt, Assyria, Peru, Mexico, China—social evolution throughout all its earlier stages has been accompanied not only by extreme subordination to living kings, but also by elaborate worships of the deities originating from dead kings.

CHAPTER X.

THE MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF PRIESTS.

§ 628. AMONG the many errors which result from carrying back advanced ideas and sentiments to the interpretation of primitive institutions, few are greater than that of associating priestly functions with actions classed as high in kind, and dissociating them from brutal and savage actions. Did not men's prepossessions render them impervious to evidence, even their Bible readings might raise doubts; and wider readings would prove that among mankind at large, priests have displayed and cultivated not the higher but rather the lower passions of humanity.

We at once see that this must be so, when we remember that instead of deities conceived as possessing all perfections, moral and intellectual, most peoples have had deities conceived as possessing ferocious natures, often in no way distinguished from the diabolical. Of the ancient Mexicans we read that their "Princes sent to one another to prepare for War, because their Gods demanded something to eat;" and that their armies "fought, only endeavouring to take Prisoners, that they might have Men to feed those Gods." According to Jackson, the Fijian priests told those around "that bloodshed and war, and everything connected with them, were acceptable to their gods." Though Pindar repudiates the ascription of cannibalism to the Greek gods, yet the narrative of Pausanias shows that even in his day,

human victims were occasionally sacrificed to Zeus ; and the *Iliad* tacitly ascribes to the Greek gods natures lower than it ascribes to men : lying, treachery, blood-thirstiness, adultery, are without palliation attributed to them. The fact that they took part in the battles of the men with whom they respectively sided, reminds us of the Assyrians, among whom also direct divine aid in fighting was alleged. Says an inscription of Esarhaddon :—

“Ishtar queen of war and battle, who loves my piety, stood by my side. She broke their bows. Their line of battle in her rage she destroyed. To their army she spoke thus : ‘An unsparing deity am I.’”

And kindred traits are directly or tacitly ascribed to the primitive Hebrew god. I do not refer only to sacrifices of human victims, or to such phrases as “the Lord is a man of war,” and “God himself is with us for our captain” (2 Chron. xiii, 12); but I refer more particularly to the indiscriminate slaughter said to be ordered by God, and to the fact that a religious war is assumed to be naturally a bloody war : instance the statement in 1 Chron. v, 22—“there fell down many slain, because the war was of God.” All which divine traits, attributed by early historic peoples as well as by existing barbarians, are accounted for when we remember that mythologies, which habitually describe battles among the gods for supremacy, are but transfigured accounts of struggles among primitive rulers, in which the stronger, more blood-thirsty, and more unscrupulous, usually prevailed.

Fully to understand the original connexion between military deeds and religious duties, we must recollect that when gods are not supposed to be active participators in the battles commanded or countenanced by them, they are supposed to be present in representative idols, or in certain equivalents for idols. Everywhere we find parallels to the statement made by Cook, that the Sandwich Islanders carry their war-gods with them to battle. Among the ancient Mexicans when meeting a foe, “the priests with their idols marched in the front.” Certain of the Yucatanese

had "idols, which they adored as gods of battles. . . . They carried these when they went to fight the Chinamitas, their neighbours and mortal foes." Of the Chibchas, Herrera, referring to private idols, says—"So great was their Devotion, that whithersoever they went, the Idol was carry'd, holding it with one Arm and fighting with the other in their Battles." Nor has it been otherwise in the old world. The account in 2 Samuel, v, 21, shows that the Philistines carried their images of the gods with them when fighting; and the ark, regarded by the Hebrews as a residence of Jahveh, was taken out to war not unfrequently (2 Samuel, xi). Indeed in 1 Samuel, iv, we read that the Hebrews, having been defeated by the Philistines, sent for the ark that it might save them; "and when the ark of the covenant of the Lord came into the camp, all Israel shouted with a great shout, so that the earth rang again. . . . And the Philistines were afraid, for they said, God is come into the camp." Moreover, on calling to mind the sacrifices habitually made before and after, and sometimes during, battles by uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples, we are further shown how close has been the connexion between killing enemies and pleasing deities.

Priests being the official propitiators of deities, the corollary is obvious. While often restrainers from wars with those of the same blood, they are originally stimulators to wars with those of other bloods worshipping other deities. Thus, concerning the Mexicans above referred to, who fought to provide victims for their gods, we read that "when the Priests thought fit, they went to the Kings, and told them, they must remember the Idols who were starving with Hunger." The Assyrian priests had further motives. "They lived on the revenues of the temples . . . were directly interested in war, as a portion of the spoil was dedicated to the temples." But without multiplying instances, it will suffice to recall the fact that even among the Hebrews, while king and people were in some cases inclined to show clemency, priests insisted upon *cherem*—

merciless indiscriminate slaughter; and Samuel "cried unto the Lord all night" because Saul, though he had "utterly destroyed" the Amalekites, had not killed their king and all their cattle: reminding us of the Fijian who, not having done his utmost in slaying, worked himself into a "religious frenzy," calling out continually "the god is angry with me."

This preliminary brief survey prepares us to find that in early stages of social evolution, along with sacerdotal functions go military functions. Let us look at these under their leading aspects.

§ 629. The truth that in the normal order the chief, who is originally the greatest warrior, is also the primitive priest, implies union of military and sacerdotal functions in the same person. At first the head fighter is the head propitiator of the gods. The frescoes and inscriptions of Egypt and Assyria, presenting the king as at once leader in war and leader in worship, illustrate a connexion habitually found.

This connexion is even closer than at first appears; for among the most important sacrifices made by kings to gods, are those made on the eve of battle to gain divine favour, or after victory in token of thanks. That is to say, the king discharges his function of religious propitiator in the most conspicuous way, at the time when his military headship is exercised in the most conspicuous way.

With but small modification, this connexion of functions is occasionally shown where the leadership in war is not exercised by the ruling man or body, but by an appointed general; for in such cases generals assume priestly functions. The Mexicans furnished an instance. The office of high-priest "involved, almost always, the duties of Tlacochealcatl, or commander-in-chief of the army." So was it with the ancient civilized peoples of Europe. At Rome, "before setting out on an expedition, the army being assembled, the general repeated prayers and offered a sacri-

fice. The custom was the same at Athens and at Sparta." To which we may add that, among the Romans, "the army in the field was the image of the city, and its religion followed it:" the sacred hearth was perpetually burning, there were augurs and diviners, and king or commander sacrificed before and after battle. And, indeed, the priestly function of the Roman commander was such that in some cases he paid more attention to sacrificing than to fighting.

Nor does the community end here. Beyond this union of military functions with sacerdotal functions in leaders, there occur among the uncivilized, cases in which active parts in fighting are taken by priests. Concerning the Tahitians, whose "chiefs and priests were often among the most famous boxers and wrestlers," Ellis says that "the priests were not exempted from the battle, they bore arms, and marched with the warriors to the combat." Presently we shall have to note that parallels have been furnished where they might least be expected.

§ 630. After recognizing the fact that at the outset, active ecclesiastical headship is united with active military headship; and after recognizing the fact that throughout later stages these two headships remain nominally united with headship of the state; we may go on to observe that very soon, priests usually cease to be direct participators in war, and become indirect participators only.

During times when the characters of medicine-man and priest are vaguely represented in the person of one who is supposed to have power over, or influence with, supernatural beings, we see foreshadowed the advising and administrative functions of priests in war. The Dakotahs show this kind of action in its rudest form.

"The war chiefs often get some of the priests or jugglers to make war for them. In fact, any of the jugglers can make a war-party when they choose."

Then among the Abipones the medicine-man—

"teaches them the place, time, and manner proper for attacking wild beasts or the enemy. On an approaching combat, he rides round the ranks, striking the air with a palm bough, and with a fierce countenance, threatening eyes, and affected gesticulations, imprecates evil on their enemies."

And we are told that among the Khonds—

"The priest, who in no case bears arms, gives the signal to engage after the latter offering, by flourishing an axe in the air, and shouting encouragement to defiance."

To raise the courage of the soldiers by hopes of help from the gods, was in like manner a function of the priest among Spartans.

"Every expedition and every council of war was preceded by a sacrifice. A priest, called the fire-bearer (*πυρφόρος*), carried before the army a burning brand, which was kept always alight, taken from the altar in Sparta on which the king had offered sacrifice to Zeus Agetor."

And the Hebrews similarly availed themselves of the agency of the priest in promising supernatural aid; as witness Deuteronomy, xx, 1—4.

"And it shall be, when ye are come nigh unto the battle, that the priest shall approach and speak unto the people, And shall say unto them, O Israel, ye approach this day unto battle against your enemies: let not your hearts faint, fear not, and do not tremble, neither be ye terrified because of them; for the Lord your God is he that goeth with you to fight for you against your enemies, to save you."

In some cases of which I have notes, the functions of the priests who accompanied the armies, are not specified. On the Gold Coast, where "war is never undertaken by kings or states without consulting the national deities," the "fetish-men accompany the warriors to the field." And Herrera describes the armies of the Yucatanese as having "two Wings and a Center, where the Lord and the High Priest were." But the military functions of the priest during active war, are in other cases somewhat different. Among the primitive Germans—

"The maintenance of discipline in the field as in the council was left in great measure to the priests; they took the auguries and gave

the signal for onset, they alone had power to visit with legal punishment, to bind or to beat."

In yet other cases the functions discharged are more exclusively of the kind called religious. The Samoans took a priest "to battle to pray for his people and curse the enemy." In New Caledonia, "the priests go to battle, but sit in the distance, *fasting* and praying for victory." Among the Comanches the supplicatory function was performed before going to war. "The priesthood," says Schoolcraft, "appear to exercise no influence in their general government, but, on war being declared, they exert their influence with the Deity." And in this conception of their office it seems that Christian priests agree with the priests of the Comanches; as witness the following prayer directed to be used by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the commencement of the late war in Egypt.

"O Almighty God, whose power no creature is able to resist, keep, we beseech Thee, our soldiers and sailors who have now gone forth to war, that they, being armed with Thy defence, may be preserved evermore from all perils, to glorify Thee, who art the only giver of all victory, through the merits of Thy only Son, Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

A noteworthy difference, however, being that whereas the priest among pagans in general, seeks some sign of divine approval as a first step, the Christian priest assumes that he has this approval; even though the case be that of attacking a people who are trying to throw off an intolerable tyranny.

Besides being direct or indirect aiders in battle, priests are in other cases relied on for military management, or appealed to for guidance. In Africa among the Eggarahs, a priest "officiates as minister of war." Of the ancient Mexicans we read—"The high-priests were the oracles whom the kings consulted in all the most important affairs of the state, and no war was ever undertaken without their approbation." Prescott speaks of the Peruvian priests as giving advice in matters of war; and Torquemada says that in Guatemala the priests had decisive authority on war

questions. In San Salvador, too, the high-priest and his subordinates, after seeking supernatural knowledge, "called together the cazique and war chief, and advised them of the approach of their enemies, and whether they should go to meet them." And the like happened among the Hebrews. I Kings, xxii, tells us of consultations with the prophets concerning the propriety of a war, and especially with one of them:—

"So he [Micaiah] came to the king. And the king said unto him, Micaiah, shall we go against Ramoth-gilead to battle, or shall we forbear? And he answered him, Go, and prosper: for the Lord shall deliver it into the hand of the king."

§ 631. Anyone simple enough to suppose that men's professed creeds determine their courses of conduct, might infer that nations which adopted Christianity, if not deterred from war by their nominally-accepted beliefs, would at least limit the functions of their priests to those of a religious kind, or at any rate, a non-militant kind. He would be quite wrong however.

The fact is familiar that Christian Europe throughout many centuries, saw priests taking as active parts in war as do priests among some extant savages. In the seventh century in France, bishops went to battle; and "by the middle of the eighth century regular military service on the part of the clergy was already fully developed:" "under Charles Martel it was common to see bishops and clerks bearing arms." Says Guizot concerning the state of the church at this period, the bishops "took part in the national warfare; nay more, they undertook, from time to time, expeditions of violence and rapine against their neighbours on their own account." And in subsequent centuries Germany and France alike witnessed the union of military leadership with ecclesiastical leadership. In Germany the spiritual head "was now a feudal baron; he was the acknowledged leader of the military forces in his dioceses." Writing of events in France, Orderic describes the priests

as leading their parishioners to battle, and the abbots their vassals, in 1094, and again in 1108; while in 1119 the bishops summoned the priests with their parishioners. Even after the middle of the fifteenth century the Cardinal de Balue mustered troops in Paris; and "the bishop, the heads of the university, the abbots, priors, and other churchmen," "appeared there with a certain number of men." Not until nearly the middle of the seventeenth century was there issued an edict which exempted the clergy from personal service in the armies. Even now, Christendom is not without an example of union between the man-slaying and soul-saving functions. It is remarked that the Montenegrins form "the only community now in Europe governed by a military bishop;" and the Rev. W. Denton says "the priests carry arms, and 'are generally good heroes,' the first at a gathering, the leaders of their flocks in war."

To a direct participation in war exhibited by actual service in the army, must be added an indirect participation implied by administrative control of the fighting organizations. Cardinal Richelieu was director of both navy and army. Moreover, his policy "was the opening of a new era for France, an era of great and systematized warfare;" and he, "in his *Testament politique*, recalls with pride the discipline he established in the army of Italy and among the troops which besieged La Rochelle. 'They obeyed like monks under arms.'"

Now-a-days people have become unaccustomed to these connexions, and forget that they ever existed. The military duties of priests among ourselves have dwindled down to the consecration of flags, the utterances by army-chaplains of injunctions of forgiveness to men who are going to execute vengeance, joined with occasional prayers to the God of love to bless aggressions, provoked or unprovoked.

§ 632. Thus, contemplation of facts supplied by all places and times, reverses that association of ideas which the facts

immediately around us produce. Recognizing the truth that the gods of savages and partially-civilized peoples, were originally ferocious chiefs and kings whose ghosts were propitiated by carrying out their aggressive or revengeful projects; we see that their official propitiators, so far from being at first associated in doctrine and deed with the higher traits of human nature, were in both associated with the lower. Hence the naturalness of that militancy which characterizes them in early stages.

Under a more concrete form this union of the sacerdotal and belligerent characters, is shown by the fact that in the normal order of social evolution, the political head is at the same time the leader in war and the leader in worship. Evidently the implication is that these two functions, at first united, can acquire separate agencies but gradually; and that these separate agencies must long continue to show some community of character: a truth indicated by that nominal headship of the church and the army which the head of the state in many cases retains when actual headship has ceased.

That other priests besides that head priest who is also head warrior, should take active parts in war, is therefore to be expected. We need feel no surprise on finding that in various barbarous societies they share in battle—sometimes as actual soldiers, at other times as inspiring prompters, at other times as advisers divinely enlightened; while occasionally they act as war ministers.

Moreover this original relation is, as we see, not easily obliterated. The history of mediæval Europe proves undeniably that conditions which cause a great recrudescence of militancy, re-establish the primitive union of soldier and priest, notwithstanding a cult which forbids bloodshed—re-establish it just as completely as though the cult were of the most sanguinary kind. Only as war becomes less chronic, and the civilizing influences of peace begin to predominate, does the priest lose his semi-warlike character.

Lastly, let us note that the differentiation of these two functions of fighting enemies and propitiating deities, which were originally joined with headship of the State, has gone furthest in those religious organizations which are separate from the State. Unlike the ministers of the established church, who ordinarily belong to families which furnish military and naval officers, and who, though not actively militant, have their militant sympathies occasionally indicated by the votes of bishops in the House of Lords, dissenting ministers, derived from classes engaged in one or other form of industrial activity, are the least militant of religious functionaries.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CIVIL FUNCTIONS OF PRIESTS.

§ 633. OF course where the head of the State, himself regarded as god-descended, plays the part of priest in propitiating the ancestral gods, and, unlimited in his authority, carries his rule into all spheres, the union of civil functions with sacerdotal functions is complete. A good example of this condition in an early stage of social development, is furnished by the Polynesians.

"This system of civil polity, disjointed and ill adapted as it was to answer any valuable purpose, was closely interwoven with their sanguinary system of idolatry, and sanctioned by the authority of the gods. The king was not only raised to the head of this government, but he was considered as a sort of vicegerent to those supernatural powers presiding over the invisible world. Human sacrifices were offered at his inauguration ; and whenever any one, under the influence of the loss he had sustained by plunder, or other injury, spoke disrespectfully of his person and administration, not only was his life in danger, but human victims must be offered, to cleanse the land from the pollution it was supposed to have contracted."

Various extinct societies presented kindred fusions of civil with sacerdotal headships. In Assyria, where the king "was either supposed to be invested with divine attributes, or was looked upon as a type of the Supreme Deity," and where "all his acts, whether in war or peace, appear to have been connected with the national religion, and were believed to be under the special protection and superintendence of the deity ;" he, while civil head of the State, is represented

in the sculptures as the chief sacrificer to the gods. The like connexion existed in ancient Egypt, in ancient Mexico, in ancient Peru; and in Japan, until recently, it continued to exist under a nominal form if not under a real form.

Obviously this is the normal connexion in those societies which have preserved that primitive structure in which, along with a general ancestor-worship there has arisen a special worship of the founder of the conquering tribe, whose descendant is at once head propitiator of him, and inheritor of his civil headship along with his military headship.

§ 634. This union, most conspicuous where the divine nature or divine descent of the king is an article of faith, continues also where he is believed to have divine sanction only. For habitually in such cases he is either nominal head or real head of the ecclesiastical organization; and while ordinarily occupied with civil functions, assumes on great occasions sacerdotal functions.

Where the religion is indigenous, this maintenance of the connexion is naturally to be expected; but we have proof that even where the religion is an invading one, which suppresses the indigenous one, there is apt to be a re-establishment of the connexion. This is shown by the growth of the ecclesiastical organization throughout Europe. At first diffused and local, it advanced towards a centralized union of religious with civil authority. According to Bedollierre, during the fourth and fifth centuries in France, senators, governors of provinces, great proprietors, imperial officers, were elected bishops; and Guizot writes that in the fifth century, "the bishops and the priests became the principal municipal magistrates." In the codes of Theodosius and Justinian are numerous regulations which remit municipal affairs to the clergy and the bishops. The jurisdiction of a bishop in Germany, beginning with his own clergy only, came to be by usage "extended to laymen, in cases where the duties of religion, the rights or discipline of the church,

were concerned; and the execution of his decrees was confided to the care of the local courts." When, in the tenth century, by the growth of the feudal system, bishops had become "temporal barons themselves, and were liable like the merest laymen, to military service, to the *jurisdictio herilis*, and the other obligations of the dignity;" they became ministers of justice like secular barons, with the exception only that they could not pronounce or execute sentences of death. Similarly in the twelfth century in England.

"The prelates and abbots . . . were completely feudal nobles. They swore fealty for their lands to the king or other superior, received the homage of their vassals, enjoyed the same immunities, exercised the same jurisdiction, maintained the same authority as the lay lords among whom they dwelt."

To all which facts we must join the fact that with this acquisition of local civil authority by local ecclesiastics, there went the acquisition of a central civil authority, by the central ecclesiastic. The public and private actions of kings became in a measure subject to the control of the pope; so that in the thirteenth century there had taken place a "conversion of kingdoms into spiritual fiefs."

§ 635. We pass by a step, in many cases only nominal, from the civil functions of the priest as central or local ruler, to the civil function of the priest as judge only—as judge coexisting with, but separate from, the political head.

That devolution of the judicial function upon the priesthood which often takes place in early stages of social development, results from the idea that subordination to the deceased ruler who has become a god, is a higher obligation than subordination to the living ruler; and that those who, as priests, are in communication with the ghost of the deceased ruler, are channels for his commands and decisions, and are therefore the proper judges. Hence various facts which uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples

present. Of the Coast Negroes we read that "in Badagry the fetish-priests are the sole judges of the people." In ancient Yucatan "the priests of the gods were so much venerated that they were the lords who inflicted punishments and assigned rewards." Already in § 525, when speaking of judicial systems, I have referred to the judicial functions of priests among the Gauls and Scandinavians. With more ancient peoples the like relation held for the like reason. Of the Egyptians we are told that—

"Besides their religious duties, the priests fulfilled the important offices of judges [Ælian, *Hist. Var.*, lib. xiv, c. 34] and legislators, as well as counsellors of the monarch; and the laws as among many other nations of the East [the Jews, Moslems, and others], forming part of the sacred books, could only be administered by members of their order."

Unlike as was originally the relation of the priest to the ruler throughout Christendom, yet when the Christian priest came eventually to be regarded, like the priests of indigenous religions, as divinely inspired, there arose a tendency to recognize his judicial authority. In the old English period the bishop had "to assist in the administration of justice between man and man, to guard against perjury, and to superintend the administration of the ordeals." And this early participation with laymen in judicial functions afterwards became something like usurpation. Beginning as tribunals enforcing the discipline of superior priests over inferior priests, ecclesiastical courts, both here and abroad, extended their range of action to cases in which clerical and lay persons were simultaneously implicated, and eventually made the actions of laymen also, subject to their decisions. At first taking cognizance of offences distinguished as spiritual, these courts gradually extended the definition of such until in some places—

"All testamentary and matrimonial questions—all matters relating to bankers, usurers, Jews, Lombards—everything involving contracts and engagements upon oath—all cases arising out of the Crusades—the management of hospitals and other charitable institutions—all charges

of sacrilege, perjury, incontinence," &c., fell under the "arbitration of the Church."

And at the same time there had been developed a body of canon law derived from papal judgments. These encroachments of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the sphere of civil jurisdiction, led eventually to struggles for supremacy; until, in the thirteenth century, ecclesiastical jurisdiction began to be restricted, and has since become relatively small in range.

§ 636. Along with a large share in the administration of justice possessed by priests in countries where, or times when, they are supposed to be inspired with divine wisdom, or utterers of divine injunctions, priests also have in such places and times, a large share in the control of State-affairs as ministers or advisers.

In some cases the political ruler seeks their aid not because he believes they have supernatural wisdom but because they are useful controlling agents. Says Cruikshank, "many, also, among the higher and more intelligent ranks of the natives [of the Gold Coast], who have very little faith in the Fetish, [or fetish-man] acknowledge its value as an engine of civil government." The Fijian chiefs admitted "that they have little respect for the power of the priests, and use them merely to govern the people." Or, as Williams says, "a good understanding exists between the chief and the priests, and the latter take care to make the gods' utterances to agree with the wishes of the former." Probably a kindred relation exists in Abyssinia, where the king of Shoa rules his people "principally through the church."

In other and more numerous cases, however, the power of the priest (or the medicine-man, or the man uniting both characters,) as political counsellor, results from belief in his supernatural knowledge. Writing of the Marutse, Holub says that in King Sepopo's employment were "two old wizen-looking magicians or doctors, . . . who exercised almost a supreme control over state affairs." Similarly,

Boyle writes of the Dyaks that "next door to the Tuah [chief] lived the 'manang' or medicine man." And this reminds us of Huc's remark concerning the Tartar emperor, Mangou-khan, who "was given to a number of superstitious practices, and the principal soothsayer was lodged opposite his tent . . . having under his care the cars that bore the idols." So has it been where the sacerdotal character has become decided. We have seen that in Mexico "the high-priests were the oracles whom the kings consulted in all the most important affairs of the State." So was it among other ancient American peoples; as in primitive Michoacan, where the priests "had the greatest influence in secular as well as ecclesiastical affairs." In ancient Egypt it was the same. "Next to the king, the priests held the first rank, and from them were chosen his confidential and responsible advisers." And it is still so in Burmah, where, Sangermano says, "all is regulated by the opinions of the Brahmins, so that not even the king shall presume to take any step without their advice."

That this advising function in civil affairs should be joined with the sacerdotal function, in societies having cults originating from worship of dead rulers, is to be expected. We see, however, that even the priests of a conquering religion acquire in this, as in other respects, the same essential positions as the priests of an indigenous religion. The history of mediæval Europe shows how prelates became agents of civil rule; alike as ministers, as diplomatic agents, and as members of councils dealing with political affairs.

§ 637. But as with the military functions of priests so with their civil functions, social development, ever accompanied by specialization, more and more restricts them.

At the one extreme we have, in the primitive king, a complete fusion of the two sets of functions; while in the governments of advanced societies we see approach to an extreme in which priests, instead of taking prominent parts

in civil affairs, are almost excluded from them. Among ourselves, save in the occasional instances of clerical magistrates, the judicial and executive powers once largely shared in by leading ecclesiastics, have lapsed out of their hands; while that remnant of legislative power still exercised by the bishops, appears not likely to be retained much longer. At the same time this differentiation has so established itself in the general mind, that it is commonly thought improper for clergymen to take active parts in politics.

Good reason exists for associating this change, or at any rate the completion of it, with development of the industrial type. Resistance to the irresponsible rule of priests, like resistance to other irresponsible rule, is ultimately traceable to that increasing assertion of personal freedom, with accompanying right of private judgment, which industrial life fosters by habituating each citizen to maintain his own claims while respecting the claims of others. But this connexion will be made more manifest as we proceed with the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

CHURCH AND STATE.

§ 638. IN various ways it has been shown that originally Church and State are undistinguished. I do not refer only to the fact that in China and Japan the conceptions of this world and the other world have been so mingled that both worlds have had a living ruler in common. Nor am I recalling only the truth that the primitive ruler, vicegerent of his deceased ancestor, whom, as priest, he propitiates not only by sacrifices but by carrying out his dictates, thus becomes one in whose person are united government by the dead and government by the living. But I have in view the further fact that where the normal order has not been broken, the organizations for sacred rule and for secular rule remain practically blended, because the last remains in large measure the instrument of the first. Under a simple form this relation is well shown us in Mangaia, where—

“Kings were . . . ‘the mouth-pieces, or priests, of Rongo.’ As Rongo was the tutelar divinity and the source of all authority, they were invested with tremendous power—the temporal lord having to obey, like the multitude, through fear of Rongo’s anger.”

And this theocratic type of government has been fully developed in various places. Much more pronounced than among the Hebrews was it among some of the Egyptians.

“The influence of the priests at Meroë, through the belief that they spoke the commands of the Deity, is more fully shown by Strabo and Diodorus, who say it was their custom to send to the king, when it

pleased them, and order him to put an end to himself, in obedience to the will of the oracle imparted to them ; and to such a degree had they contrived to enslave the understanding of those princes by superstitious fears, that they were obeyed without opposition."

Other cases of the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual power, if less extreme than this, are still sufficiently marked.

"The Government of Bhutan, as of Tibet, and of Japan, is a theocracy, assigning the first place to the spiritual chief. That chief being by profession a recluse, the active duties are discharged ordinarily by a deputy."

But in these cases, or some of them, the supremacy of the spiritual head has practically given place to that of the temporal head: a differentiation of the two forms of rule which has arisen in Polynesia also, under kindred conditions.

Where Church and State are not so completely fused as by thus making the terrestrial ruler a mere deputy for the celestial ruler, there still continues a blending of the two where primitive beliefs survive in full strength, and where, consequently, the intercessors between gods and men continuing to be all-powerful merge civil rule in ecclesiastical rule. In Egypt for example—

"The priesthood took a prominent part in everything. . . . Nothing was beyond their jurisdiction: the king himself was subject to the laws established by them for his conduct, and even for his mode of living."

Along with religious beliefs equally intense with those in Egypt, there went in the ancient American societies a like unity of Church and State. The Peruvians exhibited a complete identity of the ecclesiastical government with the political; in Yucatan the authority of priests rivalled that of kings; and in harmony with the tradition of the ancient Mexicans that the priests headed their immigration, there was such mingling of sacerdotal with civil rule as made the two in great measure one.

That this blending of Church and State is not limited to societies in which the gods are apotheosized rulers more or

less ancient, but is found also in societies characterized by cults which are not indigenous, and that it continues as long as religious beliefs are accepted without criticism, we are shown by the history of mediæval Europe.

But in this case as in all cases, various causes subsequently conspire to produce differentiation and increasing separation. Co-operating efficiently though they at first do as having interests in large measure the same, yet the agencies for carrying on celestial rule and terrestrial rule eventually begin to compete for supremacy; and the competition joins with the growing unlikenesses of functions and structures in making the two organizations distinct.

§ 639. That we may understand the struggle for supremacy which eventually arises, and tends to mark off more and more the ecclesiastical structure from the political structure, we must glance at the sources of sacerdotal power.

First comes the claim of the priest, as representing the deity, to give a sanction to the authority of the civil ruler. At the present time among some of the uncivilized, as the Zulus, we find this claim recognized.

“As to the custom of a chief of a primitive stock of kings among black men, he calls to him celebrated diviners to place him in the chieftainship, that he may be really a chief.”

In ancient Egypt the king, wholly in the hands of ecclesiastics, could be crowned only after having been made one of their body. Then among the Hebrews we have the familiar case of Saul who was anointed by Samuel in God's name. Passing without further cases to the acquired power of the popes, which became such that kings, receiving their crowns from them, swore obedience; we are shown that the consecration of rulers, continuing in form down to our own day, was, when a reality, an element of priestly power.

Next may be named the supposed influence of the priest with supernatural beings. Wherever faith is unqualified, dread of the evils which his invocations may bring, or trust

in his ability to obtain blessings, gives him immense advantages. Even where each man could offer sacrifices, yet the professional priests profited by their supposed special knowledge. Instance the case of Rome, where their power was thus enhanced.

“Every suppliant and inquirer addressed himself directly to the divinity—the community of course by the king as its mouthpiece, just as the *curia* by the *curio*, and the *equites* by their colonels. . . . But . . . the god had his own way of speaking. . . . One who did rightly understand it knew not only how to ascertain, but also how to manage, the will of the god, and even in case of need to overreach or to constrain him. It was natural, therefore, that the worshipper of the god should regularly consult such men of skill and listen to their advice.”

Of course where propitiation of a deity could be made only by sacerdotal agency—where, as among the Chibchas, “no sacrifice or offering, public or private, could be made but by the hands of the priest”—the ecclesiastical organization gained great strength.

To the influence possessed by priests as intercessors, may be added some allied influences similarly rooted in the accepted superstitions. One is the assumed power to grant or refuse forgiveness of sins. Then there is the supposed need for a passport to the other world; as shown us by usages in ancient Mexico, in Japan, and in Russia. Once more there is the dreaded excommunication, which, under the Christian system, as under the system of the druids, was visited especially on those who disregarded ecclesiastical authority.

To powers which priests acquire from their supposed relations with the gods, must be added powers of other kinds. In early societies they form the cultured class. Even the medicine-man of the savage is usually one who has some information not possessed by those around; and the developed priesthoods of established nations, as of the Egyptians and the Chaldeans, show us how knowledge of surrounding phenomena, accumulated and transmitted, enabling them to predict astronomical occurrences and do

other astonishing things, greatly exalts them in the eyes of the uninitiated. With the further influence thus gained must be joined that gained by acquaintance with the art of writing. Beyond the wonder excited among the common people by the ability to convey ideas in hieroglyphics, ideographs, etc., there is the immense aid to co-operation throughout the ecclesiastical hierarchy which an exclusive means of communicating intelligence gives; and the history of mediæval Europe shows how power to read and write, possessed by priests but rarely by others, made their assistance indispensable in various civil transactions and secured great advantages to the Church. Nor must we forget the kindred enhancements of influence arising from the positions of prelates as the teachers of civil rulers. In mediæval Europe, bishops "were the usual preceptors of the princes;" and in Mandalay at the present time, the highest church dignitary, who stands next to the king in authority, "is generally made patriarch from having been the King's instructor during youth."

Lastly may be named the power resulting from accumulation of property. Beginning with payments to exorcisers and diviners among savages, progressing to fees in kind to sacrificing priests, and growing by-and-by into gifts made to temples and bribes to their officials, wealth everywhere tends to flow to the ecclesiastical organization. Speaking of ancient Mexico, Zurita says that "besides many towns, a great number of excellent estates were set apart for the maintenance of public worship." Among the Peruvians the share of the annual produce reserved for religious services was "from a third to a fourth." In ancient Egypt "the priests lived in abundance and luxury. The portion of the soil allotted to them, the largest in the threefold division, was [at one period] subject to no taxes." So again in Rome.

"The public service of the gods became not only more tedious, but above all more and more costly. . . . The custom of instituting endowments, and generally of undertaking permanent pecuniary

obligations, for religious objects prevailed among the Romans in a manner similar to its prevalence in Roman Catholic countries at the present day."

And the analogy thus drawn introduces the familiar case of Europe during the middle ages; in which, besides offerings, tithes, etc., the Church had at one time acquired a third of the landed property.

§ 640. Holding in its hands powers, natural and supernatural, thus great and varied, an ecclesiastical organization seems likely to be irresistible, and in sundry places and times has proved irresistible. Where the original blending of Church with State has given place to that vague distinction inevitably resulting from partial specialization of functions accompanying social evolution, there are certain to arise differences of aim between the two; and a consequent question whether the living ruler, with his organization of civil and military subordinates, shall or shall not yield to the organization of those who represent dead rulers and profess to utter their commands. And if, throughout the society, faith is unqualified and terror of the supernatural extreme, the temporal power becomes subject to the spiritual power.

We may trace back this struggle to early stages. Respecting weather-doctors among the Zulus, and the popular valuation of them as compared with chiefs, we read:—

"The hail then has its doctors in all places; and though there is a chief in a certain nation, the people do not say, 'We have corn to eat through the power of the chief;' but they say, 'We have corn to eat through the son of So-and-so; for when the sky rolls cloud upon cloud, and we do not know that it will go back to another place, he can work diligently and do all that is necessary, and we have no more any fear.'"

To which it should be added that the chief among the Zulus, habitually jealous of the medicine-man, in some cases puts him to death. In another form, an example of the conflict comes to us from Samoa. At a council of war which the Samoans held to concert measures of vengeance on the Ton-

gans, the high priest, "a bold, violent, unscrupulous man, who combined in his own person the threefold office of warrior, prophet, and priest," urged that the Tongan prisoners should be put to immediate death. The king opposed this proposal, and hence originated a feud between the priest and the king, which resulted in a civil war, the overthrow and exile of the king, and usurpation of his place by the priest. Though this contest between a merciful king and a merciless priest does not in all respects parallel that between Saul and Samuel, since Samuel, instead of usurping the kingship himself, merely anointed David; yet the two equally illustrate the struggle for authority which arises between the political head and the supposed mouthpiece of divine commands. Similarly among the Greeks. Curtius, speaking of the time when the *Iliad* took form, says:—

"The priests, especially the soothsayers, also oppose themselves to the royal power; themselves constituting another authority by the grace of God, which is proportionately more obstinate and dangerous."

And we find traces of resistance to civil power among the Romans.

"The priests even in times of grave embarrassment claimed the right of exemption from public burdens, and only after very troublesome controversy submitted to make payment of the taxes in arrear."

In various ways among various peoples this conflict is shown. Of the Japanese priests in the sixteenth century, Dickson writes:—

"By their wealth, and from among their vassals, they were able to keep up a respectable army; and not by their vassals alone—the priests themselves filled the ranks."

Among the Nahuan nations of ancient America, the priests "possessed great power, secular as well as sacerdotal. Yopaa, one of their principal cities, was ruled absolutely by a pontiff, in whom the Zapotec monarchs had a powerful rival." And the relation between spiritual and temporal rulers here indicated, recalling that between spiritual and temporal rulers in Christendom, reminds us of the long fights for supremacy which Europe witnessed between political heads

wielding natural forces and the ecclesiastical head claiming supernatural origin and authority.

§ 641. There are reasons for thinking that the change from an original predominance of the spiritual power over the temporal power to ultimate subjugation of it, is mainly due to that cause which we have found in other cases chiefly operative in determining the higher types of social organization—the development of industrialism.

Already in § 618 we have noted that while their extreme servility of nature made the peoples of ancient America yield unresistingly to an unqualified political despotism appropriate to the militant type of society, it also made them submit humbly to the enormously developed priest-hoods of their bloody deities; and we have seen that kindred connexions of traits were shown by various races of the old world in past times. The contrast with other ancient peoples presented by the Greeks, who, as before pointed out, (§§ 484-5, 498) were enabled by favouring conditions to resist consolidation under a despot, at the same time that, especially in Athens, industrialism and its arrangements made considerable progress among them, must here be joined with the fact that there did not arise among the Greeks a priestly hierarchy. And the connexion thus exemplified in classic times between the relatively free institutions proper to industrialism, and a smaller development of the sacerdotal organization, is illustrated throughout European history, alike in place and in time.

The common cause for these simultaneous changes is, as above implied, the modification of nature caused by substitution of a life carried on under voluntary co-operation for a life carried on under compulsory co-operation—the transition from a social state in which obedience to authority is the supreme virtue, to a social state in which it is a virtue to resist authority when it transgresses prescribed limits. This modification of nature proceeds from that daily habit of

insisting on self-claims while respecting the claims of others, which the system of contract involves. The attitude of mind fostered by this discipline does not favour unqualified submission, either to the political head and his laws or to the ecclesiastical head and his dogmas. While it tends ever to limit the coercive action of the civil ruler, it tends ever to challenge the authority of the priest; and the questioning habit having once commenced, sacerdotal inspiration comes to be doubted, and the power flowing from belief in it begins to wane.

With this moral change has to be joined an intellectual change, also indirectly resulting from development of industrial life. That spreading knowledge of natural causation which conflicts with, and gradually weakens, belief in supernatural causation, is consequent on development of the industrial arts. This gives men wider experiences of uniformities of relation among phenomena; and makes possible the progress of science. Doubtless in early stages, that knowledge of Nature which is at variance with the teachings of priests, is accumulated exclusively by priests; but, as we see in the Chaldean astronomy, the natural order is not at first considered inconsistent with supernatural agency; and then, knowledge of the natural order, so long as it is exclusively possessed by priests, cannot be used to disprove their pretensions. Only as fast as knowledge of the natural order becomes so familiar and so generally diffused as insensibly to change men's habits of thought, is sacerdotal authority and power diminished by it; and general diffusion of such knowledge is, as we see, a concomitant of industrialism.

CHAPTER XIII.

NONCONFORMITY.

§ 642. NOTHING like that which we now call Nonconformity can be traced in societies of simple types. Devoid of the knowledge and the mental tendencies which lead to criticism and scepticism, the savage passively accepts whatever his seniors assert. Custom in the form of established belief, as well as in the form of established usage, is sacred with him: dissent from it is unheard of. And throughout long early stages of social evolution there continues, among results of this trait, the adhesion to inherited religions. It is true that during these stages numerous cults co-exist side by side; but, products as these are of the prevailing ancestor-worship, the resulting polytheism does not show us what we now understand as Nonconformity; since the devotees at the various shrines neither deny one another's gods, nor call in question in pronounced ways the current ideas concerning them. Only in cases like that of Socrates, who enunciated a conception of supernatural agents diverging widely from the popular conception of them, do we see in early societies Nonconformity properly so-called.

What we have here to deal with under this name occurs chiefly in societies which are substantially, if not literally, monotheistic; and in which there exists nominally, if not really, a tolerably uniform creed administered by a consolidated hierarchy.

Even as thus restricted, Nonconformity comprehends phenomena widely unlike in their natures; and that we

may understand it, we must exclude much that is allied with it only by outward form and circumstance. Though in most cases a separating sect espouses some unauthorized version of the accepted creed; and though the nature of the espoused version is occasionally not without its significance; yet the thing specially to be noted is the attitude assumed towards ecclesiastical government. Though there is always some exercise of individual judgment; yet in early stages this is shown merely in the choice of one authority as superior to another. Only in late stages does there come an exercise of individual judgment which goes to the extent of denying ecclesiastical authority in general.

The growth of this later attitude we shall see on comparing some of the successive stages.

§ 643. Ancient forms of dissent habitually stand for the authority of the past over the present; and since tradition usually brings from more barbarous ages, accounts of more barbarous modes of propitiation, ancient forms of dissent are habitually revivals of practices more ascetic than those of the current religion. It was shown in § 620, that the primitive monachism originated in this way; and as Christianity, with the higher moral precepts on which it insisted, joined renunciation of ordinary life and its aims (said to be derived from the Essenes), there tended to be thereafter a continual re-genesis of dissenting sects characterized in common by austerities.

Kinds of dissent differing from these and differing from modern kinds of dissent, arose during those times in which the early church was spreading and becoming organized. For before ecclesiastical government had established itself and acquired sacredness, resistance to each new encroachment made by it, naturally led to divisions. Between the time when the authority dwelt in the Christian congregations themselves, and the time when the authority was centred in the pope, there necessarily went successive usurpations of

authority, each of which gave occasion for protest. Hence such sects, arising in the third century and onward to the seventh century, as the Noetians, Novatians, Meletians, Aerians, Donatists, Jeannites, Haesitantes, Timotheans, and Athingani.

Passing over that period during which ecclesiastical power throughout Europe was rising to its climax, we come, in the twelfth century, to dissenters of more advanced types; who, with or without differences of doctrine, rebelled against the then-existing church government. Such sects as the Arnoldists in Italy, the Petrobrusians, Caputiati and Waldenses in France, and afterwards the Stedingers in Germany and the Apostolicals in Italy, are examples; severally characterized by assertion of individual freedom, alike in judgment and action. Ordinarily holding doctrines called heretical, the promulgation of which was itself a tacit denial of ecclesiastical authority (though a denial habitually based on submission to an alleged higher authority) sects of this kind went on increasing in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There were the Lollards in England; the Fraticelli in Italy; the Taborites, Bohemian Brethren, Moravians and Hussites, in Bohemia: all setting themselves against church-discipline. And then the rebellious movement of the reformation, as carried forward by the Lutherans in Germany, the Zwinglians and Calvinists in Switzerland, the Huguenots in France, the Anabaptists and Presbyterians in England, exhibited, along with repudiation of various established doctrines, ceremonies, and usages, a more pronounced anti-sacerdotalism. Characterized in common by opposition to Episcopacy, protestant or catholic, we see first of all in the government by presbyters, adopted by sundry of these dissenting bodies, a step towards freedom of judgment and practice in religious matters, accompanied by denial of priestly inspiration. And then in the subsequent rise of the Independents, taking for their distinctive principle the right of each congregation to govern itself, we see a further advance in that

anti-sacerdotal movement which reached its extreme in the next century with the Quakers; who, going directly to the fountain head of the creed, and carrying out more consistently than usual the professed right of private judgment, repudiated the entire paraphernalia of ecclesiasticism.

It is true that the histories of these various non-conforming bodies, not excluding even the Society of Friends, show us the re-growth of a coercive rule, allied to that against which there had been rebellion. Of religious revolutions as of political revolutions, it is true that in the absence of differences of character and culture greater than can be expected in the same society at the same time, they are followed by gradually established forms of rule only in some degree better than those diverged from. In his assumption of infallibility, and his measures for enforcing conformity, Calvin was a pope comparable with any who issued bulls from the Vatican. The discipline of the Scottish Presbyterians was as despotic, as rigorous, and as relentless, as any which Catholicism had enforced. The Puritans of New England were as positive in their dogmas, and as severe in their persecutions, as were the ecclesiastics of the church they left behind. Some of these dissenting bodies, indeed, as the Wesleyans, have developed organizations scarcely less priestly, and in some respects more coercive, than the organization of the church from which they diverged. Even among the Quakers, notwithstanding the pronounced individuality implied by their theory, there has grown up a definite creed and a body exercising control.

§ 644. Modern Nonconformity in England has much more decidedly exhibited the essential trait of anti-sacerdotalism. It has done this in various minor ways as well as in a major way.

There is the multiplication of sects, with which by foreign observers England is reproached, but which, philosophically considered, is one of her superior traits. For the rise of every

new sect, implying a re-assertion of the right of private judgment, is a collateral result of the nature which makes free institutions possible.

Still more significant do we see this multiplication of sects to be if we consider the assigned causes of division. Take for instance the case of the Wesleyans. In 1797 the Methodist New Connexion organized itself on the principle of lay participation in church government. In 1810 the Primitive Methodists left the original body: the cause being a desire to have "lay representatives to the Conference." Again, in 1834, prompted by opposition to priestly power, the Wesleyan Methodist Association was formed: its members claiming more influence for the laity, and resisting central interference with local government. And then in 1849, there was yet another secession from the Methodist body, similarly characterized by resistance to ministerial authority.

Of course in sects less coercively governed, there have been fewer occasions for rebellions against priestly control; but there are not wanting illustrations, some of them supplied even by the small and free bodies of the Unitarians, of this tendency to divide in pursuance of the right of private judgment. Moreover, in the absence of a dissidence sufficiently great to produce secession, there is everywhere a large amount of expressed disagreement on minor points, among those holding what is supposed to be the same body of beliefs. Perhaps the most curious instance of this is furnished by the established Church. I do not refer simply to its divisions into high, and low, and broad; all implying more or less of the nonconforming spirit within it. I refer more especially to the strange anomaly that the ritualists are men who, while asserting priestly authority, are themselves rebels against priestly authority—defy their ecclesiastical superiors in their determination to assert ecclesiastical supremacy.

But the universally admitted claim to religious freedom shown in these various ways, is shown still more by the growing movement for disestablishment of the Church. This

movement which, besides tacitly denying all sacerdotal authority, denies the power of a government, even though elected by a majority of votes, to prescribe religious belief or practice, is the logical outcome of the Protestant theory. Liberty of thought, long asserted and more and more displayed, is about to be carried to the extent that no man shall be constrained to support another man's creed.

Evidently the arrival at this state completes that social differentiation which began when the primitive chief first deputed his priestly function.

§ 645. As implied in the last sentence, the changes above sketched out are concomitants of the changes sketched out in the last chapter. The prolonged conflict between Church and State accompanying their differentiation, and ending in the subordination of the Church, has been accompanied by these collateral minor conflicts between the Church and recalcitrant portions of its members, ending in separation of them.

There is a further implication. In common with the subjection of the Church to the State, the spread of Nonconformity is an indirect result of growing industrialism. The moral nature proper to a social organization based on contract instead of *status*—the moral nature fostered by a social life carried on under voluntary co-operation instead of compulsory co-operation, is one which works out religious independence as it works out political freedom. And this conclusion, manifest *a priori*, is verified *a posteriori* in sundry ways. We see that Nonconformity, increasing as industrialism has developed, now characterizes in the greatest degree those nations which are most characterized by development of the industrial type—America and England. And we also see that in England itself, the contrast between urban and rural populations, as well as the contrast between populations in different parts of the kingdom, show that where the industrial type of life and organization predominates, Nonconformity is the most pronounced.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE MORAL INFLUENCES OF PRIESTHOODS.

§ 646. As was said when treating of "The Military Functions of Priests," there exists in most minds an erroneous association between religious ministrations and moral teachings. Though priests habitually enforce conduct which in one way or other furthers preservation of the society; yet preservation of the society is so often furthered by conduct entirely unlike that which we now call moral, that priestly influence serves in many cases rather to degrade than to elevate.

Reading as we do of the Tahitian god Oro, that when war "proceeded in its bloodiest forms, it was supposed to afford him the highest satisfaction"—reading again of the Mexican king Montezuma, that he avoided subduing the neighbouring Tlascalans "that he might have Men to sacrifice" (thus making Tlascala a preserve of victims for the gods)—reading once more of the Chibchas that "the sacrifices which they believed to be most welcome to their gods were those of human blood;" we are reminded that priests who carry on propitiations of cannibal deities and deities otherwise atrocious (deities almost everywhere worshipped in early days) have done anything but foster high forms of conduct. Robbery as well as murder has had, and has still in some places, a religious sanctification. Says Burton of the Beloochis, "these pious thieves never rob, save in the name of Allah." Of a robber-tribe

among the Chibchas, Piedrahita writes, "they regard as the most acceptable sacrifice that which they offer up out of the robbery to certain idols of gold, clay, and wood, whom they worship." And at the present time in India, we have freebooters like the Domras, among whom "a successful theft is always celebrated by a sacrifice" to their chief god Gandak. Nor is it only by encouraging disregard for life and property, that various cults, and by implication their priests, have aided in demoralizing men rather than in moralizing them. On finding that "among the Friendly Islanders the chief priest was considered too holy to be married, but he had the right to take as many concubines as he pleased"—that among the Caribs, "the bride was obliged to pass the first night with the priest, as a form essentially necessary to constitute the legality of the marriage"—that among some Brazilian tribes, "the Pajé [priest], like the feudal lord of former times in some parts of England, enjoys the *jus primæ noctis*;" or again on being reminded of the extent to which prostitution in temples was a religious observance among Eastern peoples; we are shown in yet another way that there is no necessary connexion between priestly guidance and right action: using the word right in the sense at present given to it.

But now carrying with us the implied qualifications, let us ask in what ways Ecclesiastical Institutions have affected men's natures. We shall find that they have been instrumental in producing, or furthering, certain all-important modifications.

§ 647. When describing the action of "An Ecclesiastical System as a Social Bond," it was pointed out that a common worship tends to unify the various groups which carry it on; and that, by implication, the priests of such worship usually act as pacificators. While often instigating wars with societies of other blood, worshipping other gods, they, on the average of cases, check hostilities between groups

of the same blood worshipping the same gods. In this way they aid social co-operation and development.

This function, however, is but a collateral display of their fundamental function—the maintenance of subordination: primarily to the deified progenitor, or the adopted god, and secondarily to his living descendant or appointed vicerent. It is scarcely possible to emphasize enough the truth that, from the earliest stages down to existing stages, the one uniform and essential action of priesthoods, irrespective of time, place, or creed, has been that of insisting on obedience. That primitive men may be moulded into fitness for social life, they must be held together; and that they may be held together, they must be made subject to authority. Only by restraints of the most powerful kinds can the unregulated explosive savage be made to co-operate permanently with his fellows; and of such restraints the strongest, and apparently the indispensable one, is fear of vengeance from the god of the tribe, if his commands, repeated by his successor, are disobeyed. How important is the agency of Ecclesiastical Institutions as thus re-inforcing Political Institutions, is well seen in the following description Ellis gives of the effects produced by undermining local religions in Polynesia.

“The sacrificing of human victims to the idols had been one of the most powerful engines in the hands of the government, the requisition for them being always made by the ruler, to whom the priests applied when the gods required them. The king, therefore, sent his herald to the petty chieftain, who selected the victims. An individual who had shewn any marked disaffection towards the government, or incurred the displeasure of the king and chiefs, was usually chosen. The people knew this, and therefore rendered the most unhesitating obedience. Since the subversion of idolatry, this motive has ceased to operate; and many, free from the restraint it had imposed, seemed to refuse all lawful obedience and rightful support.”

The result, as described by Ellis, being that social order was in a considerable degree disturbed.

This maintenance of subordination, to which an ecclesiastical system has been instrumental, has indirectly subserved other disciplines of an indispensable kind. No

developed social life would have been possible in the absence of the capacity for continuous labour; and out of the idle improvident savage there could not have been evolved the industrious citizen, without a long-continued and rigorous coercion. The religious sanction habitually given in early societies to rigid class-distinctions and the concomitant slavery, must be regarded as having conduced to a modification of nature which furthered civilization.

A discipline allied and yet different, to which superior as well as inferior classes have been subjected by Ecclesiastical Institutions, has been the discipline of asceticism. Considered in the abstract asceticism is indefensible. As already shown (§§ 140 and 620) it grew out of the desire to propitiate malicious ghosts and diabolical deities; and even as displayed among ourselves at present, we may trace in it the latent belief that God is pleased by voluntarily-borne mortifications and displeased by pursuit of gratifications. But if instead of regarding self-infliction of suffering, bodily or mental, from the stand-point of absolute ethics, we regard it from the stand-point of relative ethics, as an educational regimen, we shall see that it has had a use, and perhaps a great use. The common trait of all ascetic acts is submission to a pain to avoid some future greater pain, or relinquishment of a pleasure to obtain some greater pleasure hereafter. In either case there is sacrifice of the immediate to the remote. This is a sacrifice which the uncivilized man cannot make; which the inferior among the civilized can make only to a small extent; and which only the better among the civilized can make in due degree. Hence we may infer that the discipline which, beginning with the surrendering of food, clothing, etc., to the ancestral ghost, and growing into the voluntary bearing of hunger, cold, or pain, to propitiate deities, has greatly aided in developing the ability to postpone present to future. Possibly only a motive so powerful as that of terror of the supernatural, could have strengthened the habit of self-

denial in the requisite degree—a habit which, we must remember, is an essential factor in right conduct towards others, as well as in the proper regulation of conduct for self-benefit.

Irrespective, then, of the particular traits of their cults, Ecclesiastical Institutions have, in these ways, played an important part in moulding human nature into fitness for the social state.

§ 648. Among more special moral effects wrought by them, may be named one which, like those just specified, has been wrought incidentally rather than intentionally. I refer to the respect for rights of property, curiously fostered by certain forms of propitiation. Whether or not Mariner was right in saying that the word *taboo*, as used in the Tonga Islands, literally meant “sacred or consecrated to a god,” the fact is that things tabooed, there and elsewhere, were at first things thus consecrated: the result being that disregard of the taboo became robbery of the god. Hence such facts as that throughout Polynesia, “the prohibitions and requisitions of the tabu were strictly enforced, and every breach of them punished with death” (the delinquent being sacrificed to the god whose tabu he had broken); and that in New Zealand “violators of the tapu were punished by the gods and also by men. The former sent sickness and death; the latter inflicted death, loss of property, and expulsion from society. It was a dread of the gods, more than of men, which upheld the tapu.”

Obviously a sacredness thus given to anything bearing a sign that it belongs to a god, may easily be simulated. Though the mark on an animal or a fruit implies that an offering to a god will eventually be made of it; yet, since the time of sacrifice is unspecified, there results the possibility of indefinite postponement, and this gradually opens the door to pretended dedication of things which never are sacrificed—things which nevertheless, bearing the sign of dedication,

no one dares meddle with. Thus we read that in the New Hebrides "the tapu is employed in all the islands to preserve persons and objects;" that in New Zealand, tapu, from being originally a thing made sacred, has come to mean a thing forbidden. Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa furnish kindred facts: the last place being one in which the name of the tabu indicates the sort of curse which the owner of a tabued thing hopes may fall on the thief. In Timor, "a few palm leaves stuck outside a garden as a sign of the 'pomali' [tabu] will preserve its produce from thieves as effectually as the threatening notice of man-traps, spring guns, or a savage dog, would do with us." Bastian tells us that the Congoese make use of the fetich to protect their houses from thieves; and he makes a like statement respecting the negroes of the Gaboon. Livingstone, too, describes the Balonda as having this usage; and evidence of kindred nature is furnished by the Malagasy and by the Santals.

As, originally, this dedication of anything to a god is made either by a priest or by a chief in his priestly capacity, we must class it as an Ecclesiastical Institution; and the fostering of respect for proprietary rights which grows out of it, must be counted among the beneficial disciplines which Ecclesiastical Institutions give.

§ 649. Respecting the relation which exists between alleged supernatural commands and the right ruling of conduct at large, it is difficult to generalize. Many facts given in foregoing chapters unite to show that everything depends on the supposed character of the supernatural being to be propitiated. Schoolcraft says of the Dakotahs—

"They stand in great awe of the spirits of the dead, because they think it is in the power of the departed spirits to injure them in any way they please; this superstition has, in some measure, a salutary effect. It operates on them just as strong as our laws of hanging for murder."

But if, as happens in many cases, a dying man's peremptory injunction to his son (like that of David to Solomon) is to

wreak vengeance on those who have injured him, fear of his ghost becomes not a moralizing but a demoralizing influence ; using these words in their modern acceptations. When, concerning the deities of Mangaia, we read that "the cruel Kereteki, twice a fratricide, and his brother Utāhea, were worshipped as gods in the next generation ;" we are shown that divine example, if not precept, is in some cases a prompter to crime rather than otherwise. But on the average an opposite effect may be inferred. As the deified chief must be supposed to have had at heart the survival and spread of his tribe, sundry of his injunctions are likely to have had in view that maintenance of order conducing to tribal success. Hence rules traditionally derived from him are likely to be restraints on internal aggressions. Ferocious as were the Mexicans, and bloody as were their religious rites, they nevertheless had, as given by Zurita, a moral code which did not suffer by comparison with that of Christians: the one like the other claiming divine authority. Concerning the Peruvians, who like various of these semi-civilized American peoples had confessors, the account runs that—

"The sin of which they mostly accuse themselves was—to have killed somebody in time of peace, to have robbed, to have taken the wife of another, to have given herbs or charms to do harm. The most notable sin was neglect in the service of the huacas [gods] . . . abuse of, and disobedience towards, the Ynca."

And in this case, as in many other cases, we see that after the first and greatest sin of insubordination to the deity, come sins constituted by breaches of those laws of conduct needful for social concord.

Evidently through long stages of individual and social evolution, belief in the alleged divine origin of such laws is beneficial. The expected supernatural punishments for breaches of them, usefully re-inforce the threats of natural punishments. And various cases might be given showing that the moral code required for each higher stage, gaining alleged divine authority through some intermediating priest or inspired man, thus becomes more effective for the time

being than it would otherwise be: the cases of Moses and of the later Hebrew prophets serving as examples.

§ 650. Multitudinous anomalies occur, however—anomalies which seem unaccountable till we recognize the truth that in all cases the one thing which precedes in importance the special injunctions of a cult, is the preservation of the cult itself and the institutions embodying it. Hence the fact that everywhere the duty which stands higher than duties properly called moral, is the duty of obedience to an alleged divine will, whatever it may be. Hence the fact that to uphold the authority of a sacerdotal hierarchy, by which the divine will is supposed to be uttered, is regarded by its members and adherents as an end yielding in importance only to recognition of the divine will itself. And hence the fact that the histories of Ecclesiastical Institutions show us how small is the regard paid to moral precepts when they stand in the way of ecclesiastical supremacy.

Of course the atrocities perpetrated in inquisitions and the crimes committed by popes will come into all minds as illustrations. But there are more remarkable illustrations even than these. The bitterest animosity shown by established churches against dissenting sects, has been shown against those which were distinguished by endeavours to fulfil the precepts of Christianity completely. The Waldenses, who “adopted, as the model of their moral discipline, the Sermon of Christ on the Mount,” but who at the same time rebelled against ecclesiastical rule, suffered a bloody persecution for three centuries. The Quakers, who alone among protestants sought to obey the commands of the Christian creed not in some ways only but in all, were so persecuted that before the accession of James II. more than 1500 out of their comparatively small number were in prison. Evidently, then, the distinctive ethics of a creed, restrain but little its official administrators when their authority is called in question.

Not only in such cases, however, are we shown that the

chief concern of a sacerdotal system is to maintain formal subordination to a deity, as well as to itself as his agency, and that the ordering of life according to the precepts of the professed religion is quite a secondary matter; but we are shown that such a right ordering of life is little insisted on even where insistence does not conflict with ecclesiastical supremacy. Through all these centuries Christian priests have so little emphasized the virtue of forgiveness, that alike in wars and in duels, revenge has continued to be thought an imperative duty. The clergy were not the men who urged the abolition of slavery, nor the men who condemned regulations which raised the price of bread to maintain rents. Ministers of religion do not as a body denounce the unjust aggressions we continually commit on weak societies; nor do they make their voices loudly heard in reprobating such atrocities as those of the labour-traffic in the Pacific, recently disclosed by a Royal Commission (see *Times*, June 18th, 1885). Even where they are solely in charge, we see not a higher, but rather a lower, standard of justice and mercy than in the community at large. Under clerical management, public schools have in past times been the scenes of atrocities unheard of in schools under lay management; and if we ask for a recent instance of juvenile savagery, we find it at King's College School, where the death of a small boy was caused by the unprovoked blows given in sheer brutality by cowardly bigger boys: King's College being an institution established by churchmen, and clerically governed, in opposition to University College, which is non-clerical in its government and secular in its teaching.

§ 651. Contemplating Ecclesiastical Institutions at large. apart from the particular cults associated with them, we have, then, to recognize the fact that their presence in all societies which have made considerable progress, and their immense predominance in those early societies which reached relatively high stages of civilization, verify inductively the

deductive conclusion, that they have been indispensable components of social structures from the beginning down to the present time: groups in which they did not arise having failed to develop.

As furnishing a principle of cohesion by maintaining a common propitiation of a deceased ruler's spirit, and by implication checking the tendencies to internal warfare, priesthoods have furthered social growth and development. They have simultaneously done this in sundry other ways: by fostering that spirit of conservatism which maintains continuity in social arrangements; by forming a supplementary regulative system which co-operates with the political one; by insisting on obedience, primarily to gods and secondarily to kings; by countenancing the coercion under which has been cultivated the power of application; and by strengthening the habit of self-restraint.

Whether the modifications of nature produced by this discipline, common to all creeds, are accompanied by modifications of higher kinds, depends partly on the traditional accounts of the gods worshipped, and partly on the social conditions. Religious obedience is the primary duty; and this, in early stages, often furthers increase of ferocity. With the change from a more militant to a more industrial state, comes a reformed ethical creed, which increases or decreases in its influence according as the social activities continue peaceful or again become warlike. Little as such reformed ethical creed (presently accepted as of divine origin) operates during periods when war fosters sentiments of enmity instead of sentiments of amity, advantage is gained by having it in reserve for enunciation whenever conditions favour.

But clerical enunciation of it habitually continues subject to the apparent needs of the time. To the last as at first, subordination, religious and civil, is uniformly insisted on—"fear God, honour the king;" and providing subordination is manifested with sufficient emphasis, moral shortcomings may be forgiven.

CHAPTER XV.

ECCLESIASTICAL RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

§ 652. AMONG social phenomena, those presented by Ecclesiastical Institutions illustrate very clearly the general law of evolution.

Subjection to the family-head during his life, continues to be shown after his death by offering to his double the things he liked, and doing the things he wished; and when the family multiplies into a tribe, presents to the chief, accompanied by compliments and petitions, are continued after his death in the shape of oblations, praises, and prayers to his ghost. That is to say, domestic, civil, and religious subordination have a common root; and are at first carried on in like ways by the same agencies.

Differentiation early begins, however. First some contrast arises between the private cult proper to each family, and the public cult proper to the chief's family; and the chief, as propitiator of his dead ancestor on behalf of the tribe, as well as on his own behalf, unites the functions of civil head and spiritual head. Development of the tribe, bringing increased political and military functions, obliges the chief more and more to depute, usually to a relative, his priestly function; and thus, in course of time, this acquires a separate agency.

From integration of societies effected by conquest, there results the coexistence of different cults in different parts of

the same society; and there arise also deputed priests, carrying on the more important of these cults in the different localities. Hence polytheistic priesthoods; which are made heterogeneous by the greater increase of some than of others. And eventually, in some cases, one so immensely enlarges that it almost or quite excludes the rest.

While, with the union of simple societies into compound ones, and of these again into doubly compound ones, there go on the growths of priesthoods, each priesthood, differentiating from others, also differentiates within itself. It develops into an organized whole subordinate to an arch priest, and formed of members graduated in their ranks and specialized in their functions.

At the same time that an ecclesiastical hierarchy is becoming within itself more closely integrated and clearly differentiated, it is slowly losing that community of structure and function which it originally had with other parts of the body politic. For a long time after he is distinguishable as such, the priest takes an active part, direct or indirect, in war; but where social development becomes high, what military character he had is almost or quite lost. Similarly with his civil functions. Though during early stages he exercises power as ruler, minister, counsellor, judge, he loses this power by degrees; until at length there are but traces of it left.

This development of Ecclesiastical Institutions, which, while it makes the society at large more definitely heterogeneous, shows us increase of heterogeneity within the ecclesiastical organization itself, is further complicated by successive additions of sects. These, severally growing and organizing themselves, make more multiform the agencies for carrying on religious ministrations and exercising religious control.

Of course the perpetual conflicts among societies, ending now in unions and now in dislocations, here breaking up old institutions and there superposing new ones, has made the

progress of Ecclesiastical Institutions irregular. But amid all the perturbations, a course essentially of the kind above indicated may be traced.

§ 653. With structural differentiations must here be joined a functional differentiation of deep significance. Two sacerdotal duties which were at first parts of the same, have been slowly separating; and the one which was originally unobtrusive but is now conspicuous, has become in large measure independent. The original duty is the carrying on of worship; the derived duty is the insistence on rules of conduct.

Beginning as the entire series of phenomena does with propitiation of the dead parent or dead chief, and dependent as the propitiatory acts are on the desires of the ghost, which are supposed to be like those of the man when alive; worship in its primitive form, aiming to obtain the goodwill of beings in many cases atrocious, is often characterized by atrocious observances. Originally, there is no moral element in it; and hence the fact that extreme attention to religious rites characterizes the lower types, rather than the higher types, of men and of societies. Renouf remarks that "the Egyptians were among the most religious of the ancient nations. Religion in some form or other was dominant in every relation of their lives;" or, as M. Maury has it, "*l'Égyptien ne vivait en réalité que pour pratiquer son culte.*" This last statement reminds us of the ancient Peruvians. So onerous were their sacrifices to ancestors, and deities derived from ancestors, that it might truly be said of them that the living were the slaves of the dead. So, too, of the sanguinary Mexicans, whose civilization was, in a measure, founded on cannibalism, it is remarked that "of all nations which God has created, these people are the strictest observers of their religion." Associated with their early stages and arrested stages, we find the same trait in Aryan peoples.

"The Vedas represent the ancient Indo-Aryans to have been eminently religious in all their actions. According to them, every act of life had to be accompanied by one or more mantras, and no one

could rise from his bed, or wash his face, or brush his teeth, or drink a glass of water, without going through a regular system of purifications, salutations and prayers."

Similarly with the Romans. "Religion everywhere met the public life of the Roman by its festivals, and laid an equal yoke on his private life by its requisition of sacrifices, prayers, and auguries." And speaking of the existing Hindu, the Rev. M. A. Sherring says—

"He is a religious being of wonderful earnestness and persistency. His love of worship is a passion, is a frenzy, is a consuming fire. It absorbs his thoughts; it influences and sways his mind on every subject."

Everywhere we find kindred connexions; be it in the ancient Thracian who with great cruelty of character joined "ecstatic and maddening religious rites," or in the existing Mahometan with his repeated daily prayers and ablutions. Even if we compare modern Europeans with Europeans in mediæval times, when fasts were habitual and penances common, when anchorites were numerous and self-torturings frequent, when men made pilgrimages, built shrines, and counted their numerous prayers by beads, we see that with social progress has gone a marked diminution of religious observances. Evidence furnished by many peoples and times thus shows us that the propitiatory element, which is the primary element, diminishes with the advance of civilization, and becomes qualified by the growing ethical element.

This ethical element, like all other elements in the religion, is propitiatory in origin and nature. It begins with fulfilment of the wishes or commands of the dead parent, or departed chief, or traditional god. There is at first included in the ethical element no other duty than that of obedience. Display of subordination is in this, as in all other religious acts, the primary thing; and the natures of the particular commands obeyed the secondary things: their obligations being regarded not as intrinsic, but as extrinsically derived from their alleged origin. But slowly, experience establishes ethical conceptions, round which there

gather private sentiments and public opinions, giving them some independent authority. More especially when a society becomes less occupied in warlike activities, and more occupied in quietly carrying on production and distribution, do there grow clear in the general consciousness those rules of conduct which must be observed to make industrial co-operation harmonious.

For these there is eventually obtained a supernatural authority through some alleged communication of them to an inspired man; and for long periods, conformity to them is insisted on for the reason that they are God's commands. The emphasizing of moral precepts which are said to be thus derived, comes, however, to occupy a larger space in religious services. With offerings, praises, and prayers, forming the directly propitiatory part, come to be joined homilies and sermons, forming the indirectly propitiatory part: largely composed of ethical injunctions and exhortations. And the modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of an independent ethics—an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart from the previously-alleged theological foundation. Nay, more than this happens. The authority of the ethical consciousness becomes so high that theological dogmas are submitted to its judgments, and in many cases rejected because of its disapproval. Among the Greeks, Socrates exemplified the way in which a developed moral sentiment led to a denial of the accepted beliefs concerning the gods and their deeds; and in our own days we often see current religious doctrines brought to the bar of conscience, and condemned as untrue because they ascribe to a deity who claims worship, certain characters which are the reverse of worshipful. Moreover, while we see this—while we see, too, that in daily life, criticisms passed on conduct approve or condemn it as intrinsically good or bad, irrespective of alleged commands; we also see that modern preaching tends more and more to assume an ethical character.

Dogmatic theology, with its promises of rewards and threats of damnation, bears a diminishing ratio to the insistences on justice, honesty, kindness, sincerity, etc.

§ 654. Assuming, as we must, that evolution will continue along the same general lines, let us now, after this retrospect, ask—What is the prospect? Though Ecclesiastical Institutions hold less important places in higher societies than in lower societies, we must not infer that they will hereafter wholly disappear. If in times to come there remain functions to be fulfilled in any way analogous to their present functions, we must conclude that they will survive under some form or other. The first question is—Under what form?

That separation of Ecclesiastical Institutions from Political Institutions, foreshadowed in simple societies when the civil ruler begins to depute occasionally his priestly function, and which, in many ways with many modifications according to their types, societies have increasingly displayed as they have developed, may be expected to become complete. Now-a-days, indeed, apart from any such reasons as are above assigned, the completing of it, already effected in some cases, is recognized as but a question of time in other cases. All which it concerns us here to observe is that separation is the ending of a process of evolution, partially carried out in societies of the more militant type, characterized by the predominance of structures which maintain subordination, and carried out in greater degrees in societies that have become more industrial in their type, and less coercive in their regulative appliances.

The same emotional and intellectual modifications which, while causing the diminished power of State-churches, has caused the multiplication of churches independent of the State, may be expected to continue hereafter doing the like. We may look for increased numbers of religious bodies having their respective differences of belief and practice. Though along with intellectual advance there may probably

go, in the majority of sects thus arising, approximation to a unity of creed in essentials ; yet analogy suggests that shades of difference, instead of disappearing, will become more numerous. Divergences of opinion like those which, within our generation, have been taking place in the established church, may be expected to arise in all existing religious bodies, and in others hereafter formed.

Simultaneously there will probably continue, in the same direction as heretofore, changes in church government. That fostering of individuality which accompanies development of the industrial type of society, must cause increase of local independence in all religious organizations. And along with the acquirement of complete autonomy by each religious body, there is likely to be a complete loss of the sacerdotal character by any one who plays the part of minister. That relinquishment of priestly authority which has already gone far among Dissenters, will become entire.

These conclusions, however, proceed on the assumption that development of the industrial type will advance as it has advanced during recent times ; and it is quite possible, or even probable, that this condition will not be fulfilled during an epoch on which we are entering. The recrudescence of militancy, if it goes on as it has been lately going on, will bring back ideas, sentiments, and institutions appropriate to it ; involving reversal of the changes above described. Or if, instead of further progress under that system of voluntary co-operation which constitutes Industrialism properly so called, there should be carried far the system of production and distribution under State-control, constituting a new form of compulsory co-operation, and ending in a new type of coercive government, the changes above indicated, determined as they are by individuality of character, will probably be arrested and opposite changes initiated.

§ 655. Leaving structures and turning to functions, it remains to ask—What are likely to be the surviving func-

tions, supposing the evolution which has thus far gone on is not reversed? Each of the two functions above described, may be expected to continue under a changed form.

Though with the transition from dogmatic theism to agnosticism, all observances implying the thought of propitiation may be expected to lapse; yet it does not follow that there will lapse all observances tending to keep alive a consciousness of the relation in which we stand to the Unknown Cause, and tending to give expression to the sentiment accompanying that consciousness. There will remain a need for qualifying that too prosaic and material form of life which tends to result from absorption in daily work, and there will ever be a sphere for those who are able to impress their hearers with a due sense of the Mystery in which the origin and meaning of the Universe are shrouded. It may be anticipated, too, that musical expression to the sentiment accompanying this sense will not only survive but undergo further development. Already protestant cathedral music, more impersonal than any other, serves not unfitly to express feelings suggested by the thought of a transitory life, alike of the individual and of the race—a life which is but an infinitesimal product of a Power without any bounds we can find or imagine; and hereafter such music may still better express these feelings.

At the same time, that insistence on duty which has formed an increasing element in religious ministration, may be expected to assume a marked predominance and a wider range. The conduct of life, parts of which are already the subject-matters of sermons, may hereafter probably be taken as subject-matter throughout its entire range. The ideas of right and wrong, now regarded as applying only to actions of certain kinds, will be regarded as having applications coextensive with actions of every kind. All matters concerning individual and social welfare will come to be dealt with; and a chief function of one who stands in the place of a minister, will be not so much that of emphasizing

precepts already accepted, as that of developing men's judgments and sentiments in relation to those more difficult questions of conduct arising from the ever-increasing complexity of social life.

In brief, we may say that as there must ever continue our relations to the unseen and our relations to one another, it appears not improbable that there will survive certain representatives of those who in the past were occupied with observances and teachings concerning these two relations; however unlike their sacerdotal prototypes such representatives may become.

CHAPTER XVI.*

RELIGIOUS RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

§ 656. As, before describing the origin and development of Ecclesiastical Institutions, it was needful to describe the origin and development of Religion; so the probable future of Ecclesiastical Institutions could not be forecast without indicating the probable future of Religion. Unavoidably therefore, the close of the last chapter has partially forestalled the contents of this. Here, after briefly recapitulating the leading traits of religious evolution, I propose to give reasons for the conclusions just indicated respecting the ultimate form of religion.

Unlike the ordinary consciousness, the religious consciousness is concerned with that which lies beyond the sphere of sense. A brute thinks only of things which can be touched, seen, heard, tasted, etc.; and the like is true of the young child, the untaught deaf-mute, and the lowest savage. But the developing man has thoughts about existences which he regards as usually intangible, inaudible, invisible; and yet which he regards as operative upon him. What suggests this notion of agencies transcending perception? How do these ideas concerning the supernatural evolve out of ideas concerning the natural? The transition cannot be sudden; and an

* With the exception of its introductory paragraph and an added sentence in its last paragraph, this Chapter stands as it did when first published in *The Nineteenth Century* for January 1884: a few verbal improvements being the only other changes.

account of the genesis of religion must begin by describing the steps through which the transition takes place.

The ghost-theory exhibits these steps quite clearly. We are shown by it that the mental differentiation of invisible and intangible beings from visible and tangible beings progresses slowly and unobtrusively. In the fact that the other-self, supposed to wander in dreams, is believed to have actually done and seen whatever was dreamed—in the fact that the other-self when going away at death, but expected presently to return, is conceived as a double equally material with the original; we see that the supernatural agent in its primitive form, diverges very little from the natural agent—is simply the original man with some added powers of going about secretly and doing good or evil. And the fact that when the double of the dead man ceases to be dreamed about by those who knew him, his non-appearance in dreams is held to imply that he is finally dead, shows that these earliest supernatural agents are conceived as having but temporary existences: the first tendencies to a permanent consciousness of the supernatural, prove abortive.

In many cases no higher degree of differentiation is reached. The ghost-population, recruited by deaths on the one side but on the other side losing its members as they cease to be recollected and dreamed about, does not increase; and no individuals included in it come to be recognized through successive generations as established supernatural powers. Thus the Unkulunkulu, or old-old one, of the Zulus, the father of the race, is regarded as finally or completely dead; and there is propitiation only of ghosts of more recent date. But where circumstances favour the continuance of sacrifices at graves, witnessed by members of each new generation who are told about the dead and transmit the tradition, there eventually arises the conception of a permanently-existing ghost or spirit. A more marked contrast in thought between supernatural beings and natural beings is thus established. There simultaneously results an

increase in the number of these supposed supernatural beings, since the aggregate of them is now continually added to; and there is a strengthening tendency to think of them as everywhere around, and as causing all unusual occurrences.

Differencies among the ascribed powers of ghosts soon arise. They naturally follow from observed differences among the powers of living individuals. Hence it results that while the propitiations of ordinary ghosts are made only by their descendants, it comes occasionally to be thought prudent to propitiate also the ghosts of the more dreaded individuals, even though they have no claims of blood. Quite early there thus begin those grades of supernatural beings which eventually become so strongly marked.

Habitual wars, which more than all other causes initiate these first differentiations, go on to initiate further and more decided ones. For with those compoundings of small societies into greater ones, and re-compounding of these into still greater, which war effects, there, of course, with the multiplying gradations of power among living men, arises the idea of multiplying gradations of power among their ghosts. Thus in course of time are formed the conceptions of the great ghosts or gods, the more numerous secondary ghosts or demi-gods, and so on downwards—a pantheon: there being still, however, no essential distinction of kind; as we see in the calling of ordinary ghosts *manes*-gods by the Romans and *elohim* by the Hebrews. Moreover, repeating as the other life in the other world does, the life in this world, in its needs, occupations, and social organization, there arises not only a differentiation of grades among supernatural beings in respect of their powers, but also in respect of their characters and kinds of activity. There come to be local gods, and gods reigning over this or that order of phenomena; there come to be good and evil spirits of various qualities; and where there has been by conquest a posing of one society upon another, each having its own system

of ghost-derived beliefs, there result: an involved combination of such beliefs, constituting a mythology.

Of course primitive ghosts being doubles like their originals in all things; and gods (when not the living members of a conquering race) being doubles of the more powerful men; it results that they are primarily conceived as no less human than other ghosts in their physical characters, their passions, and their intelligences. Like the doubles of the ordinary dead, they are supposed to consume the flesh, blood, bread, wine, given to them; at first literally, and later in a more spiritual way by consuming the essences of them. They not only appear as visible and tangible persons, but they enter into conflicts with men, are wounded, suffer pain: the sole distinction being that they have miraculous powers of healing and consequent immortality.

Here, indeed, there needs a qualification; for not only do various peoples hold that gods die a first death (as naturally happens where they are members of a conquering race, called gods because of their superiority), but, as in the case of Pan, it is supposed, even among the cultured, that there is a second and final death of a god, like that second and final death of a man supposed among existing savages. With advancing civilization the divergence of the supernatural being from the natural being becomes more decided. There is nothing to check the gradual de-materialization of the ghost and of the god; and this de-materialization is insensibly furthered in the effort to reach consistent ideas of supernatural action: the god ceases to be tangible, and later he ceases to be visible or audible.

Along with this differentiation of physical attributes from those of humanity, there goes on more slowly a differentiation of mental attributes. The god of the savage, represented as having intelligence scarcely if at all greater than that of the living man, is deluded with ease. Even the gods of the semi-civilized are deceived, make mistakes, repent of their plans; and only in course of time does there arise the conception of

unlimited vision and universal knowledge. The emotional nature simultaneously undergoes a parallel transformation. The grosser passions, originally conspicuous and carefully ministered to by devotees, gradually fade, leaving only the passions less related to corporeal satisfactions; and eventually these, too, become partially de-humanized.

Ascribed characters of deities are continually adapted and re-adapted to the needs of the social state. During the militant phase of activity, the chief god is conceived as holding insubordination the greatest crime, as implacable in anger, as merciless in punishment; and any alleged attributes of milder kinds occupy but small space in the social consciousness. But where militancy declines and the harsh despotic form of government appropriate to it is gradually qualified by the form appropriate to industrialism, the foreground of the religious consciousness is increasingly filled with those ascribed traits of the divine nature which are congruous with the ethics of peace: divine love, divine forgiveness, divine mercy, are now the characteristics enlarged upon.

To perceive clearly the effects of mental progress and changing social life, thus stated in the abstract, we must glance at them in the concrete. If, without foregone conclusions, we contemplate the traditions, records, and monuments, of the Egyptians, we see that out of their primitive ideas of gods, brute or human, there were evolved spiritualized ideas of gods, and finally of a god; until the priesthoods of later times, repudiating the earlier ideas, described them as corruptions: being swayed by the universal tendency to regard the first state as the highest—a tendency traceable down to the theories of existing theologians and mythologists. Again, if, putting aside speculations, and not asking what historical value the *Iliad* may have, we take it simply as indicating the early Greek notion of Zeus, and compare this with the notion contained in the Platonic dialogues; we see that Greek civilization had greatly modified (in the better minds, at least) the

purely anthropomorphic conception of him : the lower human attributes being dropped and the higher ones transfigured. Similarly, if we contrast the Hebrew God described in early traditions, man-like in appearance, appetites, and emotions, with the Hebrew God as characterized by the prophets, there is shown a widening range of power along with a nature increasingly remote from that of man. And on passing to the conceptions of him which are now entertained, we are made aware of an extreme transfiguration. By a convenient obliviousness, a deity who in early times is represented as hardening men's hearts so that they may commit punishable acts, and as employing a lying spirit to deceive them, comes to be mostly thought of as an embodiment of virtues transcending the highest we can imagine.

Thus, recognizing the fact that in the primitive human mind there exists neither religious idea nor religious sentiment, we find that in the course of social evolution and the evolution of intelligence accompanying it, there are generated both the ideas and sentiments which we distinguish as religious ; and that through a process of causation clearly traceable, they traverse those stages which have brought them, among civilized races, to their present forms.

§ 657. And now what may we infer will be the evolution of religious ideas and sentiments throughout the future ? On the one hand, it is irrational to suppose that the changes which have brought the religious consciousness to its present form will suddenly cease. On the other hand, it is irrational to suppose that the religious consciousness, naturally generated as we have seen, will disappear and leave an unfilled gap. Manifestly it must undergo further changes ; and however much changed it must continue to exist. What, then, are the transformations to be expected ? If we reduce the process above delineated to its lowest terms, we shall see our way to an answer.

As pointed out in *First Principles*, § 96, Evolution is

throughout its course habitually modified by that Dissolution which eventually undoes it: the changes which become manifest being usually but the differential results of opposing tendencies towards integration and disintegration. Rightly to understand the genesis and decay of religious systems, and the probable future of those now existing, we must take this truth into account. During those earlier changes by which there is created a hierarchy of gods, demi-gods, manes-gods, and spirits of various kinds and ranks, Evolution goes on with but little qualification. The consolidated mythology produced, while growing in the mass of supernatural beings composing it, assumes increased heterogeneity along with increased definiteness in the arrangement of its parts and the attributes of its members. But the antagonist Dissolution eventually gains predominance. The spreading recognition of natural causation conflicts with this mythological evolution; and insensibly weakens those of its beliefs which are most at variance with advancing knowledge. Demons and the secondary divinities presiding over divisions of Nature, become less thought of as the phenomena ascribed to them are more commonly observed to follow a constant order; and hence these minor components of the mythology slowly dissolve away. At the same time, with growing supremacy of the great god heading the hierarchy, there goes increasing ascription to him of actions which were before distributed among numerous supernatural beings: there is integration of power. While in proportion as there arises the consequent conception of an omnipotent and omnipresent deity, there is a gradual fading of his alleged human attributes: dissolution begins to affect the supreme personality in respect of ascribed form and nature.

Already, as we have seen, this process has in the more advanced societies, and especially among their higher members, gone to the extent of merging all minor supernatural powers in one supernatural power; and already this one supernatural power has, by what Mr. Fiske aptly calls de-

anthropomorphization, lost the grosser attributes of humanity. If things hereafter are to follow the same general course as heretofore, we must infer that this dropping of human attributes will continue. Let us ask what positive changes are hence to be expected.

Two factors must unite in producing them. There is the development of those higher sentiments which no longer tolerate the ascription of inferior sentiments to a divinity; and there is the intellectual development which causes dissatisfaction with the crude interpretations previously accepted. Of course in pointing out the effects of these factors, I must name some which are familiar; but it is needful to glance at them along with others.

§ 658. The cruelty of a Fijian god who, represented as devouring the souls of the dead, may be supposed to inflict torture during the process, is small compared with the cruelty of a god who condemns men to tortures which are eternal; and the ascription of this cruelty, though habitual in ecclesiastical formulas, occasionally occurring in sermons, and still sometimes pictorially illustrated, is becoming so intolerable to the better-natured, that while some theologians distinctly deny it, others quietly drop it out of their teachings. Clearly, this change cannot cease until the beliefs in hell and damnation disappear.* Disappearance of them will be aided by an increasing repugnance to injustice. The visiting on Adam's descendants through hundreds of generations, dreadful penalties for a small transgression which they did not commit; the damning of all men who do not avail themselves of an alleged mode of obtaining forgiveness, which most men have never heard of; and the effecting a reconciliation by sacrificing a son who was perfectly innocent, to satisfy the assumed necessity for a propitiatory victim; are modes of action

* To meet a possible criticism, it may be well to remark that, whatever force they have against deists (and they have very little), Butler's arguments concerning these and allied beliefs do not tell at all against agnostics.

which, ascribed to a human ruler, would call forth expressions of abhorrence; and the ascription of them to the Ultimate Cause of things, even now felt to be full of difficulties, must become impossible.

So, too, must die out the belief that a Power present in innumerable worlds throughout infinite space, and who during millions of years of the Earth's earlier existence needed no honouring by its inhabitants, should be seized with a craving for praise; and having created mankind, should be angry with them if they do not perpetually tell him how great he is. As fast as men escape from that glamour of early impressions which prevents them from thinking, they will refuse to imply a trait of character which is the reverse of worshipful.

Similarly with the logical incongruities more and more conspicuous to growing intelligence. Passing over the familiar difficulties that sundry of the implied divine traits are in contradiction with the divine attributes otherwise ascribed—that a god who repents of what he has done must be lacking either in power or in foresight; that his anger presupposes an occurrence which has been contrary to intention, and so indicates defect of means; we come to the deeper difficulty that such emotions, in common with all emotions, can exist only in a consciousness which is limited. Every emotion has its antecedent ideas, and antecedent ideas are habitually supposed to occur in God: he is represented as seeing and hearing this or the other, and as being emotionally affected thereby. That is to say, the conception of a divinity possessing these traits of character, necessarily continues anthropomorphic; not only in the sense that the emotions ascribed are like those of human beings, but also in the sense that they form parts of a consciousness which, like the human consciousness, is formed of successive states. And such a conception of the divine consciousness is irreconcilable both with the unchangeableness otherwise alleged, and with the omniscience otherwise alleged. For a consciousness constituted of ideas and feelings caused by objects and occurrences, cannot be

simultaneously occupied with all objects and all occurrences throughout the universe. To believe in a divine consciousness, men must refrain from thinking what is meant by consciousness—must stop short with verbal propositions; and propositions which they are debarred from rendering into thoughts will more and more fail to satisfy them. Of

course like difficulties present themselves when the will of God is spoken of. So long as we refrain from giving a definite meaning to the word will, we may say that it is possessed by the Cause of All Things, as readily as we may say that love of approbation is possessed by a circle; but when from the words we pass to the thoughts they stand for, we find that we can no more unite in consciousness the terms of the one proposition than we can those of the other. Whoever conceives any other will than his own, must do so in terms of his own will, which is the sole will directly known to him: all other wills being only inferred. But will, as each is conscious of it, presupposes a motive—a prompting desire of some kind. Absolute indifference excludes the conception of will. Moreover will, as implying a prompting desire, connotes some end contemplated as one to be achieved, and ceases with the achievement of it: some other will, referring to some other end, taking its place. That is to say, will, like emotion, necessarily supposes a series of states of consciousness. The conception of a divine will, derived from that of the human will, involves like it, localization in space and time. The willing of each end, excludes from consciousness for an interval the willing of other ends; and therefore is inconsistent with that omnipresent activity which simultaneously works out an infinity of ends.

It is the same with the ascription of intelligence. Not to dwell on the seriality and limitation implied as before, we may note that intelligence, as alone conceivable by us, presupposes existences independent of it and objective to it. It is carried on in terms of changes primarily wrought by alien activities—the impressions generated by things

beyond consciousness, and the ideas derived from such impressions. To speak of an intelligence which exists in the absence of all such alien activities, is to use a meaningless word. If to the corollary that the First Cause, considered as intelligent, must be continually affected by independent objective activities, it is replied that these have become such by act of creation, and were previously included in the First Cause; then the reply is that in such case the First Cause could, before this creation, have had nothing to generate in it such changes as those constituting what we call intelligence, and must therefore have been unintelligent at the time when intelligence was most called for. Hence it is clear that the intelligence ascribed, answers in no respect to that which we know by the name. It is intelligence out of which all the characters constituting it have vanished.

These and other difficulties, some of which are often discussed but never disposed of, must force men hereafter to drop the higher anthropomorphic characters given to the First Cause, as they have long since dropped the lower. The conception which has been enlarging from the beginning must go on enlarging, until, by disappearance of its limits, it becomes a consciousness which transcends the forms of distinct thought, though it for ever remains a consciousness.

§ 659. "But how can such a final consciousness of the Unknowable, thus tacitly alleged to be true, be reached by successive modifications of a conception which was utterly untrue? The ghost-theory of the savage is baseless. The material double of a dead man in which he believes, never had any existence. And if by gradual de-materialization of this double was produced the conception of the supernatural agent in general—if the conception of a deity, formed by the dropping of some human attributes and transfiguration of others, resulted from continuance of this process; is not the developed and purified conception reached by pushing the process to its limit, a fiction also? Surely if the primitive

belief was absolutely false, all derived beliefs must be absolutely false."

This objection looks fatal; and it would be fatal were its premiss valid. Unexpected as it will be to most readers, the answer here to be made is that at the outset a germ of truth was contained in the primitive conception—the truth, namely, that the power which manifests itself in consciousness is but a differently-conditioned form of the power which manifests itself beyond consciousness.

Every voluntary act yields to the primitive man, proof of a source of energy within him. Not that he thinks about his internal experiences; but in these experiences this notion lies latent. When producing motion in his limbs, and through them motion in other things, he is aware of the accompanying feeling of effort. And this sense of effort which is the perceived antecedent of changes produced by him, becomes the conceived antecedent of changes not produced by him—furnishes him with a term of thought by which to represent the genesis of these objective changes. At first this idea of muscular forces as antecedent unusual events around him, carries with it the whole assemblage of associated ideas. He thinks of the implied efforts as efforts exercised by beings like himself. In course of time these doubles of the dead, supposed to be workers of all but the most familiar changes, are modified in conception. Besides becoming less grossly material, some of them are developed into larger personalities presiding over classes of phenomena which, being comparatively regular in their order, suggest a belief in beings who, while far more powerful than men, are less variable in their modes of action. So that the idea of force as exercised by such beings, comes to be less associated with the idea of a human ghost. Further advances, by which minor supernatural agents are merged in one general agent, and by which the personality of this general agent is rendered vague while becoming widely extended, tend still further to dissociate the notion of objective force from the

force known as such in consciousness ; and the dissociation reaches its extreme in the thoughts of the man of science, who interprets in terms of force not only the visible changes of sensible bodies, but all physical changes whatever, even up to the undulations of the ethereal medium. Nevertheless, this force (be it force under that statical form by which matter resists, or under that dynamical form distinguished as energy) is to the last thought of in terms of that internal energy which he is conscious of as muscular effort. He is compelled to symbolize objective force in terms of subjective force from lack of any other symbol.

See now the implications. That internal energy which in the experiences of the primitive man was always the immediate antecedent of changes wrought by him—that energy which, when interpreting external changes, he thought of along with those attributes of a human personality connected with it in himself ; is the same energy which, freed from anthropomorphic accompaniments, is now figured as the cause of all external phenomena. The last stage reached is recognition of the truth that force as it exists beyond consciousness, cannot be like what we know as force within consciousness ; and that yet, as either is capable of generating the other, they must be different modes of the same. Consequently, the final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man, is that the Power manifested throughout the Universe distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness.

It is untrue, then, that the foregoing argument proposes to evolve a true belief from a belief which was wholly false. Contrariwise, the ultimate form of the religious consciousness, is the final development of a consciousness which at the outset contained a germ of truth obscured by multitudinous errors.

§ 660. Those who think that science is dissipating religious beliefs and sentiments, seem unaware that whatever of mystery

is taken from the old interpretation is added to the new. Or rather, we may say that transference from the one to the other is accompanied by increase; since, for an explanation which has a seeming feasibility, science substitutes an explanation which, carrying us back only a certain distance, there leaves us in presence of the avowedly inexplicable.

Under one of its aspects scientific progress is a gradual transfiguration of Nature. Where ordinary perception saw perfect simplicity it reveals great complexity; where there seemed absolute inertness it discloses intense activity; and in what appears mere vacancy it finds a marvellous play of forces. Each generation of physicists discovers in so-called "brute matter," powers which but a few years before, the most instructed physicists would have thought incredible; as instance the ability of a mere iron plate to take up the complicated aerial vibrations produced by articulate speech, which, translated into multitudinous and varied electric pulses, are re-translated a thousand miles off by another iron plate and again heard as articulate speech. When the explorer of Nature sees that quiescent as they appear, surrounding solid bodies are thus sensitive to forces which are infinitesimal in their amounts—when the spectroscope proves to him that molecules on the Earth pulsate in harmony with molecules in the stars—when there is forced on him the inference that every point in space thrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through it in all directions; the conception to which he tends is much less that of a Universe of dead matter than that of a Universe everywhere alive: alive if not in the restricted sense, still in a general sense.

This transfiguration which the inquiries of physicists continually increase, is aided by that other transfiguration resulting from metaphysical inquiries. Subjective analysis compels us to admit that our scientific interpretations of the phenomena which objects present, are expressed in terms of our own variously-combined sensations and ideas—are expressed, that is, in elements belonging to consciousness, which are but

symbols of the something beyond consciousness. Though analysis afterwards reinstates our primitive beliefs, to the extent of showing that behind every group of phenomenal manifestations there is always a *nexus*, which is the reality that remains fixed amid appearances which are variable; yet we are shown that this *nexus* of reality is for ever inaccessible to consciousness. And when, once more, we remember that the activities constituting consciousness, being rigorously bounded, cannot bring in among themselves the activities beyond the bounds, which therefore seem unconscious, though production of either by the other seems to imply that they are of the same essential nature; this necessity we are under to think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the Universe: further thought, however, obliging us to recognize the truth that a conception given in phenomenal manifestations of this ultimate energy can in no wise show us what it is.

While the beliefs to which analytic science thus leads, are such as do not destroy the object-matter of religion, but simply transfigure it, science under its concrete forms enlarges the sphere for religious sentiment. From the very beginning the progress of knowledge has been accompanied by an increasing capacity for wonder. Among savages, the lowest are the least surprised when shown remarkable products of civilized art: astonishing the traveller by their indifference. And so little of the marvellous do they perceive in the grandest phenomena of Nature, that any inquiries concerning them they regard as childish trifling. This contrast in mental attitude between the lowest human beings and the higher human beings around us, is paralleled by contrasts among the grades of these higher human beings themselves. It is not the rustic, nor the artizan, nor the trader, who sees something more than a mere matter of course in the hatching of a chick; but it is the biologist, who, pushing to the uttermost his analysis of vital phenomena, reaches his

greatest perplexity when a speck of protoplasm under the microscope shows him life in its simplest form, and makes him feel that however he formulates its processes the actual play of forces remains unimaginable. Neither in the ordinary tourist nor in the deer-stalker climbing the mountains above him, does a highland glen rouse ideas beyond those of sport or of the picturesque; but it may, and often does, in the geologist. He, observing that the glacier-rounded rock he sits on has lost by weathering but half an inch of its surface since a time far more remote than the beginnings of human civilization, and then trying to conceive the slow denudation which has cut out the whole valley, has thoughts of time and of power to which they are strangers—thoughts which, already utterly inadequate to their objects, he feels to be still more futile on noting the contorted beds of gneiss around, which tell him of a time, immeasurably more remote, when far beneath the Earth's surface they were in a half-melted state, and again tell him of a time, immensely exceeding this in remoteness, when their components were sand and mud on the shores of an ancient sea. Nor is it in the primitive peoples who supposed that the heavens rested on the mountain tops, any more than in the modern inheritors of their cosmogony who repeat that "the heavens declare the glory of God," that we find the largest conceptions of the Universe or the greatest amount of wonder excited by contemplation of it. Rather, it is in the astronomer, who sees in the Sun a mass so vast that even into one of his spots our Earth might be plunged without touching its edges; and who by every finer telescope is shown an increased multitude of such suns, many of them far larger.

Hereafter as heretofore, higher faculty and deeper insight will raise rather than lower this sentiment. At present the most powerful and most instructed mind has neither the knowledge nor the capacity required for symbolizing in thought the totality of things. Occupied with one or other division of Nature, the man of science usually does

not know enough of the other divisions even rudely to conceive the extent and complexity of their phenomena; and supposing him to have adequate knowledge of each, yet he is unable to think of them as a whole. Wider and stronger intellect may hereafter help him to form a vague consciousness of them in their totality. We may say that just as an undeveloped musical faculty, able only to appreciate a simple melody, cannot grasp the variously-entangled passages and harmonies of a symphony, which in the minds of composer and conductor are unified into involved musical effects awakening far greater feeling than is possible to the musically uncultured; so, by future more evolved intelligences, the course of things now apprehensible only in parts may be apprehensible all together, with an accompanying feeling as much beyond that of the present cultured man, as his feeling is beyond that of the savage.

And this feeling is not likely to be decreased but to be increased by that analysis of knowledge which, while forcing him to agnosticism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the Great Enigma which he knows cannot be solved. Especially must this be so when he remembers that the very notions, origin, cause and purpose, are relative notions belonging to human thought, which are probably irrelevant to the Ultimate Reality transcending human thought; and when, though suspecting that explanation is a word without meaning when applied to this Ultimate Reality, he yet feels compelled to think there must be an explanation.

But one truth must grow ever clearer—the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to which he can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed.

REFERENCES.

To find the authority for any statement in the text, the reader is to proceed as follows :—Observing the number of the section in which the statement occurs, he will first look out in the following pages, the corresponding number, which is printed in conspicuous type. Among the references succeeding this number, he will then look for the name of the tribe, people, or nation concerning which the statement is made (the names in the references standing in the same order as that which they have in the text); and that it may more readily catch the eye, each such name is printed in *Italics*. In the parenthesis following the name, will be found the volume and page of the work referred to, preceded by the first three or four letters of the author's name; and where more than one of his works have been used, the first three or four letters of the title of the one containing the particular statement. The meanings of these abbreviations, employed to save the space that would be occupied by frequent repetitions of full titles, is shown at the end of the references; where will be found arranged in alphabetical order, these initial syllables of authors' names, &c., and opposite to them the full titles of the works referred to.

i, 419-21; i, 419; i, 305, 440; Cust. ii, 142; Bell, ii, 237). § 559. *Rome* (Dur. iii, 155-60; iii, 183-7, 9; iii, 173-4; iii, 172-3; iii, 176)—*Italy* (Sis. 8-9). § 560. *Greeks* (Gro. ii, 88)—*Japan* (Mit. i, 32)—*France* (Corn. xxvii (1873) 72)—*Montenegro* (Boué, ii, 86)—*Dahomey* (For. i, 20)—*Sparta* (Thirl. i, 329)—*Merovingian* (Amp. ii, 305; Martin, ii, 448)—*Dahomey* (Bur. ii, 248)—*Japan* (M. and C., 34)—*Egypt* (Wilk. i, 189)—*Persia* (Raw. iv, 202)—*Araucanians* (Thomp. i, 406)—*Fiji* (Ersk. 464)—*Dahomey* (Dalz. 69)—*Egypt* (Brug. i, 53). § 573. *Tenae* (Dalt. 35)—*Todas* (Shortt, pt. i, 9)—*Pueblos* (Banc. i, 546)—*Karens* (Gov. Stat. p. 64; McM. 81)—*Lepchas* (Hook. i, 129-30; Camp. J.E.S.L. 1869, 150-1)—*Santals* (Hunt. i, 214; ditto Stat. xiv, 330)—*Shervaroy* (Shortt, pt. ii, 7)—*Todas* (Shortt, pt. i, 7-9; Hark. 16-17)—*Arafuras* (Kolf, 161-3)—*England* (Hall. chap. viii)—*France* (Lév. ii, 47-8)—*England* (Free. Sk. 232; Bage. Eng. Const.)—*France* (Taine's "Ancien Régime")—*England* (Mart. Intro. 21-2-3; Buck. i, 445-50; Pike, ii, 574). § 574. *Bodo and D.* (Hodg. J.A.S.B., xviii, 745)—*Lepchas* (Camp. J.E.S., July 1869)—*Santál* (Hunt. i, 209; Sher. J.A.S.B. xx, 554)—*Jakuns* (Favre in J.I.A. ii)—*Bodo and D.* (Hodg. J.A.S.B. xviii, 745)—*Neilgherry H.* (Ouch. 63)—*Lepchas* (Camp. J.E.S. (1869) 150-1)—*Arafuras* (Kolf. 161-3)—*Lepchas* (Camp. J.E.S. July 1869; Hook. i, 175-6)—*Santals* (Hunt. i, 217)—*Hos* (Dalt. 206)—*Todas* (Shortt, pt. i, 1)—*Shervaroy H.* (Shortt, ii, 78)—*Jakuns* (Favre J.I.A. ii)—*Malacca* (Jukes, 219-20)—*Bodo and D.* (Hodg. J.A.S.B. xviii, 745)—*Santál* (Hunt. i, 209-10)—*Lepchas* (Hook. i, 175-6; 129-30)—*Arafuras* (Kolf. 163-4)—*Lepchas* (Hook. i, 134)—*Santals* (Hunt. 208)—*Bodo and Dhimals* (Hodg. J.A.S.B. xviii, 707)—*Santál* (Hunt. i, 217)—*Bodo and Dhimals* (Hodg. i, 150)—*Todas* (T.E.S. vii, 254). Note to Chap. XVIII. *Bodo and Dhimals* (Hodg. "Koech," 162)—*Lepchas* (Hook. i, 135)—*Santál* (Hunt. i, 215-6; i, 181)—*Lepchas* (Camp. J.E.S. July 1869)—*Arafuras* (Kolf. 159-60). § 583. *The deaf* (Kit. 200; Sm. 4)—*Weddas* (Harts. 413)—*Dör* (Heug. 195)—*Bongo* (Schw. i, 304-5)—*Zulus* (Gard. 72)—*Latooki* (Bak. i, 247-50). § 584. *Australians* (Smy. i, 107)—*Malagasy* (Rév. 9-11)—*Japanese* (Sat. 87; 79-80)—*India* (Ly. 18)—*Greeks* (Pla. iv; Gro. iii, 187). § 585. *Zulu* (Call. 230-1)—*Andamanese* (J. A.I. xii, 162)—*Waras* (Brett, 362)—*Chinooks* (U. S. Ex. v, 118)—*Andamanese* (J.A.I. xii, 142)—*Waras* (Bern. 53)—*Urua* (Cam. ii, 110)—*Zulus* (F.S.A.J. ii, 29)—*Nicaraguans* (Banc. ii, 801)—*Ahts* (Banc. iii, 521)—*Gonds* (His. 19)—*Ukiah and Sanéls* (Banc. iii, 524)—*Zulus* (Call. 372)—*Shilook* (Schw. i, 91)—*Indians* (School. v, 403)—*Indians* (School. v, 403)—*Chibchas* (Boll. 12)—*China* (Edk. 42)—*E. English* (Kem. ii, 208-9)—*Mongols* (Prej. i, 76)—*Vera Paz* (Banc. ii, 799)—*Mosquitos* (Banc. i, 744)—*Wakhulu* (Thoms. i, 19)—*Africa* (Pinto, i, 124)—*Borneo* (Bock, 78)—*Greeks* (Mau. ii, 33-4)—*Egypt* (Klunz. 103-5)—*Gambia* (Cgilby, 369)—*Blantyre* (MacDon. i, 59-110)—*Dyaks* (St. J. i, 199)—*Nyassa* (Liv. i, 353)—*S. Leone* (Bast. "Mensch," ii, 129)—*Damaras* (Anders. 229)—*Bhils* (T.R.A.S. i, 72)—*Wahebe* (Thoms. i, 237)—*Bongo* (Schw. i, 305)—*Blantyre* (MacDon. i, 62-3)—*Poland* (Mau. ii, 463; 58)—*Apaches* (Banc. iii, 527)—*Nayarit* (Banc. iii, 529)—*Babylonians* (ref. lost)—*Ainos* (Bird, ii, 97; 98)—*Mongols* (How. i, 33)—*England* (Free. i, 768, 521)—*Borneo* (Boy. 229)—*Esquimaux* (Hayes, 199)—*Edinburgh* (Kitto, 199-200)—*Californians* (Banc. iii, 523)—*Mangaia* (ref. lost)—*Hawaii* (Cum. i, 295)—*Natches* (ref. lost)—*Egypt* (ref. lost)—*Beirât* (Jessup, 243)—*Bushmen* (F.S.A.J. ii, 42-3)—*Greece* (Gro. i, 14; Sm., W. ii, 319)—*Amandabele* (Sel. 331)—*Hindoos* (Ly. 19)—*Gauls* (Coul. i, 89; 91)—*Teutons* (Vel. Pat. c. 105)—*Norse* (Das. xviii; Mal. 153)—*Hamóa* (Mar. ii, 112). § 586. *Egypt* (Ren. 153; Rec. ii, 11; Ren. 151-2; 153; Bru. i, 70; Rec. iv, 130-1; Mas. "Rév. Sci." 819; Herod. ii, 206; Rec. vi, 144; Bru. i,

84; T.B.A.S. vii, pt. i; Mas. "Rév. Sci." 819; Stu. 94; 150-2; Rec. viii, 95, 98; Bru. i, 425, 124; Rec. iv, 58-9; Bru. i, 88; Rec. viii, 77-8; Ren. 86-7)—Note (Bru. i, 114; chap. iii). § 587. *Hindus* (Wil. 32-4)—*Assyrians* (Rec. v, 3-4; Smith, 13-14)—*Hebrews* (Chey. 33; Müll. "S. of R." 110)—*Abraham* (Ew. i, 295)—*Hebrew Pantheon* (Sup. Rel. i, 110)—*Bedouins* (Burek. i, 259 *et seq.*)—*Greeks* (Pot. i, 172)—*Egypt* (Rec. vi, 101-2)—*Peruvians* (Mol. 17)—*Greece* (Pash. i, 213-4)—*Early Romans* (Mom. i, 183)—*Sandwich I.* (Vanc. ii, 149)—*Chaldea* (Rec. vii, 133)—*America* (School. iii, 317; Brett, 401)—*Egypt* (Rec. vi, 103)—*Cent. Amer.* (Ovie. bk. xlii, ch. 2)—*Mongols* (How. i, 37)—*Peru* (Anda. 57)—*Mangaia* (Gill, 118)—*Fiji* (Wil. 185)—*Padam* (Dalt. 25)—*Greece* (Gro. iv, 82-5; 95; i, 626). § 589. *Patagonians* (Fitz. ii, 152)—*N. Americans* (Burt. 131)—*Guiana* (Dalton, i, 87)—*Mundurucús* (Bates, 225). § 590. *Zulus* (Call. 157)—*Bourriats* (Mich. 200)—*Kibokwé* (Cam. ii, 183-9)—*Namtschatkans* (Kotz. ii, 13)—*New Zealand* (Yare, 141)—*Wáralis* (J.R.A.S. vii, 20). § 591. *Uaupés* (Wall. 499)—*Great Cassan* (Ogil. 355-6). § 592. *Egypt* (Ren. 211-12)—*Assyria* (Smith, 16). § 594. *New Britain* (Pow. 197)—*Santáls* (Hun. i, 183)—*Karens* (J.A.S.B. xxxiv, 205). § 595. *Samoans* (Tur. "Samoa," 151)—*Banks Islanders* (J.A.I. x, 286)—*Blantyre Negroes* (MacDon. i, 61). § 596. *New Caledonia* (Tur. "Poly." 427)—*Madagascar* (Ell. "Mad." i, 336)—*India* (Per. 303). § 597. *Samoans* (Tur. "Pol." 239)—*Tahitians* (Ell. "Pol. Res." ii, 208)—*Madagascar* (Dru. 236)—*Ostyaks* (Pri. iii, 336)—*Gonds* (His. 19)—*Chinese* (Gutz. i, 503)—*Sabceans* (Pal. ii, 253)—*Hebrews* (Kue. i, 338-9)—*Aryans* (Maine, 85). § 598. *Egypt* (Ren. 133)—*Aryans* (Dunc. iv, 252, 264-5)—*Jews* (Zim. 495-6)—*Corea* (Ross, 322). § 599. *Japan* (Ada. i, 6)—*Rome* (Hun. "Ex." 746)—*Aryans* (Maine, 55, 78, 64, 79, 55; Hun. "Intro." 149)—*Christendom* (Maine, 79)—*India* (Maine, 56). § 600. *Egypt* (Ren. 134-5; Brug. ii, 40-1)—*Assyria* (Rec. v, 81, 8). § 601. *China* (Doo. ii, 226)—*Corea* (Ross, 335). § 602. *Asia* (Huc. ii, 55)—*Ethiopians* (Rec. vi, 73-8)—*Peruvians* (Garci. v, 8)—*New Caledonians* (Tur. "Poly." 526). § 603. *Tanna* (Tur. "Pol." 88)—*Mangra* (Gill, 293-4)—*New Zealanders* (Thom. i, 114)—*Madagascar* (Ell. "Mad." i, 359)—*Sandwich Islands* (Ell. "Pol. Res." ii, 235)—*Humphreys Island* (Tur. "Samoa," 278)—*Pueblo* (Banc. iii, 173)—*Maya* (Banc. ii, 647)—*Peru* (Pres. 11-12)—*Sium* (Thom. J. 81)—*Javanese* (Craw. iii, 15)—*China* (Med. 133)—*Japan* (ref. lost)—*Greeks* (Blac. 45; Gro. ii, 475; Mau. ii, 382-4)—*Romans* (Sec. 55)—*Scandinavians* (Das. xlv & lxii)—*Europe* (Fréd. ii, 414, v, 433). § 604. *Blantyre Negroes* (MacDon. i, 65, 64-5, 61)—*Niger* (Bur. 132)—*Samoa* (Tur. "Samoa," 18-19)—*Scandinavians* (Das. xiii)—*Greeks* (Glad. "Homer," iii, 55)—*Hebrews* (Kue. i, 338-9). § 606. *Romans* (Coul. "Cité," 233)—*Blantyre Negroes* (MacDon. i, 64)—*New Zealanders* (Ang. i, 247)—*Mexican* (Cla. i, 271)—*Peru* (Garci. bk. ii, ch. 9)—*Khonds* (Macph. 30)—*Tahiti* (Ell. "Pol. Res." ii, 208)—*Ashantee* (Dup. 168)—*Maya* (Banc. ii, 648)—*Egypt* (Bru. i, 46)—*Damaras* (And. 223)—*Dahomans* (Burt. ii, 173)—*Peru* (Mol. 25)—*Chibchas* (Sim. 247-8)—*Karens* (J.A.S.B. xxxiv, 206). § 607. *Ostyaks* (Erm. ii, 44)—*Gonds* (For. 142)—*Kukis* (J.A.S.B. xxiv, 630)—*Latooka* (Bak. ii, 4-5)—*Bechuanas* (Hol. i, 324)—*Gonds* (His. 19). § 608. *Damaras* (And. 224)—*Gonds* (His. 19)—*Santáls* (Hun. i, 200-1)—*Peruvians* (Garci. bk. ii, ch. 9). § 610. *Malagasy* (Ell. "Mad." i, 395)—*Egypt* (Bru. i, 15; Wilk. i, 173)—*Rome* (See. 93)—*Mexicans* (Cla. i, 271)—*Peru* (Ciez. 262). § 611. *Egyptians* (Gro. iii, 438)—*Peruvians* (Mol. 54-5)—*Greece* (Cur. i, 323). § 612. *Fiji* (Wil. —)—*Greece* (Cur. i, 369). § 613. *Aryans* (Müll. "San. Lit." 533)—*Peruvians* (Garci. bk. iii, ch. 8; Herr. iv, 343). § 614.

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